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CONTENTS

TWO CHARLESTONIANS IN PURSUIT OF TRUTH: THE GRIMKÉ BROTHERS

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I consider it a rare distinction to be here today in this incomparable city of natural and architectural beauty, proud history, and musical Southern speech, addressing you in what must be the recognizable tones of a Northern outlander. But as someone once remarked: "Where heads and hearts unite, there is the one true church." And you and I share in common the quest for historical truth about the men and women who gave vigor, variety, and character to Charleston.

Concerning the quest for truth, we have it from Solomon that "In the multitude of counsellors, there is safety." If Solomon was right, the South Carolina Historical Society and all who share an interest in the history of this characterful city and state should devote an attention long-merited but long-overdue to Thomas Smith Grimké and his younger brother Frederick. That these two men are not better known to American history is precisely one of those deprivations of historical truth that constitutes the shame of our humanistic scholarship. For this particular deprivation, it seems to me that Northern and Southern historians alike share the responsibility. Northern historians—who told so much of the story of the antebellum South in a stridently self-congratulatory way—and Southern historians—who told it in a proudly defensive way—both forgot about the claims of the *unorthodox* to be recognized. And to echo the words of James L. Petigru: "What hope is there for the human race when there is no minority?"

In retrospect these two Charlestonians are noble but somewhat tragic figures. By right of family distinction they could have floated on an easy tide of cultivated life. Their father, John Faucheraud Grimké, was certainly an eminent Charlestonian: the Associate Senior Judge of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, Revolutionary officer, Mayor of Charleston, member of the South Carolina Legislature, a leading advocate of ratification of the Constitution and member of the South Carolina Ratifying Convention, codifier of the laws of South Carolina, a member of the Board of Directors of the Charleston branch of the United States Bank, and Grand Master of the Masonic Lodge. Their mother, the ele-

* This is the text of the address delivered by Professor Adrienne Koch of the Department of History, University of Maryland, at the annual meeting of the South Carolina Historical Society held on Saturday, February 24, of this year.

gant and comely Mary Smith Grimké, had her own indubitable source of social strength. She was the daughter of the affluent Thomas Smith of Broad Street, and descendant of Thomas Smith, the proprietary Governor and Landgrave of South Carolina. Thus these two Grimké brothers could easily have rested content with the prominent social status of their family, behaved themselves like other civilized and comfortable Charlestonians in the early nineteenth century—and offered the mid-twentieth century historian little to remember, to consider, or admire. But they were extraordinary men, following the dynamic lead of the protestant principle. Although their manners and habits in many outward regards were "conformist," their intellectual powers and moral courage were little short of staggering.

Thomas Smith Grimké (1786-1834) was the second-born in the John and Mary Grimké household. He was the undisputed top scholar at the College of Charleston and then went on to Yale where he apparently established himself as the outstanding member of his class. He became an active and resourceful member of Phi Beta Kappa, a protégé of the President, the Reverend Timothy Dwight, the friend of several of the faculty members, and companion of the ablest students among his classmates. After Judge Grimké's death in 1819, Thomas became surrogate-father to the large Grimké family and sustained Mrs. Grimké in the worries of widowhood. Meanwhile he delighted in his own family—he had married Sally Drayton, the cherished daughter of William Drayton, and they raised a family of six sons. While he thus cheerfully bore the burdens of heading two families, he found it possible to maintain a remarkable career. At the bar, in relatively short order, Thomas Smith Grimké commanded what has been described as the most extensive practice in the state. He became a legend in his own day for the most conscientious and thorough knowledge and application of the law, and for his vast self-denying charities. Boundless charities flowed from his deeply pious Christian nature. He denied himself handsome attire, unmindful that he was the object of gibes by the more pleasure-loving Charlestonians for his habitually shabby appearance. Generous to a fault, it was only after his death that public recognition of his inveterate and sacrificial philanthropy came. James H. Smith, in a richly informative memorial address, noted that Grimké unfailingly spent more than half of his annual income in this way. More revealing still is the information that his strong sense of just and correct law bound him to render decisions strictly honoring its terms; but that immediately after a judgment worked some hardship on an unfortunate person, he would quietly remedy out of his own pocket what he had been legally obligated to do.

Yet Thomas Smith Grimké cannot be seen as simply a master jurist. His humanistic interests—his vast fund of literary and historical knowledge, his command of Christian theology, literature and interpretation, his admirable knowledge of the Classical and English poets, (he committed thousands of lines of verse to memory)—are not a lawyer's tastes and talents, but rather those of a moralist and man of letters. The numerous orations, addresses, and special writings of Thomas Smith Grimké prove the point. He was author of well over thirty substantial published pamphlets (many of his essays were brought together and published in bound volumes during his lifetime), which breathe a spirit of conviction and of an eloquent and lofty idealism.

Until his premature death at the age of forty-eight, Thomas Smith Grimké drove himself unmercifully. In addition to his public role as lawyer and his private charities, his productive pen, his love for friendly conversation and his perpetual personal good works, he was one of the founders, and perhaps the most brilliant member, of the American Peace Society. He was also the moving spirit of the Colonization Society of South Carolina, a delicate and damaging role to play in the Charleston of his time. James H. Smith commented that Thomas was "unfit for a politician," being too honest and principled for that necessary but remorseless art. Indeed, in *that* sense he *was "unfit."* The man was a born Christian reformer. Sin was sin, but it was correctible—given intelligence, ingenuity, and love for each little sparrow that falls. Nonetheless, he was a state senator from St. Philip's and St. Michael's parish for four years (1826-1830) and a Unionist leader whose opposition to nullification was truly formidable for its unanswerable compound of historical fact and logic. His behavior under grave stress, when he opposed the Nullifiers in the South Carolina legislature and wrote his flaming disproofs of what he believed was their mistaken "states' rights" policy, was token enough of his capacity to endure contempt and hatred for the sake of what his conscience revealed as right.

Yet Thomas was a gentle, and apparently a most winsome crusader. Although he possessed the moral courage of which martyrs are made, his temperament happily inclined him to gracious and lovable ways. Whatever he did and however he thought, for the most part he retained the affection and respect of his Charleston peers across the board—all the way from his political enemies, to the educators with whom he disagreed, the ministers whom he out-preached, and the purely social ladies and gentlemen who constituted the lotus-eating sector of Charleston society. That a man so endowed with friendly charm, and so generally liked, was also the most *radical* reformer in the community is one measure

of his great stature in his time. The point is that he had a fearless, or a trusting instinct, that commanded him to follow where his thought led; and even when it led him to views entirely unlike those of his friends and neighbors, as it did, for example, in his crusade for absolute pacifism, they respected him for it. All in all, Thomas Smith Grimké was the kind of priceless man who courted no popularity but managed by his quality to win it for his very departures from the accepted code.

Frederick Grimké (1792-1863), his younger brother, was also a man without a price. Like Thomas, he went to Yale for his collegiate education, performed brilliantly as a scholar, and became Phi Beta Kappa orator for his class. The path of law opened for him too, but, after some years of practice in Charleston, he decided to move to Ohio to bring the example of Eastern schooling and Southern breeding to the service of what he called "the rising Empire of the West." In his first years in the new state, Frederick became a partner in a law firm with three distinguished Ohioans. But he was a deeply reflective man whose learning clearly suited him to the bench even more than to the bar. Recognition of this fact was not long in coming. He was appointed a judge of the Court of Common Pleas, and in 1836 he was made a judge of the Supreme Court of Ohio, an office he held for six years, resigning it in 1842 in order to free himself for the great object of his life, the study and writing of philosophy.

Unlike Thomas who was for all his radical dissents a sociable man, Frederick was a deliberately lonely man, almost a récluse. His sociability was largely restricted to his circle of colleagues in the Superior Court of Ohio, and to one bosom friend, William Greene of Cincinnati. He maintained polite contacts with his large family in South Carolina and reserved but friendly ones with his sisters Sarah and Angelina, whom he visited in New Jersey every year for over a decade in the 1850's on his annual fall vacation in the East. Politics at every level from local Ohio affairs to the detailed history of Congressional legislation and Federal appointments aroused a sleepless interest in Frederick Grimké—but his political interest was that of an acute observer, a mordant analyst who ponders the deplorable antics of men greedy of place and power.

Like his brother Thomas and his sisters Sarah and Angelina, Frederick Grimké, despite his well-defined differences with them, was a reformer too. He did not plead with men by the magic of impassioned speech to change their hearts. He did not lend himself to an organization or party to effect the improvements he so deeply wished to see prosper. He did not conceive his role to be that of an individual philanthropist, nor certainly that of a political activist. *His* reforms, like Socrates', would come—if

they could come at all—through the process of rational enlightenment. His philosophy was in and for the world, but he was not the Savior and men would need reason, self-discipline, and education to profit by his work. Although he was a product of the early nineteenth century (and showed it by his literary and poetic tastes), he saw no alternative to reason and common sense as the proper guards over conscience and sentiment.

These fragmentary suggestions about the characters and lives of the Grimké brothers are a prelude to considering them—as they would have wished to be considered—in terms of their most characteristic selves, as *intellectuals.* Both Grimkés developed bodies of thought that are too wide-ranging for a brief review. I have therefore selected only two for comment. First, I will turn to Thomas Smith Grimké's views on educational philosophy and then to Frederick Grimké's great work on *The Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions.*

The philosophy of education was a lifelong interest for Thomas Smith Grimké: from the mid-1820's to the very day before he died a plan of education suited to Americans was uppermost in his thoughts. In this reform, Grimké functioned very much as an educational pioneer. He considered the basic values for which education should strive—and decided that the function of American education should be "to bless, not merely to adorn." He urged that the matrix ideals of the Protestant Reformation and the American Revolution should guide the American educator in his future policies. Like Franklin, Jefferson, and Benjamin Rush before him, Grimké's educational plans were all based upon an unshakable conviction that democracy could work if education provided the means. He particularly wished to see Charleston and South Carolina become trail-blazers in this greatest of all American missions.

Although the first important public expression of his views appeared in 1827, Thomas Grimké had arrived at his leading principles several years before. One clear proof of this may be seen in his letter to his son, Drayton, in December of 1826. Writing to congratulate the lad on a poem he had written and on his first essay for the College Society at Yale, the father launched into an elaborate review of his own educational ideas and methods, taking a frank but tactless share of credit for the "improvement" he had wrought in his son's mind. He had himself served as Drayton's tutor, precisely because he refused to cast him forth to the "usual mode" of education at a "classical seminary." Pressed by business and by public affairs, he had confidence that his educational plan which had as its secret "the perpetual and active exercise of the mind" was far more important than a regular schedule of daily memorization and re-

citations from set textbooks. He wrote: "The habit of thinking and reasoning on all that is read, whether it be facts or principles, whether it be History or Geography, Philosophy, Rhetoric or Poetry, is the powerful instrument of all valuable education." He further opened the secret when he contrasted his method with another. "You have been educated *ab initio,*" he wrote his son, "on the Prostestant principle, that you have a right to think and reason for yourself, and that it is your duty to do so, taking as your guide, the instructions of those who have a right to advise. . . . But the majority of boys are educated on the Catholic principle, that they must read with a submissive faith, that they must believe *all* in Homer and Virgil, in Horace and Theocritus to be poetry—all in Cicero and Demosthenes to be eloquence—all in Thucydides and Herodotus, in Livy and Tacitus, to be unrivalled in History." Not only was this the ripe maturation of the Protestant principle, it was also peculiarly the right principle to perfect American talents to the point where they would produce in "every department of science and art" in the short space of a century a literature and scholarship unrivalled in the Western world. The cultural future looked bright to Grimké as he predicted that "the triumph to be accomplished will flow from the principles of the American Revolution."

In 1827, Thomas Smith Grimké wrote an address which he delivered in Charleston's First Presbyterian Church on the 9th of May, at the anniversary of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Charleston. The title of the address is spaciously informative. It specified that the subject was "on the Character and Objects of Science and Especially the Influence of the Reformation on the Science and Literature, Past, Present and Future of Protestant Nations." He proposed a unified perspective from which to judge what the curriculum should be, and to reform the method of teaching and learning in American education. He approached the history of science as the record of men who "labor in the high and holy cause of human improvement." He considered the study of man and nature as properly a joint or unified study: "Man . . . is endowed with capacity to comprehend, though imperfectly, the laws of his own being, and to read, in the admirable language of the visible world, the mysteries of natural revelation. The mind, the heart, the character of the whole human family, the harmony, sublimity and beauty of the sensible creation, are the scriptures of science." This Emersonian thought Grimké expressed nine years before Emerson himself developed the theme in his essay on "Nature," and ten years before his celebrated address on "The American Scholar."

All knowledge—of self and other—was thus in one sense "holy" work—and by this Grimké did not mean work free of disciplined information, systematic development, or patient trials and proofs. Rather, he stressed the *values* for which men pursue science and truth. What worth, he asked, has scientific knowledge if it does not meliorate the condition of man and promote substantial, practical, permanent improvement in the education and lives of the people, as in the humanization of government? Thus science became for him an honored and efficient fellow-laborer with morality and religion in advancing the moral government of the world, and in blessing men with arts and conveniences they would otherwise fail to find. What is the value, Grimké doggedly insisted, of human learning "if it enlighten its Professors only, and not the People?"

This address was widely circulated after it was printed—and since it was an extreme position that Grimké developed, it aroused considerable discussion, North as well as South. He meant it to do just that. In one sense Grimké's challenge was meant for the startled eyes of the professors who had educated *him*. I suggest the hypothesis that his views may have influenced a similar challenge presented by Noyes Darling, a Connecticut judge, state senator, and in 1827 a member of the Yale corporation, when he demanded a complete overhaul of the Yale curriculum, in order to make it "modern" and more serviceable to the youth of America. Judge Darling called for the abolition of the classical language requirements for admission, and of a college curriculum centered rigidly on Greek, Latin, and higher mathematics. These isolated features tended to become the battlecry, the slogans of the whole critique, yet Thomas Smith Grimké, who had advocated these measures (paradoxically, with sound classical quotations to buttress his views), had intended far more than a merely negative critique. Of course many so-called vulgar "materialists" and "utilitarians," reflecting the values of a restless and opportunity-laden society, had demanded the abandonment of classical requirements so that ignorance would not bar their sons from the college citadels. But Grimké was *not* vulgar; he was far from a materialist; and he was one of the most celebrated products of the Yale "inner" academic establishment! The "club" within the Yale faculty could hardly have ignored this powerful and pious South Carolinian's learned appeal for educational reform, nor could it easily repudiate the fruit of those zealously prayed-for "revivals" which had been the triumph of President Timothy Dwight's reign.

Judge Darling's modernist challenge was answered by the celebrated Yale Report of 1828, which succeeded in holding the line. The Yale faculty had wrestled with Grimké's type of challenge and with the earlier re-

forms of Jefferson at the University of Virginia and young George Ticknor at Harvard. It must have relieved the torment at last when the Yale faculty huddled together with President Jeremiah Day and produced a report that resoundingly (and I might say *safely*) defended the classics as the heart of a liberal arts education.

Curiously enough, one wonders whether the victory of the 1828 Report at Yale was as complete as the unanimous acceptance of it by the Yale Corporation and faculty seems to suggest. For in 1830, the Alpha Chapter of Phi Beta Kappa in New Haven invited Thomas Smith Grimké to deliver the annual anniversary address. He thus brought his idealistic and modernist proposals for an educational reformation to the heart of the conservative college stronghold. Boldly Grimké announced: "I fear that we look in vain to the Academy, the College, the University. Their spirit has rarely been that of the Reformer, who loves to regenerate. It is rather that of an Antiquary, who seeks to abide by the ancient landmarks." Surely a disturbingly open spirit, but Yale itself had trained this vigorous critic, and it decided that year (1830) to bestow upon Thomas Smith Grimké the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws.

The climax of the educational controversy between the ancients versus the moderns, however, took place in that cherished Mississippi Valley which all Easterners knew as a symbol of rising democracy and the future of American civilization. Miami University at Oxford, Ohio, invited Grimké to address the students and faculty in the fall of 1834. The busy lawyer and orator saw at once a double value in this arduous journey. He would make a bid for the attention of the West to his educational philosphy—and meanwhile he would have the opportunity to visit with Judge Frederick Grimké, his favorite brother, whom he had not seen for many years. Accordingly, he spoke at Miami University in September and apparently captivated his rapt audience by the brilliance of his address on "The Comparative Elements and Dutys of Grecian and American Eloquence". He then moved on to Cincinnati, where in October he addressed an annual Meeting of the Western Literary Institution and College of Professional Teachers on the subject of American Education. Grimké once more sounded the attack on the classics and mathematics as the major content of "*general*" education. If Grimké intended to act as an educational gadfly, he succeeded. The spiraling controversy over the objectives and central method of American education winged its way through the Valley. As it turned out, however, neither Thomas Smith Grimké's recommendation of the Bible as a fundamental text in American education nor his sweeping denial of the centrality of classical and mathematical subjects in higher education were taken seriously. But his sense

of something vast and new in the American experience, and his far-sighted proposals about introducing into the curriculum the study of American history, American literature, and modern languages as well as the history of modern physical and social sciences were a message of a different order. These thoughts were listened to with a realistic assent that gained Grimké new converts with each passing year.

An unexpected illness brought this symbolic journey west to an abrupt and final close. Thomas Smith Grimké was seized with cholera on his way to Columbus. He sought refuge in the home of a stranger, and it was there that Frederick found him, on the point of death, unable to speak but gallant enough to "utter a few broken sentences" and smile "a lovely smile" when he saw his cherished brother at his bedside. The younger brother buried the older a few days later. By all signs, this death in the family occasioned *the* profound sorrow of Frederick Grimké's restrained life. He wrote the crushing news to his brother Henry in Charleston—a letter more solicitous of human feelings than any other he ever penned. He recounted his brother's triumphs in Ohio and recalled that Thomas had been "always willing, always foremost in those good deeds which have been his delight and employment from his youth upwards." He perceived that his brother had "sacrificed himself in the cause of Religion and Philanthropy", and he permitted himself to exclaim: "Oh as death comes but once, shall we not rejoice in the midst of our affliction that he had come upon our brother when he was rich in the very gift which can fit him for an immortal crown."

It should be evident that a very close relationship existed between these two brothers. Enough correspondence survives between them to prove their affection and mutual regard. One small sign of this is also evident in the strange pagination of Frederick Grimké's very first published work, *An Essay on the Ancients and Moderns,* which opens on a sequence numbered in the two hundreds! The answer to this puzzle is that Frederick paged his essay to continue his brother's treatment of the theme, as developed in the latter's address, *Reflections on the Objects of All Sciences and Literature.* By this odd device, Frederick was both paying tribute to his brother and affiliating his own attack on the mystique of the superiority of the ancients to the moderns in philosophy, in imaginative literature, in style, and in linguistic beauty with his brother's lead. Both men understood that they were engaged in far more than "a battle of the books" in these critical essays. Thomas with a bold sweep and Frederick in the more cautious way of the professional philosopher stated that, if their defense of the superiority of modern knowledge and genius were correct, the whole system of education in America (as well

as in the Western world) must be regarded as a static and tragic misfit for intellectual development. Where Thomas had come to his position imbued with enthusiasm for a purified Christianity and for the wisdom of the Bible, both as a superb character-former and as living literature, Frederick arrived at his defense on more explicitly philosophic grounds. His citations came directly from Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, and Ricardo —and to a lesser degree from the eloquent statesman Burke, the poet Byron, and the novelist Scott. He wrote: "The very objects about which human knowledge is conversant, and on which the most gifted faculties are employed, have been so changed and re-created, that we may be said to live in a new and more glorious world, and not in the same world, with the old furniture of the ancients bequeathed to us."

But if ever a man's life may be said to flow into one masterwork, Frederick Grimké's went into the several revised editions of his profound book, *The Nature and Tendency of Free Institutions.* This study is, in my estimation, the most thorough analysis of the philosophical meaning of the American Experiment ever written by an American. This judgment is made in full gravity, despite the comparatively meager notice the book excited when it issued from an obscure Ohio press at a time when the Northeastern seaboard cities of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia were the undisputed arbiters of the literary reputations of the entire country. It was Grimké's purpose to use his extraordinary scholarly knowledge of the political literature of the founding fathers as a basis for an independent examination of both the essential meaning of free government and of the changes that an expanded democracy had wrought upon the original framework. As an empiricist and enlightened realist (whose realism took account of the unsurpassed power of moral ideals as a dynamic component in history), he comprehended perfectly that government must be set in the wider framework of society. His powerful intelligence explored the structural, legal, and purely political aspects of the American political system *as they were really working.* In this enterprise, he was less concerned with the morphology of political types of government than with the intricate and elaborate evolutionary network of social attitudes, new modes of authority and obedience, and with the roles of tradition, critical innovation, and dissent.

Grimké's major contribution was the subtle uncovering of the nature of the democratic *process.* To achieve this, he made extensive use of the comparative method, drawing upon his extensive and detailed knowledge of ancient and modern history, but particularly of the modern history of the British Isles and France. The more he illumined the context of European institutions and movements of reform, the more he sharpened the individuating characteristics of American democracy.

One will naturally advert in thought to Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* as a related intellectual enterprise. Yet Tocqueville's profound study of democratic equality, written in part with angelic eloquence, was based on a far more slender and selective range of knowledge—and the knowledge was taken in large chunks, second-hand. Quite otherwise, Grimké demonstrated his sensitive knowledge of precisely *the* critical sources for his own analysis of the nature of the thought and process by which the American Republic had come to be. Moreover, the French sociologist's reliance upon the play of passionate paradox, his compulsive preference for an ambiguous drama of contrapuntal ideas in place of intellectual inquiry obscured the vast subject he was trying to lay bare. As a stylist, Frederick Grimké could not compare with Tocqueville. As a political philosopher, however, and as an empirical sociologist and logician Tocqueville would have had to bow to the South Carolinian.

On a number of counts, his work in fact did outdo Tocqueville's in solid merit. He clearly commanded an expert's knowledge of American political thought and literature. Grimké found here the clues to majority rule—without nightmares about majority tyranny. He maintained that a peculiar social tendency existed in the American Republic towards a more and more encompassing middle class. American society was without a fixed aristocracy, and he saw the implications of that fact for mobility, and the absence of a permanent class affiliation. This extensively middle class society, through the instrumentality of *national* political parties, could in fact be representative of common interests, as negotiated through an ever-shifting collection of "minority" interests. His estimate of comparative European and American history and governments read differently and pointed a different moral than did that of Tocqueville. He did not yearn after a vanished or threatened aristocratic order because he found a faith in the people of a self-governing society a sufficiently persuasive faith.

Grimké insisted that the objectives of government were twofold: to administer public business and "to bind society together, in other words, to uphold civilization." He found that the constitution of government which was best fitted to promote public business was also the one best calculated to advance civilization. What is refreshingly new is his joining of the theory of the origin of government in social contract and natural rights to its *consequential* character, by means of what he called the "new wheel in the machinery of government". The "new wheel" was the power existing *outside* the structure of government, as in the new role of public opinion. He considered that power to be potentially moral power, and he refused to make the assumption, already current in his day, that some

form of cultural determinism (climate, tradition, the given habits of the people) undercut the reality of moral ideals and the power of ideas. Rather he insisted upon the pragmatic efficacy of moral judgments in politics and law, contending that "improvement could come by no other route." "The great end to be attained by holding up some principles and some institutions as just and true", he wrote, "and others as the reverse, is to quicken and animate both individuals and states in their efforts to abjure the former, and to cultivate the last." Resisting the trap of a supposedly neutral cultural relativism (and attendant skepticism) he countered: "By regarding and habitually treating some actions and some institutions as right, and others as wrong, we make a considerable step towards rendering the former attainable, since it is of the very essence of right that it is something which can be reduced to practice. The distinction, then is no longer between the possible and the impossible, but between things practicable and things which are only difficult to be attained."

Widespread intelligence, *education* available for all, and the solicitation of habits of reflection from the people were more than human goods of a personal sort: more than human excellences. They were the concomitant of what Frederick Grimké termed "natural" government—one that rested upon the widest possible basis and represented the interests of all orders of men, "so that men in the pursuit of their daily avocations, and government in the discharge of its official duties, may be compelled to run *the same career of improvement.*" In thus identifying the free institutions of America with the maintenance and even the perfection of a high-order civilization, Frederick Grimké revealed the depth of his democratic faith.

As a final word, I must say that I am aware that I have only scratched the surface of the relationship between Thomas and Frederick Grimké, and my fragmentary comments have hardly sufficed to bring them before us in their complex reality as men. But I hope that the fragments at least suggest the significance of these two nineteenth-century Charlestonians for American moral and intellectual history. In the capacious body of their writings, there is an unworked mine of information about the "age of reformation" in ante-bellum America; there is a mirror in which we may see two aristocratic souls generously promoting the welfare of the *democratic* republic; and there are certain vivid ideas and ideals that have neither died nor grown old. But in the simplest sense, Thomas Smith Grimké and Frederick Grimké are memorable—for they fulfilled the ultimate moral injunction: "Be *ashamed* to die until you have won some victory for humanity."