THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL MAGAZINE

JULY 1975

VOLUME 76 NUMBER 3

CONTENTS

Articles: PAGE

Daniel Defoe: Writer, Statesman, and Advocate of Religious Liberty in South Carolina, by John W. Brinsfield 107

The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron: The Diary of James W. Boynton, edited by Abbott A. Brayton 112

Early Indian Trade in the Development of South Carolina: Politics, Economics, and Social Mobility During the Proprietary Period, 1670-1719, by Philip M. Brown 118

Free Black Owners of Slaves: A Reappraisal of the Woodson Thesis, by R. Halliburton, Jr. 129

Letters of Eliza Lucas Pinckney, 1768-1782, edited by Elise Pinckney 143

The Schirmer Diary 171

Reviews:

Berkeley and Berkeley, *Dr. John Mitchell, the Man Who Made the Map of North America,* by Lucile Gaines MacLennan .. 174

Wiley, *Confederate Women,* by Layton Wayne Jordan 175

Moore, *The Juhl Letters to the* Charleston Courier, by Shannon DuBose 176

Birnie, *The Earles and the Birnies* 177

From the Society 178

From the Archives: New Indexes for the Court of Common Pleas by Marion Chandler and Joel Shirley 190

EARLY INDIAN TRADE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA:

POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL MOBILITY DURING THE PROPRIETARY PERIOD, 1670-1719

PHILIP M. BROWN *

From the founding of Carolina in 1670, until the 1730's, South Carolinians amassed great wealth in the Indian trade, providing that colony's initial capital accumulation which would later be invested in rice and indigo plantations and in the black slave trade. English goods were traded to Indians for furs and peltry which were exported to England, and there was a large market in Indian slaves. Through political, economic, and social control of South Carolina, the traders were instrumental in the colony's growth and in general southwestward expansion. They built a far-reaching trade empire, behaving ruthlessly to the Indians, French and Spanish colonials, fellow traders in neighboring colonies, and the Proprietors and public officials of their own colony.

Lewis Gray has rightly called the Indian trade a pioneer stage of economic growth. As he put it, "The profits of the Indian trade supplied capital for agricultural development and sustained the infant colonial establishment until agriculture could gain a foothold."[1] While Gray spoke of the entire South, his statement bears specific truth for South Carolina. This article will explore the traders' political struggle to control the colony, the economics of the trade, and mobility and social character of the traders.[2]

* Mr. Brown teaches in the Goddard-Cambridge Graduate Program of Goddard College in Cambridge, Mass.

[1] Lewis Cecil Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1806* (Gloucester, 1958), 129.

[2] This research is facilitated by the work of the South Carolina Historical Commission (now the Department of Archives and History) in publishing the *Journal of the Commissioners of the Indian Trade, Sept. 20, 1710-Aug. 29, 1718*, ed. W. L. McDowell (Columbia, 1955) (hereafter cited as *JCIT*); the *Journal of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina*, ed. A. S. Salley (Columbia, 1913-1914) (hereafter cited as *JCH*); the *Journal of the Grand Council of South Carolina*, ed. A. S. Salley (Columbia, 1907) (hereafter cited as *JGC*); and the *Commissions and Instructions from the Lords Proprietors to Public Officials of South Carolina, 1685-1715*, ed. A. S. Salley (Columbia, 1916) (hereafter cited as *CIP*). An excellent secondary source is Verner Crane's *The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732* (Ann Arbor, 1929).

fearing their capture, got underway and steamed to them, about 15 miles from our anchorage.

I was asked to remain in the river on the tug with our one gun and several small arms. We knew that the Rebels would see from the fort when the steamer was out of the river and would try to take the tug. The *Conemaugh* could not get over the bar to assist us that night on account of the low tide. Lieutenant Eastman gave us a torpedo to destroy our vessel in case we were obliged to surrender. Our resolute show of force was successful, however, for nothing occurred during the day. About 12 noon it became very foggy and thick. The boat crews returned about dark with their prisoners. The steamer did not know this, but if she had she could not have entered the anchorage that night. At dark it began to rain very hard and Lieutenant Brownwell came on board the tug with me. As we expected an attack we kept on watch the entire night. We were wet to the skin the next day when the *Conemaugh* returned and we gladly went on board again.[9]

[9] The *Queen of the Wave,* run ashore, after bombardment was burned by her crew. The hull, engines, and cargo, however, remained essentially intact. Realizing the value of the ship and cargo in Confederate hands, Eastman mounted a salvage operation. The ship yielded 3200 sheets of tin, 20 bottles of quinine, 23 ounce-bottles of morphine, 15 pounds of opium, several bales of calico, 2 anchors, one binnacle, 12 reams of large-size printing paper, and some machinery parts. The unsalvageable cargo was destroyed when the ship was blown up on March 8th, *Official Records,* p. 687.

The Growth of Political Power

Initially the Proprietors did not see the profit of an Indian trade; rather, they expected the colony to grow silk, currants, raisins, capers, almonds, and olives.[3] Recognition of the value of trade with the native Americans was due mainly to the efforts of Dr. Henry Woodward, who conducted the first trade while on a diplomatic mission prior to colonization. His activity prompted the Proprietors to embark on a definite trading plan by the time of the first permanent settlement.[4] Setting up a Proprietary monopoly of the trade, they created the schism which would eventually lead to their ouster in the 1719 Revolution. Private traders immediately took to the wilderness in search of fortune, creating the first conditions for warfare with the tribes. The Stono War of 1674 and the Westo War of 1680 were partly urged by private traders who wanted to enrich themselves on the sales of Indian slaves. The Grand Council placed an embargo on trade, but that action hurt the monopoly more than the men circumventing it. A regulatory commission was set up in 1680 but dissolved two years later.[5]

From this point on, trade regulation would be a major force in Charleston politics, with traders and their merchant allies putting forth plans at variance with those of the Proprietors and their officials. As early as 1685 the traders were engineering the removal of Governors and others. The Proprietors wrote to Governor West, complaining that ". . . the dealers in Indians boast they can with a bowl of punch get who they would chosen to the parliament and afterwards who they would chosen of the Grand Council."[6] Trade regulation for the traders necessarily meant control of all aspects of colonial life.

The Indian trade was usually the dominant political and economic force in early colonial South Carolina, though often catalyzed by ex-

[3] Proprietors to Storekeeper, July 27, 1699; Henry Brayne to Proprietors, August 7, 1669; Proprietors to Captain Halstead, May 1, 1671 in *Collections of the South Carolina Historical Society* (Charlestown, 1897), I, 128, 149, 318-319; (hereafter cited as *CSCHS*).

[4] *JGC*, October 2, 1671. Chapman Milling, *Red Carolinians* (Chapel Hill, 1940), 52.

[5] William James Rivers, *A Sketch of the History of South Carolina to the Close of the Proprietary Government by the Revolution of 1719* (Charlestown, 1856), 62, 63. 122-123; (includes primary material in Appendix). Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 118. Proprietors to Governor West, May 17, 19, 1679; Proprietors to Governor Morton, May 10, 1682, Sept. 30, 1683, *Records in the British Public Records Office Relating to South Carolina* (5 vols., Atlanta, 1928-1947) (hereafter cited as *PRO*), I, 82-84, 97-102, 141-142, 255, 290. *JGC*, July 14, 1677, September 3, 1673; April 12, June 1, 4, 23, 24, 1680.

[6] Proprietors to Governor West, March 12, 1685, *PRO* II, 33.

ternal events. Typical of this was the Carolinian response to the Glorious Revolution in which the traders' main representative, Seth Sothell, led a successful revolt against Proprietary trade monopoly. While Sothell's Revolt had the appearance of a popular rebellion for the proclamation of William and Mary, and in opposition to James' tyranny, it was clear that the trading interest were in the lead. The powerful traders sitting in the Commons House of Assembly greeted Sothell enthusiastically and organized a petition signed by 500 residents urging him to assume leadership of the government, which he did.[7] The Proprietors themselves knew who was behind the rising—in a letter to the Council, they said:

> We have long been sensible of the jealousies and heart-burning occasioned among the principal inhabitants of Carolina by their endeavors to have more trade with the Indians than their neighbors, and which has often hazarded the peace and well-being of the settlement.[8]

Traders also recognized the difficulties and thus attempted regulation since "The Indian trade as it is now managed is a grievance to this settlement and prejudicial to the safety thereof."[9] The next several years exhibited increased attempts at a rational system, hand in hand with struggles over popular measures such as land reform. Regulation, however, remained piecemeal—in 1695 an impost on skins with lower house control over disposition of funds, in 1701 the outlawing of credit sales to the Indians.[10]

Queen Anne's War intervened to prevent further planning, but it did provide lucrative slave sales for Charleston traders. Trader-led expeditions against the Indians placed these men in a position of strength afterward as they pushed to usurp the Proprietary government.[11] Included in their actions were control of the governor's salary, the right to launch unofficial depredations against the Indians, the ability to appoint their colleagues to public posts, the right to issue paper currency, and the House's sovereignty over trade regulation.[12]

[7] Proprietors to Governor Ludwell, May 13, 1691, *PRO* III, 4. Rivers, *Sketch*, 152-155, and Proprietors to Colleton, Appendix, 410. Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Gloucester, 1957), II, 219-221.

[8] Proprietors to Grand Council, May 13, 1691, Rivers, *Sketch*, Appendix, 414-416.

[9] *JCH*, September 28, 29, October 4, 1698.

[10] *JCH*, November 21, 23, 27, 28, 1695; August 13, 15, 22, 23, 27, 1701.

[11] *JCH*, September 7, 1703. Crane, *The Southern Frontier*, 80.

[12] *JCH*, December 20, 22, 1706; January 31, June 30, 25, 27, July 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, November 8, 1707. Eric P. Newman, *The Early Paper Money of America* (Racine, 1967), 299.

Thomas Nairne, wealthy planter-trader and House leader, led the struggle for the 1707 bill providing for a trader-dominated regulatory commission.[13] Preventing the governor from participation in the Board of Indian Commissioners, the plan called for House control. Of course, the same leading traders sat on the Commission and in the House, men like Richard Beresford, Captain Musgrove, Thomas Welsh, Benjamin Quelch, Benjamin Motte, Ralph Izard, Samuel Everleigh, and James Moore. Agents of the Board were typically far-sighted and imperial-minded men like John Wright and Thomas Nairne. Through relative self-regulation, the traders extended their empire, accumulating wealth along the southern frontier.

Still, their plundering, cheating, and killing of Indians remained a continual problem. The Commission often heard complaints from Indians and competing traders of abuses. At times it corrected them by levying fines on the violators. Skirmishes with the Indians continued, and eventually led to large-scale warfare—in 1712 the Tuscarora War followed upon traders' expeditions of great severity.[14] The Rev. Dr. LeJau, pastor to the wealthy planter-traders of Goose Creek and an astute chronicler, responded to the many hundreds of slaves marched back to Charleston:

> It is said that those Indians were oppressed and had no justice done to them when they asked it . . . it is evident that our traders have promoted bloody wars this last year to get slaves.[15]

In 1715 came the devastating Yamasee War. Verner Crane correctly describes it as "a far-reaching revolt against the Carolinian trading regime."[16] It was a true observation—in addition to the usual theft and brutality, the traders created a situation in which the Indians owed imaginary sums for goods sold illegally to them on credit by the traders. Estimates on the 1711 rum debt alone amounted to approximately 100,000 skins, nearly two years' work for the Indian trappers. By the outbreak of war, the Yamasee debt was evaluated at £50,000. The Yamasee War nearly destroyed South Carolina. Many lives were lost, plantation crops ruined, and most of the trade demolished. London creditors pushed for repayment of debts totalling £100,000. Four paper emissions to fund the war, amounting to £65,000, caused a considerable economic dislocation, and scheduled redemption was in serious doubt.

[13] *JCH*, July 2, 19, 1707.

[14] *JCH*, April 2, May 14, December 3, 1712.

[15] Dr. Francis LeJau, *The Carolina Chronicle of Dr. Francis LeJau*, ed. Frank J. Klingberg (Berkeley, 1956), 104-109.

[16] Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 162.

While the average annual export from Charleston from 1699 to 1715 was 54,000 skins, it dropped to under 5,000 for the fiscal year following the outbreak of the Yamasee War, and for the five years following remained at approximately one-third the pre-1715 level.[17]

Two solutions were found for the colony—complete trade regulation and anti-Proprietary revolt. The 1716 regulation bill abolished private trading, demanding that all skins be traded at specified 'factories.' Traders were to be licensed, under penalty of £500 fine for failure to comply. Charles Hill, George Logan, John Barnwell, and James Moore, wealthy traders and merchants of long experience, were selected as the first commissioners of the reconstituted Commission.[18]

As for the Proprietors, there was general consensus in Charleston that they had failed to provide adequate defense in the Yamasee War. Further, they had tried to block the paper issues and were now demanding higher taxes. Inflation in 1717, combined with Virginian encroachment on trading, forced the trader-led House and Commission to expand their efforts both at trade expansion and at securing greater political power.[19]

Leading the anti-Proprietary movement were the most influential traders, including James Moore, Jr., John Barnwell, House Speaker Hepworth, Richard Allein, Samuel Everleigh, George Chicken, Thomas Smith, and Richard Beresford.[20] Governor Johnson knew the end was near; his fear-provoked summoning of the militia for the avowed purpose of defense against imminent Indian forays angered the popular leaders. On the last day of 1719 the Commons House of Assembly converted itself into a Convention, choosing James Moore, Jr. as governor.

[17] Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 111-112, 169-172, 175-177. Rivers, *Sketch*, 262, 279. E. Lawrence Lee, *Indian Wars in North Carolina*, 1663-1763 (Raleigh, 1963), 40, 42. Richard P. Sherman, *Robert Johnson: Proprietary and Royal Governor of South Carolina* (Columbia, 1966), 23. Francis Yonge, "A Narrative of the Proceedings of the People of South Carolina in the Year 1719" in B. R. Carroll, *Historical Collections of South Carolina* (New York, 1836), I, 147. Newman, *Early Paper Money*, 300-301. Curtis P. Nettels, *The Money Supply of the American Colonies Before 1720* (New York, 1964), 265. Gray, *History*, 137.

[18] *JCIT*, Appendix, 325-329.

[19] Rivers, *Sketch*, 276-277. *JCIT*, September 12, 20, November 2, 28, 1717; July 19, 1718.

[20] Pretended Council and Assembly to Board of Trade, December 24, 1719 in William James Rivers, *A Chapter in the Early History of South Carolina* (Charlestown, 1874), Appendix, 39-41; (this is a final chapter to Rivers' *Sketch*, but published later with separate pagination). Langdon Cheves, "Middleton of South Carolina," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, I, 231.

Johnson's half-hearted attempt to back down the insurgents failed, and a peaceful transition of power took place.[21]

With little opposition, the trader regime of South Carolina rebuilt the war-torn economy, and by 1721 trade was on par with the pre-1715 level.[22] The Revolution of 1719 had been both a manifestation of past power and a resolve for the future.

Economics of the Indian Trade

The Indian trade in the southern colonies was primarily in deer skins. Beaver were relatively scarce and their skins brought higher prices. Various English goods were traded to the Indians for their peltry, which was then exported to England. Exchange rates, after 1716, were set by the Indian Trade Commission. While the type of skin was sometimes unspecified, a reading of most sources indicates that the standard skin traded was white deer skin of about one pound weight. A gun brought 35 skins, a 'half-thicks' coat brought 30, a calico petticoat 14, a pistol 20, a white blanket 16, a yard of strouds 8, a broad hoe 5, a narrow hoe 3, a shirt 5. One skin exchanged for either 30 bullets, a knife, a pair of scissors, or 12 flints.[23]

White deer skins weighing one pound or more fetched 5 s. per pound in export to England; if under a pound they brought 2½ s. each. Raw buck skins of at least 1½ pounds sold for 5 s. "Raw doe and other light skins" were valued by "goodness and weight," not to exceed 2½ s. apiece.[24]

Figures are not available on all exchange goods purchased by the traders, but enough exist to allow some calculation of profit. Broad hoes cost an average 6 s. ld. each, narrow hoes 5 s. A yard of strouds, quite popular, cost £1. Gun prices had the largest range, from £4 17 s. to £6 9 s. each.[52] The highest profit was made on broad hoes. Costing an average 6 s. 1 d. each, they brought 5 skins worth £1 5 s., a profit of more than 400%. Narrow hoes were only slightly less profitable at 300%. £1 worth of strouds brought 8 skins worth £2. Guns were less profitable, averaging 60 per cent, but were quite useful in fomenting inter-tribal warfare and thus yielding slaves to buy from both sides of the conflict.

[21] Rivers, *Sketch*, 294, 309-310. Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 218. Cheves, "Middleton."

[22] Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 112. Gray, *History*, 137.

[23] *JCIT*, July 24, 1716; August 7, 1717.

[24] *JCIT*, July 6, 1716.

[25] *JCIT*, January 30, February 7, 17, 1717; January 6, 1718.

This was profitable business. Overhead was small—except for the better-than-average wages of pack-horse men, the trader had few expenses apart from ordinary plantation maintenance and the upkeep of a house in town (which came cheaply through popular victories for nominal quitrents and low land prices). There are no adequate figures to determine merchants' profit, but the merchants' near-constant alliance with wealthy traders indicates that they too prospered.

The trade in peltry and furs had a phenomenal growth. For a one-year period, 1698-1699, 64,488 deerskins alone were exported from Charleston. Over the next decade and a half the average yearly trade was 54,000 deerskins (other skins were less well acounted for). The fiscal year 1706-1707 was the height, with 121,355 skins leaving the colony. In 1715 the Yamasee War nearly destroyed the trade, with only 4,702 skins exported for the fiscal year following the outbreak of hostilities. Only in 1721-1722 did the volume approach the earlier level. One decade after the Revolution of 1719, trader supremacy in all areas of colonial life created the conditions for an annual volume of 255,000 skins, and this increased in the 1730's.

On skins alone, fortunes were made; Indian slavery added to that blood money. By the second year of settlement, Indian slavery was already provided for in legislation. Slave codes were established shortly, with similar restrictions for blacks and Indians. African and native American slave populations increased inversely. The former worked the plantations, the latter hunted. Since the Indian slaves knew the territory well and had their own people nearby, escape was easy and common. This situation probably accounts for their prices being lower than those of Africans. Due to the ease of escape, most of the Indian slaves were sold to the West Indies, especially to the Barbadoes, from which many Carolinians had migrated. By 1708 the trend to black slave predominance was clear, with 4100 of them as compared to 1300 Indian slaves.[27] The Yamasee War virtually ended the practice of Indian slavery. After the peace, Indian slave prices even tripled, but soon fell toward zero.[28] In the earlier years, Indian slaves sold for ap-

[26] Gray, *History*, 137. Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 111-112.

[27] Herbert E. Bolton, "Spanish Resistance to the Carolina Traders in Western Georgia: 1680-1704," *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, 9 (1925), 119-137. Almon Wheeler Lauber, "Indian Slavery in Colonial Times Within the Present Limits of the United States," *Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law* (New York, 1913), LIV, 120-207. Report of Governor and Grand Council to Proprietors, September 17, 1708, *PRO*, V, 203.

[28] *JCIT*, September 10, November 28, 1717; May 13, 1718. Commons House Report to Proprietors, 1737 in Edward McCrady, *The History of South Carolina*

proximately £14 each,[29] and considering the hundreds enslaved in any one campaign, much profit was made in this horrible trade.

Incidental income generated by the Indian trade was a further economic gain to the Charleston empire. Planter-traders were often the leaders of the trading group, growing cash crops with slave labor purchased by Indian trade profits. Even factors hired by the Commission could grow cash crops at their posts on the edge of civilization. The port was another source of income. In one four-month period, the export duties collected on furs and peltry totalled £586. Crafty customs collectors often stuffed their pockets, but as the House rose in power, that revenue became part of the public wealth to be used in military expeditions and public improvements.[30]

Trader Character and Social Mobility

Situated at the end of English civilization in the New World, the South Carolinians faced French and Spanish hostility as well as that of the Indians whom they exploited, displaced, and murdered. Many of the early settlers were from the Barbadoes where they had learned to create huge plantations with slave labor. In South Carolina they applied their experience, quickly becoming an entrepreneurial ruling class. The typical chaos engendered by their competition created problems, especially in fostering Indian wars. This reckless practice, combined with the planters' extravagant standards of living in genteel Charleston, formed the origins of ante-bellum planter society.

There were essentially two groups of traders. One group, the wealthy planters and merchants doubling as planters, stand out as the leaders of Charleston politics and colonial economic strength. They served in the Commons House and on the Trade Commission, as well as appointing each other to various public offices. The second group, small traders, were often adventurers without roots in landed society, although many would later enter that world. Small traders tended to work for themselves in the first two decades of settlement; in later years monopolization caused them to work for the large trader-planters or, after 1716, for the public trading system.

Under the Proprietary Government, 1670-1719 (New York, 1969), Appendix, 723. W. Robert Higgins, "Charleston Merchants and Factors Dealing in the External Negro Trade, 1735-1775," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine,* 65 (1964), 206-217.

[29] Lauber, "Indian Slavery."

[30] *JCIT,* April 25, 1718.

The *Journal* of the Indian Trade Commission is highly informative of the daily activities of the traders. Certain church records and contemporary reports also give information as to social character and mobility. Even a cursory glance through the *Journal's* pages will turn up any number of reprehensible acts by traders. Murder, beating, 'illegal' enslavement, theft of goods and land, and coercion to work were common. Prosecution was rare for these offenses; legal action centered on unlicensed trading, which the leaders saw as the main threat to prosperity and stability.[31] Prosecution was thus for offenses against the ruling class rather than against the real victims. Regulation and punishment of traders for Indian oppression might have prevented the disastrous warfare, but at the same time would have brought most traders before the Board several times a year.

It was easiest for the ruling traders to blame offenses on the lesser traders. Governor Moore, himself a planter-trader, characterized the small entrepreneurs as "barbarous, heathenish, immoral with an unjust wasy of living and dealing." [32] Yet Moore and his kind tolerated the same behavior when the small traders worked for them or when such conduct came from the gentry. The wealthy Henry Wiggington, cited for the heavy offense of employing unlicensed traders, escaped without a fine—a few months later he was appointed to a seat on the Commission! [33]

The Rev. Dr. LeJau was the best contemporary critic of his parishioners. His anger was, in fact, directed more at them than at the small traders. The reverend saw his flock as "very idle and dissolute men" who "commit many enormities and injustices." He accused them of fomenting war for profit; war hurt his missionary projects, and he understood why "our Indian traders are very much averse to see missionaries among the Indians." [34] LeJau was not a moralist—he felt the Indians to be quite inferior beings and felt that the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel would bring them some degree of humanity.

The slave-holder ideology and ruthless behavior of the Indian traders laid the foundations for the 18th century attitudes towards blacks, and

[31] *JCIT*, September 21, October 14, 1710; March 9, April 20, May 30, June 13, July 28, August 1, 2, September 13, 1711; March 21; April 17, June 20, 27, October 25, 1712; there are innumerable other mentions as well. For some examples in House proceedings, see *JCH*, Jan. 4, 15, 20, 22, 26, 1702; March 11, 28, April 2, 1706.

[32] Commons House Report of 1708 in Rivers, *Sketch*, 243. *JGC*, June 22, 1692. John Archdale, "A New Description of Carolina," A. S. Salley, ed., *Narratives of Early Carolina, 1650-1708* (New York, 1959), 295. *JCH*, April 2, 1702.

[33] *JCIT*, October 14, 1710; September 13, 1711; March 21, June 20, 1712.

[34] LeJau, *Chronicle*, 39, 41, 58, 61.

it is clearly no accident that the leading traders and their sons became the largest black slave dealers and owners in the next generation.

Since the Indian trade was the basis for early economic growth in South Carolina, it offered the best chances for social mobility. Even pack-horse men earned more than Charleston laborers and artisans (excepting smiths). Their wages were twice those of a weaver and four times those of a common laborer.[35] Fortunes, however, were made through actual ownership.

Thomas Welch, originally an itinerant trader among the Choctaws on the Mississippi, set up a large plantation in 1711 during his rise to the ruling circle. A similar mobility was exhibited by John Fraser, one of those most frequently cited for atrocities. John Jones moved from private frontier trading to the rank of militia captain and bought land for a plantation with profits earned in Queen Anne's War.[36]

James Moore's career is an interesting example of mobility. Although a Barbadian gentleman, Moore had little wealth when he arrived in Charleston in the 1670's. In 1677 he was plantation manager for Lady Yeamans, widow of the former governor. Marrying her, Moore came into enough money to set himself up as a military leader, planter, and trader. Between 1681 and 1684 he purchased 5,850 acres. Active in Sothell's Revolt, Moore befriended the ruling class and by 1692 was a member of the Commons House. Later President of the Grand Council, he moved to the governor's house when Blake died in office in 1700.[37]

An incredibly high degree of mobility was manifested by the French Huguenots who arrived following the 1685 revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Most of them were artisans, and probably turned to Indian trading since Charleston already had an adequate supply of artisans. As early as 1696 a "Liste des Francois et Suisses" stated that "Many of the French follow a trade with the Indians, living very conveniently for that interest."[38] Fraser and Welch, mentioned above,

[35] *JCIT*, June 10, 11, 1718. Rivers, *Sketch*, 239.

[36] Mary U. Rothrock, "Carolina Traders Among the Overhill Cherokees," *East Tennessee Historical Society Publications*, (1929), I, 3-18. A. S. Salley, "Fraser Family Memoranda," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, 5 (1900), 56. *JCIT*, August 1, 2, 1711; May 30, 1701. *JCH*, March 21, 1706. Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 83.

[37] *Warrants for Land in South Carolina*, ed. A. S. Salley (Columbia, 1910, 1911, 1915), April 25, 1681; July 15, 1683. *JGC*, December 28, 1678; April 12, 1680. Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 119. Osgood, *American Colonies*, II, 28. Rivers, *Sketch*, 204.

[38] "Listes des Francois et Suisses," (1696), reproduced in pamphlet form after a reprint in *The Southern Intelligencer* (Charleston, 1822), 16, (in Widener Library, Harvard University).

were among those men. Benjamin Godin, Benjamin de la Conseillere, Isaac Mazyck, and John Guerard, often in varying partnerships with each other, became merchant-traders of high stature. All but Mazyck made their way to the House; Guerard and Welch attained important Commission seats. Samuel Wragg, another trader, was a leader of the 1719 Revolution. Other rising members of the French community included John and Barnaby Gaillard, Isaac Motte, Jerome Courtonne, and Gabriel Manigault.[39]

Traders passed on fortunes to their sons who continued the Indian trade business. Stephen Bull, a colonial leader, left a huge estate which his three sons managed profitably—when William Bull died his estate which included 20,000 acres and 138 slaves, was valued at £9,900 sterling; John's estate was worth about twice that, including some 7,000 acres and 407 slaves.[40] Merchant-traders like Samuel Everleigh and Charles Hill continually purchased land in lots of 1000 acres. Everleigh's son, George, remained a leading trader in the middle of the 18th century.[41]

Most ruling families continued their dominance even into the revolutionary era. The largest traders for the period 1735-1775, including Benjamin Stead, Everleigh, Joseph Wragg, and William Yeamans, were all second-generation traders. These men maintained the primacy of deerskin exports until the 1740's when the same family fortunes established the immense rice and indigo plantations of South Carolina's swamplands.[42] Wragg, Godin, Fraser, Hill, and Guerard became the largest dealers in black slavery in the 1730's and 1740's.[43]

Creating the initial capital accumulation for South Carolina plantation life, Indian traders made fortunes in the wilderness. Their slave-trade activities were important in creating the character structure of the ante-bellum plantocracy.

[39] *JCIT*, September 20, 1710; August 31, November 11, 1714; July 23, 26, 1716; August 1, 1718. *Warrants*, June 16, 1709. Rivers, *Sketch*, 173, 175-176. Arthur Henry Hirsch, *The Huguenots of Colonial South Carolina* (Durham, 1928), 194-195. "Leaders of the Commons House of Assembly," Appendix to Jack P. Greene, *The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the Southern Royal Colonies, 1689-1776* (Chapel Hill, 1963), 475-488. Henry A. M. Smith, "Goose Creek," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine*, 29 (1928), 71-73.

[40] M. Eugene Sirmans, "Politicians and Planters: The Bull Family of Colonial South Carolina," *Proceedings of the South Carolina Historical Association* (Columbia, 1962), 32-41.

[41] *Warrants*, December 11, 1704; July 31, 1711. *JCIT*, July 27, 1712; November 14, 1717. W. O. Moore, Jr., "The Largest Exporters of Deerskins from Charlestown, 1735-1775," *South Carolina Historical Magazine*, 74 (1973), 144-50.

[42] Moore, "Largest Exporters."

[43] Higgins, "Merchants in Negro Trade."