

THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL MAGAZINE

VOLUME 102 • 2001



Publication of this volume is made possible
in part by the Frederick Horner Bunting
Publication Fund and

WACHOVIA

(ISSN 0038-3082) • (USPS 502360)

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY THE

SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

FIREPROOF BUILDING

100 MEETING STREET

CHARLESTON, SC 29401-2299

PHONE (843) 723-3225 • FAX (843) 723-8584

THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL MAGAZINE

VOLUME 102 • 2001

ARTICLES

An Affair of Honor at Ft. Sumter by C. Russell Horres, Jr.	6
Hyrne Family Letters, 1699-1757 Edited by Pauline M. Loven	27
Bishop John England and the Possibilities of Catholic Republicanism by Daniel F. Kearns	47
Celebrating 100 Years of the <i>South Carolina Historical Magazine</i> by Walter Edgar	68
The Wit and Wisdom of Robert Quillen, 1887-1948 by Marvin L. Cann	110
Setting the Mark: Lucile Godbold and the First International Track Meet for Women by Jane P. Tuttle	135
On the Beat: Black Policemen in Charleston, 1869-1921 by John Oldfield	153
Seeds of Reform: David R. Coker, Premium Cotton, and the Campaign to Modernize the Rural South by Peter A. Coclanis	202
The Progressive Democrats in Chicago, July 1944 by Miles S. Richards	219
Bishop Lynch's People: Slaveholding by a South Carolina Prelate by David C.R. Heisser	238
Traditional Belles or Borderline Bluestockings? The Petigru Women by William H. Pease and Jane H. Pease	292
"Great Events Have Taken Place": The Civil War Diary of Adèle Allston Vanderhorst by Pamela J. Clements	310
A Businessman in Crisis: Col. Daniel Jordan and the Civil War by Henry Carrison	335

BOOK REVIEWS	76, 169, 263, 362
RECENTLY PROCESSED MANUSCRIPTS	98, 191, 279, 381
MEMORIALS	99, 194, 283, 386
INDEX, VOLUME 101	387

A BUSINESSMAN IN CRISIS : COL. DANIEL JORDAN AND THE CIVIL WAR

HENRY CARRISON*

IN DECEMBER 1859, WHEN COL. DANIEL W. JORDAN BOUGHT Laurel Hill, a rice plantation on Waccamaw Neck, he joined the creme de la creme of South Carolina's well defined antebellum social strata.¹ For generations, rice plantations had rewarded their owners with fabulous wealth, political influence, and social exclusivity, and nowhere in the U.S. was rice production concentrated like it was along the fresh water tidal stretches of the four rivers emptying into Georgetown's Winyah Bay—a third of the country's total production.²

Plowden C. J. Weston, from whom he bought the plantation, was one of these "rice princes." Educated at Harrow and Cambridge, Weston owned three plantations other than Laurel Hill, and when he died in 1864, he left a library valued at over \$15,000 (\$149,000 today)³ and a wine cellar containing 110 dozen bottles of wine.⁴ Unlike these established planters, however, Col. Jordan, 49, who was from North Carolina, had not inherited great wealth, nor was he dazzled by its brilliance. While the trappings of the rice plantations—the long avenues of live oaks, the great houses, the elegant furnishings, the ordered gardens, and the liveried servants—had obvious appeal for him, Laurel Hill was strictly an investment.

During the eight years he owned Laurel Hill, Col. Jordan was tested as few men are in business, and his decisions had to be made virtually alone. Like many of his fellow planters, War, Emancipation, and floods wiped out his entire investment in rice, a tremendous loss. Yet he survived, invested again in other businesses, and eventually prospered. Without his propensity to accept risks, he might have suffered less; on the other hand, without his

*Henry Carrison is an independent researcher. Much of the information about Col. Jordan was taken from the Daniel W. Jordan Collection of over 4,000 letters and other papers at the Perkins Library of Duke University.

¹ Elected Lt. Col. of the Mississippi state militia in November, 1838. The title, used by acquaintances, was eventually adopted.

² Walter Edgar, *South Carolina: A History* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 269.

³ John J. McClusker, "How Much Is That in Real Money? A Historical Price Index for Use as a Deflator of Money Values in the Economy of the United States," *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, 101, pt. 2, (Oct. 1991), 297-373. (1991 figures increased by 15% to adjust to the year, 2000.)

⁴ George C. Rogers, Jr., *The History of Georgetown County, South Carolina* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 258-259.



**Col. Daniel W. Jordan (1810-1883) in the late 1850s.
Image courtesy of the author.**

personal courage and creativity, he would never have prevailed. Combining intellect, intuition and tough pragmatism, he had both the head and soul of an entrepreneur.

Col. Jordan had prospered in the 1850s as a turpentine producer, although earlier in his career he had known failure as well as success. These experiences had taught him several important lessons that he used to derive a business strategy. He observed that with volume production of commodities such as cotton, turpentine, and rice, unit costs could be reduced significantly. The key was to use labor specialization, task repetition, and incentives to gain efficiencies. Consequently, it was important that he become, and remain, a large slaveowner, and one of the trademarks of his businesses was that they were geared for volume. Another lesson, this one more painful, was that while borrowed money was a convenient source of capital, financial leverage was potentially dangerous because lenders seemed to want their money most at the very time that borrowers were least able to

pay. If possible, therefore, a borrower needed access to emergency cash. Finally he had seen that while one's life might be disrupted by events beyond his control, perseverance and flexibility were invaluable tools for survival. In December 1859, as he celebrated the purchase of Laurel Hill with a "Montezuma" cigar and a glass of champagne, he had no inkling that these principles would be so quickly, and so severely, tested.

As a young man in Eastern North Carolina in 1833, having heard stories about the fantastic cotton yields of the newly opened western acreage, he joined the thousands of would-be planters in a mass migration from their worn out Carolina and Virginia farms to Alabama and Mississippi.⁵ Unfortunately for him, his timing was bad. After three years of moderately good crops, he had built his Mississippi plantation to about 500 acres and 40 slaves. By 1836, however, he was vulnerable, having borrowed heavily to finance his business—\$20,000 to \$25,000 (approximately \$418,000 today). In mid-1837, burdened with the weight of private speculation combined with the demise of the Second Bank of the U.S., the fragile economy finally collapsed, resulting in the catastrophic "Panic of 1837." Col. Jordan lost his farm, his slaves, and his bride's considerable inheritance, and by the time he returned to North Carolina in 1840, he was literally bankrupt.

It was a discouraging setback, but he was determined to succeed. His timing was considerably more auspicious when he started his turpentine production business in 1843 in Brunswick County, N.C., just south of Wilmington. In the spring of 1845, an industry boom was created when England repealed its import duty on naval stores. The price doubled, then nine months later it increased by half again when a New York dealer tried to corner the market.⁶ In 1846, Col. Jordan moved his operation and his family down to Little River, S.C., and by 1859 he owned about 250 slaves and distilled and shipped 10,000 barrels of turpentine spirits and rosin annually to New York, making him for a time possibly the largest single producer in the United States.⁷

⁵ During the 1830s and 1840s, South Carolina lost 40 percent of its population, and North Carolina each lost a third, to resettlement in the Southwest. Francis Butler Simkins and Charles Pierce Roland, *A History of the South* (New York: Knopf, 1963), 115.

⁶ Percival Perry, "The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1739-1861," Duke University, 1947, doctoral thesis, 247.

⁷ There is very little information available on the size of turpentine producers. In his doctoral thesis, "The Naval Stores Industry in the Ante-Bellum South, 1739-1861," approved by Duke University in 1947, Percival J. Perry offers a few facts which serve only as hints. Apparently the number of large full time producers was minimal—perhaps 30 or less—and these operated almost exclusively in North Carolina. James Metts and John A. Avirett, both North Carolinians, owned 65 and 125 slaves respectively. Two of the largest were Daniel W. Russell and James R. Grist, both operating in Brunswick County, N.C. In 1855, Russell owned 25,000 acres of

By 1859 also, circumstances had changed in the thirteen years since Col. Jordan pioneered large scale turpentine production in Little River. Although he owned approximately 15,000 acres, bought for their stands of longleaf pine, competition was moving in, and pine tracts convenient to deep water for transportation were harder to find. In commodity production, cheap, reliable transportation is a critical factor and for him, it was complicated and risky. His production of turpentine spirits and rosin was rafted from his three distilleries on the Waccamaw River down to Bucksport or Bucksville to meet one of the 12-15 New York based schooners he chartered annually to deliver these barrels to his commission merchant in New York. For sailing ships this round trip to Georgetown and back was demanding and dangerous, particularly on the return trip when these "coasters" would be heavily loaded both above and below deck. In the warm months their crews would often be weakened by malaria from the rice field mosquitoes, and during the winter, could find themselves trying to beat against one of the infamous "nor'easters," and at the same time avoiding the shoals and cross currents of "The Graveyard of the Atlantic," Capes Fear, Lookout, and Hatteras, on the lee shore.

However, Col. Jordan had a reason for paying the expensive freight and insurance charges to New York—it gave him access to money. Unlike the Southern banks and Wilmington commission merchants like DeRosset & Brown, the New York merchants would make capital advances, the majority of which he invested in slaves. Resources like this were invaluable to large slave buyers and lessees like Col. Jordan. On the other hand, once a businessman had committed his business to growth, he had to be prepared for the financial pressures of constantly owing large sums of money and for generating sufficient cash flow to service these obligations. In the latter years of the 1850s, the balance of his capital advances from Benjamin Blossom, his New York agent, was \$7,000 to \$10,000, although there was no note and no scheduled repayment, and his annual cost for leased slaves was about \$12,500; combined, it was the equivalent of about \$423,000 today.

As the 1850s ended, aside from his normal interest in new ventures, Col. Jordan had good reasons to exit the turpentine business. For two decades, turpentine spirits mixed with alcohol had been marketed as the popular, although volatile, illuminant, camphene. In August 1859 in Pennsylvania, however, a former railway conductor, Edwin L. Drake, discovered an effective means of drilling for oil, and almost immediately kerosene, a brighter burning and safer fuel, was being produced. But the economics of

land and produced \$25,000 in sales volume with 150 slaves. By comparison, in 1853, Col. Jordan's sales were approximately \$55,000; the number of slaves and acres of timberland he owned at the time are estimates—150 slaves owned and 50 to 75 leased, and 8,000 acres.

turpentine had also deteriorated—materially. Most of the longleaf pine timber along the coast and rivers, especially on those tracts with deepwater access, now bore the familiar “cat face”⁸ scars of turpentine production; trees worked for turpentine died after about ten years. Slave prices were determined by cotton; slaves that cost \$750 in 1846 had doubled in price to \$1,500;⁹ the annual rental contracts for slaves had risen to \$250/year from \$125/year. Charter freight charges in 1860 at 75 cents per barrel were double the 35-cent cost in 1846.¹⁰ Yet along with the diminishing pine forests and the cost squeeze, the base prices for spirits and rosin remained about the same: \$.40/gallon for spirits and \$1.30/barrel for rosin. As a result, the producers were pressured to increase volume every year just to realize the same income, which required more slaves...and so on.

Having grown cotton and peanuts with varying degrees of success, Col. Jordan did not hesitate to undertake rice planting, although the techniques for planting and growing rice was unfamiliar. In addition to having the Charleston market just 60 miles away, the attractions included a relatively stable plantation life, less travel, predictable prices, a fine rice mill, and a large plantation with no shortage of neighborhood expertise should technical advice be needed. A typical plantation of 600 acres in cultivation might utilize 300 slaves and produce 1,000,000 pounds of rice which, at 3 1/2 cents per pound, would yield an annual income of \$35,000 (or \$650,000 today),¹¹ approximately 1 1/2 times what he earned annually from turpentine, and a number of plantations produced twice that amount. However, he did not forget his axiom about needing a fallback for servicing his debt; Col. Jordan readily accepted business risks but was not a gambler. In the event his rice crop failed or was washed out by a freshet, he would retain some turpentine and peanut production, and there was also a salt works on the Laurel Hill property at Magnolia Beach. His next line of defense was to sell Laurel Hill. Finally, and only as an emergency resort, he could sell slaves. With an active market and a slave force heavily weighted to young male field hands, this investment was not only more liquid than most bank notes but the value of slaves had been rising every year since the Panic of 1837 and represented not only the vast majority of his wealth, but also the annual increase in his net worth.

Col. Jordan thought it likely either that the North and South would negotiate a political compromise, or that the North might continue to

⁸ So called because of the series of V-shaped scars made on the tree trunk to encourage flow of raw turpentine sap.

⁹ Emory Quinter Hawk, *Economic History of the South* (New York, 1934, Reprint Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), 241.

¹⁰ Prices taken from actual contracts in 1846 and 1860.

¹¹ Charles W. Joyner, *Down by the Riverside: A South Carolina Slave Community* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 19-20.

posture and threaten but would not forcibly oppose the South's secession. There seemed to be a reasonable probability that the prosperity of the 1850s would continue into the 1860s. Besides, large rice plantations were occasionally sold but rarely to anyone outside the plantation community—this could be the chance of a lifetime. Therefore, in December 1859, he paid Plowden Weston's asking price of \$85,000 with \$17,000 cash and a mortgage note for \$68,000 and began to reorient his business to planting rice. First, he sold nearly 10,000 acres of timberland to Nicholas Nixon for a \$25,000 note.¹² Next he bought about 40 slaves from Effingham Wagner for \$44,000, giving Wagner \$8,000 cash and notes for the balance.¹³ Finally, he liquidated one of the innovative turpentine partnerships he had set up years earlier to give two of his most promising overseers a chance to build their own equity. One of them, Isaiah Williams, had not adapted well to leadership. The other, Eli Parker, had flourished, and while this partnership was reduced in size, Col. Jordan bought a large tract in the lower Santee swamp for Parker to continue producing turpentine. The object was to provide as many slaves as possible for the rice fields. The 1860 census indicates that Col. Jordan owned 305 slaves, making him one of only 84 men in the entire South to own more than 300 slaves.¹⁴

Committed to learning the nuances of planting rice firsthand, Col. Jordan stayed on Waccamaw Neck all summer instead of taking his family to a retreat as was his practice, and by July his crop looked very promising. The year before, 1859, the plantation produced 672,000 pounds of whole rice, or about \$23,000 in revenue, and he expected to produce at least that much income. By October, however, it was evident that his yield would fall short. Actual production in 1860 was 314,000 pounds, which converted to only \$11,000—less than half the prior year.¹⁵ The reason for the discrepancy with the crop yield is a mystery, although two factors probably contributed. One was the likelihood that his slaves had not, in one season, made the transition from the piney woods to the rice field. The second resulted from his negotiations with his miller, Thomas Daggett. Plowden Weston's father, Francis Marion Weston, had hired Daggett, an engineer from Massachusetts, to be the miller for the Laurel Hill mill, and when he proved to be not only an excellent miller but a blacksmith and carpenter, either Francis, or more likely, Plowden Weston, made Daggett a part owner in the mill. This arrangement did not suit Col. Jordan, however. To him, ownership of Laurel Hill meant control of the entire operation, including the mill, which

¹² Col. Jordan bought his first tract of land in Little River from the brothers, Nicholas and Thomas Nixon, in 1846, and the Nixons had introduced him to peanut farming on a large scale.

¹³ Accounting for transaction dated 1/16/60.

¹⁴ Edgar, *South Carolina: A History*, 311.

¹⁵ Laurel Hill rice mill ledger, South Carolina Historical Society.

he later valued at \$29,000.¹⁶ Daggett realized this, and by May, 1860, five months after the change in ownership, Daggett decided to leave Laurel Hill, "the situation of my family requiring it." He had just installed a steam powered barrel stave machine and corn-grinding mill at a "cost price" of \$6,640.¹⁷ By the fall, the two men had settled on a price. Unfortunately, when Daggett left, Laurel Hill was without an experienced miller, and as a consequence both the quality and quantity of the milled rice suffered.

Further, by the fall of 1860, Col. Jordan was beginning to feel pressure from his lenders. From the professionals, his slave trader in Richmond and his commission merchants in New York and Charleston, he could expect periodic calls for repayment caused by the ebb and flow of money in the economy.¹⁸ However, men from whom he had leased slaves for years on annually renewing notes were requesting full payment, as were those who had sold him land. With an agricultural economy, most families were virtually self-sufficient, had few investment opportunities, and little need for transactional cash, so individual loans was a way to invest. If an individual lender felt that his money was secure, he was usually willing to collect only the going rate of interest, 6 to 8 percent, and to renew his note year after year.¹⁹ But in 1860, with South Carolina's hotspurs threatening to secede if Abraham Lincoln was elected President, the added uncertainty prompted lenders to call in their notes.

With sales of turpentine and peanuts and \$7,000 of milled rice that came with the plantation, he managed to satisfy the majority of his small creditors, postponing payment on the total of \$23,000 owed to the commission merchants. Col. Jordan had anticipated that the business transition might be

¹⁶ Col. Daniel W. Jordan "Diary," January 1, 1868, Jordan Collection, DMC.

¹⁷ Thomas W. Daggett to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, May 8, 1860, Jordan Collection, DMC.

¹⁸ For his sales of turpentine, Col. Jordan was represented in New York by the commission merchant, Benjamin Blossom. For rice, he dealt with the Charleston firm of Mazyck & Howard, and while the relationship with both principals was close, he generally corresponded with Stephen L. Howard. William St. Julian Mazyck was a cousin of Plowden Weston, and since Weston was a creditor, Col. Jordan wanted to avoid a conflict of interest.

¹⁹ In the South capital was a scarce resource and there were many more opportunities to invest than there were available funds. Borrowed money, therefore, was not an option but rather a fact of life, and one requirement for the borrower was that he had to inspire enough credibility to convince suppliers/creditors that he not only could but would perform; i.e., repay them. It was crucial that one's credit reputation be above reproach. No financial statements were ever issued, and usually there was no collateral. On large notes—\$500 or more—the creditor required a well known "security" signature, or endorser—usually a large landowner or slaveowner. Col. Jordan might sign hundreds of his own notes in a year's time, and endorse another twenty or thirty. The "securities" on his notes were friends and family; for

tight, but the speed and direction that events were taking made him uncomfortable. It was like being in a small rowboat on a fast moving river—he could hear a dull roar coming from somewhere ahead....and it was growing louder.

However, money and rice yields weren't the only things on Col. Jordan's mind in the fall of 1860. His oldest daughter, Sarah Victoria, 19, a graduate of St. Mary's in Raleigh and Madame Tognò's, a finishing school on Meeting St. in Charleston, and her father's pride and joy, was preparing to marry Ambrose Davie, a recent medical school graduate of the University of North Carolina and a grandson of Gen. William Davie, the Revolutionary War hero, in December 1860. They were married on December 13, a Friday, and a week to the day before South Carolina seceded from the Union.

The immediate reaction of Southern businessmen to the announcement of secession that winter was enthusiasm. With England as a partner, they would be free of the moralistic sermons from the abolitionists, and from their dependence on Northern "capitalists." In contrast, for the Northern merchant who dealt in cotton, rice, sugar, turpentine, and other Southern commodities, secession brought a state of panic. Not only was their source of income threatened but hundreds of thousands of dollars in capital loans owed to them by Southern planters were suddenly in jeopardy. Col. Jordan's New York agent, Benjamin Blossom, was no exception even though he had been unusually clear sighted in the warnings he issued in early December; in fact, the two men represented opposing points of view about the likelihood of war and the consequences of disunion. Col. Jordan, the entrepreneur and optimist, saw the possibilities, whereas Blossom, the conservative, saw the downside. Blossom wrote:

You seem not to realize what you have to do though with your lauded negro property depreciated 50 percent & all trade & commerce killed for no one knows how long with [—] foes & possible trouble with your negroes & the certainty that in less than one year peaceable separation the two sections could drift into war. . .The credit of the South, as of yourself here, is based on the support stable value of Land & Negroes & crops, etc. & the cause lately pursued (because of evils having occurred which will have probably to a great extent [prove] imaginary) has depreciated these millions of dollars & will depreciate them millions and millions more. The peculiar products of the South have declined so that 200 millions of dollars will not cover the loss on Naval Stores, Rice, Sugar, & Cotton

instance, Henry Buck endorsed his \$68,000 note to Plowden Weston. In fact, it was not unusual for an endorser, for convenience, to pre-sign a number of printed note forms even though by doing so this endorser would have no idea either of the magnitude or the timing of his potential liability.

Crops, unless things mend & prices recover. The maintenance of the Union alone will cause return of Confidence & recovery of prices.²⁰

The financial pressure that began building in 1860 only intensified for the first months after secession, and as a large borrower, Col. Jordan was contending, not only with the large creditors, but with the sudden groundswell towards liquidity. However, nothing—debts, tight money, crop failure, bankruptcy—all his prior disappointments and setbacks combined—nothing could have prepared him for the next letter, which was postmarked “Donaldsonville, Louisiana, and dated February 13th, 1861:

Col. Jordan
Greenville, S.C.

Dear Sir:

“Ere this reaches you, you will no doubt have heard the afflicting news that your poor daughter, M[rs.] Davie and her husband were lost on the steamboat Charmer which was destroyed by fire on Sunday night last opposite the plantation of my son in law M T_____ Gaudet in the parish of St. James about ten miles below this place and some 60 miles above New Orleans.²¹

Given the ambiguity of the address, Col. Jordan may have received the news earlier, but whoever the messenger, the suddenness and finality of the loss of his daughter on her wedding trip must have left him stunned and utterly heartbroken. But he was not allowed time to grieve—the relentless financial pressure did not abate. On February 28, just a week after he learned about Victoria and Ambrose, his Charleston agents, Mazyck & Howard, unaware of the tragedy and under considerable financial stress themselves, wrote: “The statement you make of your affairs seems very satisfactory. We trust you will realize your anticipation. But before these commodities can be converted into money, what is to be done? Your present [debt] to us is about \$14,500. Our means are very small & the Banks will do nothing, we already owing them.”²²

²⁰ Charles W. Blossom to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, December 8, 1860, Jordan Collection, DMC.

²¹ _____ Gaudet to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, February 13, 1861, Jordan Collection, DMC.

²² Mazyck & Howard to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, February 28, 1861, Jordan Collection, DMC.

Another significant pending obligation was his first installment of \$6,800 due to Plowden Weston in February 1861. Given the disappointing rice crop from the prior year, and concerned about the mounting financial pressure, Col. Jordan swallowed his pride and approached Weston, hoping that as one of the wealthiest of the rice planters, he would understand the unusual circumstances and postpone the principal payment for six months until the rice crop could be harvested. To his surprise, Weston refused, a decision probably based on the fact that a modification involved his father's estate, which he was not in the mood to change. After protracted negotiations, Mazyck & Howard, who had a large stake in his success, lent Col. Jordan the interest on the Weston note and eventually prevailed upon Weston to postpone the principal payment.

Of course Col. Jordan, no stranger to cash flow related problems, thought he had arranged a reliable fallback. If, in spite of his sanguine expectations, the rice crop failed, he knew he could rely on turpentine and peanuts. His mistake was in assuming that there would continue to be a market. On April 12, when the Confederate artillery opened on Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor some 60 miles south of him, it not only eliminated any further political compromise but also removed Col. Jordan's access to the New York market for the sale of his products. Then to make matters worse, in late June, by order of President Lincoln, Union warships began implementing Winfield Scott's "Anaconda Strategy," a total blockade of the South's key deepwater ports.

Few men could have withstood this financial pressure, combined with the personal tragedy of losing his oldest child and her husband. He was receiving letters about twice a week from a variety of suppliers, large and small, who were concerned about their businesses and who wanted full payment now! Desperate, he was forced to consider desperate measures. A young Georgetown entrepreneur, Sidney S. Fraser, suggested running turpentine through the blockade from Georgetown to England, but his Charleston agent, Stephen Howard, who was his primary source of liquidity, convinced him that the risks were too great.

Because of their relative independence, turpentine slaves had a reputation for being unruly, so when news of the capture of Ft. Sumter filtered through the grapevine, it may have been responsible for three unusual incidents. More likely, with Col. Jordan's finances somewhat in extremis, the slaves may have been irritated about a shortage in provisions. In any case, these incidents were ominous, presaging more trouble to come. On April 18th, four days after Ft. Sumter surrendered, Eli Parker wrote Col. Jordan a note from the Santee tract:

Col. Jordan

Moses whipped Henderson²³ a day or two ago. I went up there to day & took him—but thought Should have to shoot him but at last he give up - Some one no doubt but our negros broke open a man's House last night & took all the meat he had & even pots plate knives & forks - you had better have those Searched that go to your House. If such goes on there will be no staying here...²⁴

Parker wasn't exaggerating. Slavery worked only because Negroes generally accepted their status as slaves, or were compelled to work by judicious use of the threat of punishment—usually whipping. But on the rice plantations in the vicinity of Georgetown, the proportion of black to white was a minimum of 6 to 1 and after 1862, when the planter families began to move away, the proportion increased rapidly. A few weeks later, as a result of a similar incident involving female slaves, Parker received a letter from Susan Moyed asking to be paid for what "Mr Jordan's negros" stole from her. "I am a poor woman and I am not able to lose my things and not get nothing from them..." She asked for \$60 for her loss of "1 nice worsted dress, 1 pair of sheets, 2 pretty coats, 1 pair drawers, and some unbleached homespun."²⁵

On July 30, 1861, Howard wrote Col. Jordan that several Charleston merchants were planning to run the blockade with a load of naval stores. He commented hopefully, "The general impression in the city is that England & France will soon raise the Blockade, as the slow progress of the Lincoln Army has destroyed the prospect of a short war." The combination of the blockade and tight money had Howard worried. He wrote, "We would not call upon you [for money] at this time if we possibly could get on without it, but our Banks are doing nothing, and as we are not able to sell anything, will require the assistance of our friends to go on..."²⁶

In response to Howard's letter of July 30, Col. Jordan sent a load of turpentine spirits to Charleston in August but the vessel was intercepted by the blockade and captured. Adding insult to injury, the yield for the 1861 rice crop at Laurel Hill was even worse than the 1860 crop—it amounted to only 230,000 pounds, or \$8,000.

²³ Moses may have been a slave driver, or Henderson, an overseer.

²⁴ E.I. Parker to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, April 18, 1861, Jordan Collection, DMC.

²⁵ Susan Moyed to E.I. Parker; 1861, Jordan Collection, DMC.

²⁶ Stephen L. Howard to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, July 30, 1861, Jordan Collection, DMC.

By November 1861 the price for rice had increased to 4 cents/lb. from 2 1/2 cents in September—shortages were beginning to affect prices more than the loss of the export market. Throughout the fall, Howard prodded Col. Jordan to send all the rice he could. In most of these letters, he implores, in effect: “No more money! You need to pay us some of what you owe. We’re out of money to lend—there’s a blockade here and we have enough trouble finding buyers. You told us you had arranged with a bank to cover your expenses until the crop could be sold. Make them honor their commitments or find another bank to lend you money.” Despite the rhetoric however, Howard continued to accept Col. Jordan’s drafts—the tradition of service was just too strong.

Frustrated by frequent transportation bottlenecks and soaring freight expenses in the fall of 1861, Col. Jordan bought an interest in a schooner, *Laura*, to haul his products to Charleston. He was also drafting his own bills of lading, lacking the printed forms. In February, 1862, Captain Chadwick of the *Laura* sent some disturbing news:

Col Jordan Dear Sir I arived here Last night from Santee where I left the *Laura* with parkers son the yankeys have cut off the pasage to charleston they have Sunk 5 of the costers....What do you think best to be done Come back go up the Santee or fight our way through write me or come down on Thursday if I can get 20 men I can take those barges with (Eds?). I want to go up home to day and will be back Thursday.

JRChadwick²⁷

Now the ships blockading Charleston were not simply watching the ocean entrance; the approaches behind the barrier islands were also being patrolled. Since steam propulsion was needed to transport the rice barrels upriver to the railroad trestles, the owners sold the *Laura* for \$5,000, probably for service as a blockade runner.

As George Rogers explains in his *History of Georgetown County*, the fall of two key Confederate forts on the Tennessee River in early February 1862, Forts Henry and Donelson, created the need to pull replacement troops from the coastal defense and reinforce the western armies. The fortifications ringing Winyah Bay, therefore, were abandoned and a defensive line established further inland.²⁸ In April and May, 1862, Federal gunboats that had been patrolling the coast, made their first incursions into the rivers, and

²⁷J.R. Chadwick to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, February 18, 1862, Jordan Collection, DMC

²⁸Rogers, *History of Georgetown County*, 396.

were there for the remainder of the war. These gunboats, whose primary mission was to prevent blockade runner traffic, would occasionally harass planters known to be secessionists by burning boats, docks, barns, and mills, and whenever possible offering asylum to the "contrabands," or slaves.

Soon thereafter, as a way to protect their families as well as their slaves, the planters began to leave their plantations for properties they bought up to 150 miles inland. Emily Weston, Plowden's wife, wrote to Benjamin Allston on July 4, 1862, that Plantersville, a community twenty miles inland, was filled to overflowing with planters and that the only families remaining on Waccamaw Neck were the Jordans and the Rosas. David D. Rosa, a New Yorker, was hired by Plowden Weston as a tutor and later he made him the overseer of his plantation, Hagley.²⁹ Commander Prentiss, officer in charge of the Union gunboats operating in Winyah Bay, reported in May 1862, that, "the rebels are just now very much frightened, and are leaving their plantations in every direction, driving their slaves before them in the pine woods."³⁰

With the familiar routes to Charleston cut off by the Federal gunboats, Col. Jordan had two alternative routes to market. His products could to be shipped up the Santee River to intersect the Northeastern Railroad, with Charleston as a destination, or up the Pee Dee River to meet the Wilmington train. The problem, in addition to the basic logistics and the enemy gunboats, was that the wooden rice barrels were heavy (650-720 lbs.) and cumbersome, and there being only rudimentary roads and few bridges, the railroads had a transportation monopoly which they were not bashful about exploiting. For shippers, the service was atrocious. The rice barrels were rolled by hand or lifted with block and tackle, but train cars were open to wind and rain and even with the stout staves and straps, breakage could not be prevented when the barrels shifted or when cars rammed each other (air brakes were a later invention). David Cowan, who managed Col. Jordan's shipments to Wilmington, found the Wilmington and Manchester Railroad particularly frustrating: "the manner in which the R.R. Companies have acted, by breaking Bbls to pieces and carrying them as above stated [ruined by rain water] has worked very much to my injury.... Railroads, like every thing else, are making more money than they know what to do with - and nothing can be done with them."³¹

It is a testament to the courage and fidelity of Mazyck & Howard that they allowed Col. Jordan to continue to draw on their account and thereby

²⁹ Walton H. Rawls, *A Century of American Sculpture: Treasures from Brookgreen Gardens* (New York: Abbeville Press, 1988), 115.

³⁰ Rogers, *History of Georgetown County*, 402.

³¹ David Cowan to Col Daniel W. Jordan, May 2, 1860, Jordan Collection, DMC.

keep his operation going through 1862. Now that the Confederate harbor defenses had been effectively abandoned, the unopposed Federal gunboats were constantly in Winyah Bay or patrolling the rivers, and slaves were looking for opportunities to escape to one of these vessels. In September, at rice harvest, the gunboat activity on the Waccamaw had increased to a point that Col. Jordan chose not to harvest a majority of his rice crop for fear of losing his slaves. His only large recorded sale in 1862 was a \$19,000 sale of turpentine to the Confederate Government in December; \$9,000 of these proceeds went to Plowden Weston and \$6,000 went to Mazyck & Howard.

That winter, Howard had an intriguing idea—one that had the potential of solving several financial problems simultaneously. The planters had moved inland, leaving Mazyck & Howard with thousands of dollars in unpaid crop advances. As Howard put it: ".....the rice planters are paying us nothing and our balances to them are large and they (are) in no condition to meet them."³² The plan would involve Col. Jordan buying rice from these absentee planters, including those on the Pee Dee, Sampit, Black, and Santee Rivers in addition to the Waccamaw; Mazyck & Howard would advance Col. Jordan the funds to buy the rice. One of the keys to Howard's plan was getting the products to market, and in that, Col. Jordan had proven to be daring and resourceful. The rice had to be processed, and there was the large rice mill at Laurel Hill. It was dangerous, but the elements were in place to make it possible.

Col. Jordan took most of the risks but if the plan worked, everybody would win. Moreover, the timing was propitious because Howard, who was close to the market, expected a major movement in price to follow the decline in production caused by the planters' leaving. His reasoning went like this: the market price for milled rice was 8 cents, and would soon be 10 cents. It cost 4 to 5 cents/lb. for purchase, milling, and sales commissions, another 4 to 5 cents to get it to the railroad, and 4 to 5 cents rail freight, or about 12 to 15 cents total. Other than possibly transportation, expenses wouldn't change. Now suppose the market price moved to 20 cents and one could buy as much as he wanted. The profit possibilities would be limited only by how much rice could be bought and processed.

The Confederate government was essentially the market because the soldiers had to be fed, and this way, they would get it. For those planters who still had their overseers and remaining slaves planting their fields, they would receive payment immediately and avoid the logistical headaches of milling their rice and smuggling it to Charleston. Col. Jordan would perform that function—he would buy the rice, mill it, and ship it. For

³² Mazyck & Howard to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, February 22, 1863, Jordan Collection, DMC.

Mazyck & Howard, who would underwrite the purchases and sell the rice to the Confederate government, they would earn the 2 1/2 percent commission and perhaps get some prior advances paid. For the government buyers who were having difficulty acquiring rice in quantity, this was a service. For Col. Jordan, frustrated as he was with three unsuccessful efforts to produce a satisfactory rice crop, this not only made sense but played to his strengths—negotiations and logistics. The key was to avoid the gunboats. It proved safer to ship the rice up the Pee Dee by steamer to the Wilmington and Manchester trestle than to ship it seventy three miles up the Santee River and then back down to Charleston on the train.³³

Their first participant was Henry A. Middleton who owned Weehaw and Kensington on the Black River. George Rogers says of H.A. Middleton that he was the grandson of Henry Middleton, president of the Continental Congress and nephew of Arthur Middleton, signer of the Declaration of Independence. In 1850 he owned 302 slaves and his plantations yielded 900,000 pounds of rice in 1851; he was also "one of the truly rich men in the district."³⁴ Col. Jordan's only limitation was the amount of money Mazyck & Howard could advance to buy the rough rice. They started cautiously....this scheme was not yet proven and money was scarce.

Howard's intuitions proved to be right. By March 22, 1863, rice was selling for 19 cents to private buyers in Charleston—a phenomenal increase in one of the most important money crops produced in South Carolina. Only a year earlier, which was nine months into the blockade, rice had been selling in Charleston for 3 cents. The Southern economy, however, was fragile since most of the wealth had been invested in slaves, and the chronic shortage of liquid capital, combined with the inability to earn foreign exchange by exporting its commodities, caused the rapid run up in prices.

As the primary buyer, the government had two advantages. One was that they could pay cash for their purchases. Second, they could accept delivery at the trestles where the railroads crossed the river rather than in

³³ Wilmington, the South's only large port on the East Coast, was still active and had the added possibility of export whereas traffic in and out of Charleston had, for all intents and purposes, ceased. Until it fell in January, 1865 to a tremendous combined Federal land and naval siege, Fort Fisher, designed on the order of Sevastopol and called the "Gibraltar of America," overlooked the mouth of the Cape Fear River and kept the blockading fleet around Wilmington at arms length. To effectively cut off traffic into and out of Wilmington meant that a blockading fleet had to patrol over fifty miles of the Cape Fear's labyrinth of inlets, shoals, and islands, and the virtual impossibility of doing so made Wilmington the home port for most of the South's blockade runners. It was the Wilmington blockade runners that were largely responsible for maintaining Lee's army in the field and supplied with food and equipment during 1864 and 1865.

³⁴ Rogers, *History of Georgetown County*, 285.

Charleston or Wilmington where storage was expensive if it could be found. Consequently, the government offered a price substantially less than that offered by the private buyers.

But where was the government getting its cash? This was wartime and Southerners had little money for taxes, yet the government suppliers had to be paid. Consequently, the Confederate Treasury Secretary, C.C. Memminger, chose the only alternative and floated paper currency, or "Confederate money," which was predictably highly inflationary. Like the game of "hot potato," Confederate money was effective so long as the next person would accept it in payment for goods or services—the Confederate government did not compel its acceptance. Patriotism carried it for a few months, but it couldn't last—inflation was inevitable. By March 1863, prices in terms of this currency, were seven times their level two years earlier. However it was the items not produced in the South that were totally out of reach—nails, for example, were selling for \$1.50/pound, but only if they could be found.³⁵

The planters liked the advantages offered by this venture and the rice kept coming—Alex M. Forster from the Sampit River plantation, Friendfield, sent Col. Jordan a note in April saying that he was loading the Laurel Hill boat and had received \$2,000 from Mazyck & Howard for a thousand bushels but that with prices continuing to climb, he wanted to wait before selling any more.³⁶ J. H. Trapier sent word that he had heard that Col. Jordan was buying rice and asked what price he could get for 5,000 bushels at his plantation on the Black River.³⁷

This new venture was very risky in that river steamboats could be intercepted at any time by the Union gunboats and the rice confiscated. Col. Jordan had a several choices—whether to try to ship his rice all the way into Charleston or Wilmington in order to sell to the private buyers at a much higher price, or sell to the government at the river trestle and save the rail freight, and whether to use the Santee or the Pee Dee. The Pee Dee, which went to the North Carolina market, was safer, but initially the prices were lower. Furthermore, the Yankees were not the only ones who threatened to take the rice by force. At first the North Carolina officials, no doubt in response to the need for food for the army but with tight budgets to pay for their purchases, tried intimidation. Cowan wrote to Col. Jordan that the government offered 10 cents for an entire lot and "threatened to Seize (it) unless accepted." Because the "market price" for the few remaining private buyers was considerably higher he refused, but ultimately had to sell. "The

³⁵ David Cowan to Col. Daniel W Jordan, Sept. 20, 1863, Jordan Collection, DMC.

³⁶ Alex M. Forster to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, April 1, 1863, Jordan Collection, DMC.

³⁷ J. H. Trapier to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, July 13, 1863, Jordan Collection, DMC.

next lot of 400 casks I am about to send to other parties @ 13c. Should you Ship after the above, you must make up your mind to abide (the) consequences. I think I can evade them....."³⁸ This price differential between the government and the private buyers did not last—the government soon realized that if they were going to continue to buy rice in quantity, they would have to accept a price closer to the private rate.

In April, Mazyck & Howard received a large shipment from Col. Jordan that arrived on the 11th "in the most wretched order...."³⁹ They had asked the government to accept the rice at the river bridge, but because of the condition of the barrels, were refused. This time they couldn't blame rough treatment by the railroad because the barrels themselves were missing hoops and had opened to let in the rain. Three quarters of the barrels were without heads. Mazyck & Howard had a sizable salvage job which they achieved admirably, sold it to the government, and collected \$30,932.77. Howard commented that with the threat from the Union fleet, private buyers and speculators were nowhere to be found and the banks had all left town. Out of curiosity, he checked on shipments from other rice planters and found them to be generally undamaged and reported that they were using more and better hoops. Never attentive to this kind of "detail," Col. Jordan assigned supervision to a manager and apparently, since no one expected this arrangement to continue for long, he was more interested in shipping volumes of rice than in slowing the process to emphasize quality.

Shipments of rice were amazingly large and frequent—by late April, Cowan had sold another lot for \$27,339.59. "I fear I will not be able to realize 18 cents on the next lot," he worried. "Virginia men don't pay 25c as it will bring no more than that [18 cents] in Richmond."⁴⁰ Meanwhile, Parker has been busy in the turpentine business, and sent Col. Jordan an accounting of the filled barrels—over 13,000 barrels of raw turpentine and 2,000 barrels of rosin. Many of the rosin barrels were sunk in black water ponds for security and remained there for the remainder of the war. Even at pre-war prices, the total cache was worth \$15,000. Most of this turpentine survived the war and was probably used to pay Benjamin Blossom his accumulated pre-war advances.

Col. Jordan and John LaBruce also operated a salt works on Magnolia Beach and sold salt for \$12/bu. Although demand for salt was only occasional, some orders were for as much as 100 bushels, which was

³⁸ David Cowan to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, March 18, 1863, Jordan Collection, DMC.

³⁹ Mazyck & Howard to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, April 8, 1863, Jordan Collection, DMC.

⁴⁰ David Cowan to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, April 26, 1863, Jordan Collection, DMC.

welcome as a supplement to income.

Early in May 1863, Col. Jordan must have taken some satisfaction in making a \$20,400 payment on his note to Plowden Weston. By this time he had paid \$46,000 of the \$85,000 purchase price. Weston wrote in May, thanking him for his "very prompt and honorable payment of these sums which have proved a great convenience." Confident that he could generate substantial sums from the purchase, milling, and sale of rice, Col. Jordan even asked Weston if he could prepay the bond through the February 1865 installment. Weston replied that he was not anxious to receive the prepayment although he certainly would not refuse it, and would prefer to get it by August when the interest on Confederate securities was reduced. He also mentioned that he was glad that Laurel Hill had not yet suffered from the Yankee raids.⁴¹

Stephen Howard and David Cowan, Col. Jordan's representatives in Charleston and Wilmington respectively, had their sensitive fingers on the pulse of the market and kept him informed. They were a good team, especially since this was where Col. Jordan's genius lay—in organizing projects, in transportation, in finance, and in logistics. Despite the success of this current venture, it was increasingly apparent that his purchase of Laurel Hill had been a mistake, but when he mentioned his willingness to sell it, Howard reminded him that any arrangement would have to bear the approval of Plowden Weston. To get his approval, the sale could not pay him out early and would have to bring security, or collateral, that would be an improvement on what he currently held. Then there was the question of how the buyer would pay for it. In Confederate money? It was doubtful that Weston would accept it. In fact, the money situation was getting worse daily and Howard was concerned that unless the Confederate government did something soon to restore confidence, this already highly inflated money would be worthless.⁴² Cowan described the difficulties in locating private buyers and finding a safe place to store money:

I can sell any quantity—more at same figure (25 cents); it appears to me to be a good trade—Gov't can move it, individuals cannot. RR Co has no place to store it—Gov't is willing to take it on platform, subject to injury by weather—individuals are unwilling to take the risk...Cape Fear Bank will receive your money on deposit on following conditions—Viz—Charging depositors 1/4 %—

⁴¹ Plowden C.J. Weston to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, May 17, 1863, Jordan Collection, DMC.

⁴² Mazyck & Howard to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, December 7, 1863, Jordan Collection, DMC.

depositor agrees to take such funds as he deposits—in case the town is attacked, depositor is to be notified to draw his money—if he fails to do so, and the money is lost—it is his and not the bank's loss. I am unwilling to subscribe to any such arrangement, and have therefore withdrawn my deposits....⁴³

This new arrangement had succeeded beyond anyone's expectations; Col. Jordan's sales for the first six months of providing this service were in excess of \$100,000, and his profit margin, based on his results for February through June, 1864, was 50 percent—a phenomenal windfall, even in inflated Confederate money. At the same time, he provided both the planters and the government a valuable service. Since Col. Jordan was, for the government buyers, a relatively small supplier, he was paid at the going rate, a price sufficient to bring not only his rice but quantities from other sellers, to market. He was paid in Confederate money, but his inventory turnover was so rapid—a week or two—that the rate of inflation did not pose a serious handicap. Furthermore, as a net borrower, inflation reduced the real value of his debt because it allowed him to repay it with cheaper dollars.

However, though the rice could be easily sold, as the activity of the Union gunboats accelerated, more rice planters quit planting, being unwilling to risk losing their slaves to escape or capture. So while he made some rice sales early in 1864 totaling about \$75,000, the daily threat from the gunboats had its intended effect. Finally, in the late spring of 1864, the Laurel Hill mill was burned by one of the gunboats and shortly thereafter the Jordans moved to Camden.

None too soon. By the spring of 1865, with nobody to feed them, and experiencing for the first time the exuberance of freedom without the familiar strictly imposed discipline, the former slaves looted, burned, and stole their way through the rice plantations.⁴⁴ There were several reactions to this military, political, and sociological crisis. One was an unsigned and undated note that came to Col. Jordan from his Laurel Hill overseer, probably I. H. Sawyer:

Dear Sir

I write under the most exciting of circumstances—at the fall of Charleston I tried to move the negroes but found that they all wanted [to] run away. At the same time Columbia fell. I did not know where I could carry them. I have heard that they passed through your place & destroyed everything & hoped they could be fed—it would

⁴³ David Cowan to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, December 8, 1863, Jordan Collection, DMC.

⁴⁴ J.H. Easterby, *The South Carolina Rice Plantation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), 206.

be impossible to keep them anywhere—the yankees have possession of Georgetown in force & will soon rade through here & destroy everything. The opinion of all influential men is that the negros are a gone question & if so I thought it improper to try & save them. Thought everybody here are taken the oath of allegiance to the yankee Government—thinking of our conversation I went down to town & took the oath. They gave new protection for property only negros—[after?] loose the negros [we] had are better so to save what we can I done it against my will & now regret it.

Ned & Doc have gone to yankees & five of ours all ready—Some will Stay here on the place can't say how many. I will induce all to stay so if we are to have negros after the war we can get at them. Some have lost all. If you think best you could send for them but would take [an] armed force to carry them—then in the condition of the country they would run & go to the yankees. If they all go or nearly so. I wish you had some of the mules if you have need for them.

[At] times like these I am at a loss how to act for the best. I got Mr Ogburn to carry this letter to you & bring an answer to me as it was the only way that I can hear from you. write me everything that you think I may do for the best. Could you not send Joe for some of the mules or Peter if you need them—I may have acted wrong but that was the last resort here to save anything. If [] does the yankees at Georgetown they will not rade in less than three or four weeks—if you can send down you would be safe but if I leave all the negros would go at once.

I send your check on Charleston for 2545.40 twenty five hundred forty five and 40/100 Dollars. I can't use it here perhaps you it is what I got for the meat furnished the Government. Col or Mrs J write me conclusions about the matter by []

By April, 1865, the month the war ended, Col. Jordan was in Camden, trying to decide what to do next and corresponding with Eli Parker, his partner in the turpentine business. The first priority was to generate some income, but at least in the turpentine woods, the former slaves were reluctant to work whether or not there was money to pay them. Parker wrote that he had either distilled or saved some spirits which he took to Georgetown to sell but was offered only 60 cents, a premium price before the war but now with the effects of inflation, was unreasonably low. Disappointed, he stored the barrels in a warehouse. The latest market quotation in New York for spirits was \$1.85, but people were saying that it could fall to \$1.00 because of a new product, kerosene. Parker reported that their turpentine stills were torn up and the copper bottoms were worn out

and it would take two or three thousand dollars to restore them to working order. Furthermore, there were no coopers or iron hoops; his suggestion was to use whiskey or beer barrels—they held 25 gallons, cost only 50 cents each, and were the best in the world. The most difficult challenge, however, was to find labor. He continued:

You were very fortunate that General Potter did not reach your place. You have no idea what influence the Yankees have among the negroes. I saw the provost marshal, [the Col] commanding, and they say that they do not know the disposition that has been made of Laurel Hill or what has become of the mashenary [machinery] you Spoke of—they are under the impression that if you come down and take [possession] that you can retain Laurel Hill. Gilmore is to be military Governor of South Carolina—the yankees say that if every man does not take the oath that the state will be garrisoned by negro troops. The negroes here have been very ornery but of late they have been disciplined and punished which has made quite a change—at one time it was dangerous to travel but not now—perfectly safe. I should like to know what our plan will be now to make money....I think you had better come down alone & take the oath & try to save your property.⁴⁵

If there was one thing about business that Col. Jordan understood, chapter and verse, it was the value of labor. Nothing was going to happen anywhere until Negroes could be persuaded to work, whether for food and shelter or for money. On the other hand there was no money to be had. When the slaves were freed, the planters, who represented the wealth in the South, lost 90 percent of the value of their assets, and now that the war was over, Confederate money was worthless. In a letter to Col. Jordan, Charles Alston, in a rather high handed missive, lays much of the blame for the local chaos with the former slaves at Col. Jordan's doorstep.⁴⁶ His scarcely

⁴⁵ Eli Parker to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, May 28, 1865, Jordan Collection, DMC.

⁴⁶ Dear Sir - At the request of my neighbors I write to ask you as to your property at Laurel Hill. It is filled up by vagabond negroes from all parts of the country who go there when they please—take what they please and are [in] fact destroying what you left of a settlement. They are thus a perfect nuisance to the neighborhood, a harbor for all the thieves and scoundrals who won't work. We know of no person acting as your agent here and I therefore write to know what you intend doing with regard to the property & whether you have abandoned it or whether you have taken steps to recover possession and if so at what day we may expect yourself or agent to occupy and endeavor to keep some order and law on it. As it stands now it is become a positive injury to all of us who are near. It would be some relief even for us to learn that by next January at least these people would be turned off or kept

concealed frustration is understandable. Col. Jordan's response is not available, but in all likelihood he would have explained that he did indeed expect to return but for the moment was attempting to resolve several pressing matters in Camden. The difference in perspective is worth noting. Alston was not interested in Col. Jordan *per se*; he was interested in restoring and protecting his way of life—the legacy of wealth and privilege that was being threatened. Col. Jordan understood, and was sympathetic, but to him Laurel Hill was an investment, and a marginal one at that. Nevertheless, he did return to Laurel Hill that spring, lived there, and planted rice crops there in 1866 and 1867.

The military rule imposed on the South may have initially been a godsend in insuring law and order. However, within a matter of weeks it was apparent that there would be a leveling bias that could come only at the expense of the relatively wealthy. One of the new rules was that employers were required to get a work contract signed by each worker, all of whom were illiterate. Parker described the reaction:

Dear Sir

I have at last got all negros here to sign the contract. They go to work munday morning. [I] could not get them to do it before they signed it with grate reluctance and Isaac Reid would not do it and had to take him to Kingstree. he cut up all sorts of shines—Said he would suffer to be Shot down before he would sign it—that he didn't pretend to do anything for any man that he had been under all his life. I go to Georgetown today & will try to get those but fear they will not and as they have been off the place all summer there will be no compelling them. however I will do the best I can. The man has not yet come from Charleston to buy the turp—you had better send Pork at once as I fear they will not do much until they get it. I shall look for coopers & wagon & smith to drive down.

Respect yours
E.I. Parker⁴⁷

under better control. I write you for our situation will be dependable on indeed if all the Planters do not stand by each other in maintaining order. We have already made many things better and if absent Planters return or place agents on their places all might yet go well.

An answer directed to Georgetown at your earliest convenience will oblige

Yours very truly

Charles Alston

⁴⁷ Eli Parker to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, September 29, 1865, Jordan Collection, DMC.

It is difficult today, 135 years later, to appreciate the hardships of 1865 and 1866. Of the 60,000 South Carolinians who fought, 21,000 did not return. Sherman and Potter had burned and wrecked businesses, court houses, plantations, railroads, and bridges. The Union military was in charge. There was no money and shortages of everything but tears; slaveowners from South Carolina alone lost nearly \$300 million in freed slaves.⁴⁸ Negroes were reluctant to work or refused altogether. To survive was hard enough; to operate a business in those conditions was nearly impossible. Yet Col. Jordan was operating four—simultaneously! In 1864 he bought a 2,000 acre cotton plantation in Camden which was being managed by his son. Then there was the turpentine business in the Santee swamp run by Eli Parker, and a cotton buying business in Camden for Theodore Wagner of Charleston.

The fourth business may have been a good idea, but it required persuasion, leadership, money, coordination, nerves, and considerable luck. It involved leasing several of the inactive Georgetown rice plantations. The elements made sense—a number of families had not returned to their plantations, so their land was lying fallow and their former slaves had no work and therefore no source of food. Mazyck & Howard was also interested in generating some revenue. In early 1866, after Col. Jordan had registered his pledge of allegiance to “faithfully support and defend the Constitution ... etc” in the Camden Provost Marshal’s Office, he and Dr. John D. McGill leased a Waccamaw plantation, “Prospect Hill,” for a year for \$2,000 from Benjamin Huger Ward, which they planted as a partnership, along with McGill’s Richmond Hill, adjacent to Laurel Hill.⁴⁹

In addition to Laurel Hill, which, of course, he owned, Col. Jordan leased and planted four other plantations:

Rose Hill	Waccamaw River
Longwood	Waccamaw River
Windsor	Black River
Keithfield	Black River

This would mean that Col. Jordan would have hired approximately 500-700 former slaves—the same ones who had been looting and burning—and at least 7 overseers. He bought seed, houses, food, tools, livestock, etc., and as Stephen Howard, who financed this venture, remarked, “you are the largest rice planter in the state and hope you may make enough to let us again be able to quote rice as a staple of the soil.”⁵⁰ The normal risks of

⁴⁸ Edgar, *South Carolina: A History*, 374-375.

⁴⁹ Col. Daniel W. Jordan, February 9, 1866, Jordan Collection, DMC.

⁵⁰ Mazyck & Howard to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, April 30, 1866, Jordan Collection, DMC.

growing rice had not changed other than being multiplied seven times. Money was extremely scarce. But the key factor was still labor and the Negroes were violent and unpredictable. Few people would have dared to invest at all, let alone on a scale that required an up-front rental payment of about \$7,500 (\$72,000 today), or \$1,700 to 2,000 apiece for each of the plantations, before the first seed was planted.

An added complication was that the occupying military had taken over several of the plantations and contracts between the planters and the freedmen had to bear their endorsement. The following agreement may have been typical—clearly this is a cooperative effort between Col. Jordan, the owners, and the Negro workers, and a version would soon come into common practice as “share cropping.”

27 March, 66

Dear Sir:

Your note of 22nd inst came to hand this evening.

I will rent the Keithfield plantation for \$1750 - being at the rate of \$10 per acre, and the mill for \$1500.

The rent of the plantation to expire on 1st Jan, 1867; of the mill on 1st April/67.

The party renting to take the seed rice at a valuation to be assessed by three impartial gentlemen—cash payment.

The contract made with the negroes for the present year to continue in force—namely, 1/10 of the whole crop & seed rice at the rate of 2 1/2 bushels per acre to be deducted - the remainder to be divided into two equal portions—one for the planter and the other for the laborers.

The trunks to be kept in good working order.

The mill to be delivered up in good working condition.

The engine to be used if required for threshing out the crop in case the mill is rented separately.

... Yours respectfully

FS. Parker⁵¹

George Rogers described the dangers of dealing with labor in a litany of examples of violence and contracts broken by the former slaves. Three days after he signed this letter, F.S. Parker, the manager of Keithfield, was

⁵¹ F.S. Parker to Col. Daniel W. Jordan, March 27, 1866, Jordan Collection, DMC.

attacked by a mob:

According to Dennis Hazel, colored agent of Parker at Keithfield, on March 31 freedman Abram quit work and called others from the fields. They armed themselves with axes, hatchets, hoes, and poles and drove Hazel to the boat. "Sampson threw a hatchet after me which struck the water in front of the boat nearly striking me in the head." Parker sent to town for help, and later two Union soldiers and Hazel approached the freedmen. "As soon as we entered the street the people collected with axes, hoes, sticks and bricks and pelted us with bricks and stones and poles, and took the gun away from one of the soldiers." Parker was forced to jump into the river and swim to the other side. Parker swore that no white man could control the Negroes now that they were free.⁵²

This was an ambitious endeavor, and though not Col. Jordan's last business venture, in terms of large scale entrepreneurial risk it was to be his last hurrah. Did it succeed? The correspondence for the latter 1860s is sparse, but it appears that it did, although not comparable to the windfall that he experienced with buying, milling, and shipping the rice in 1863 and 1864. However, the acid test of its viability was positive: by the end of that crop year Mazyck & Howard had been repaid all their advances.

In September, Col. Jordan wrote to his wife, Emily, in Camden about his crops and his preliminary arrangements for the 1867 rice season, "Tom Flagg is getting up 50 hands and I have given him where he lives and also the big island. Some of the Weston hands are coming and I really think I shall get 100 to 125 hands on Laurel Hill. I shall interest Dr. Magill in it so he may attend to it. We have rented Bob Nesbit's place near here—Huger [Ward] and myself will work Longwood and also Friendfield, and, I think, Alderly..... Longwood crop is quite good, say 9000 bushels—L. Hill nothing—Rose Hill so so—Fairfield good—Windsor 5000 bushels." He will go to Charleston—there is "broke bone fever" there but no yellow fever.⁵³

Apparently Col. Jordan would have three partners for 1867, Flagg, Magill, and Ward.

Unfortunately, their brave efforts to lean against the wind for a second year met with disaster, and Col. Jordan's describes the aftermath in some memoirs that he called his "Diary," written at Laurel Hill:

⁵² Rogers, *History of Georgetown County*, 433.

⁵³ Col. Daniel W. Jordan to Emily Jordan, September 20, 1866, Jordan Collection, DMC.

On this day, January the first, 1868, I have concluded to do what I should have done long years ago; and what I think the duty of the head of every family who wishes to transmit to his descendants the many strange things which are constantly occurring in this uncertain and strange world, viz. a diary of passing events.

This is brought more forcibly to my mind by the wonderful events of the last seven years of war—five of which in actual hostilities, and three made on an unresisting and generous people, by a section of the country, the citizens of which call themselves our brothers—sprung from the same people and speaking the same language. To add to our distress we are threatened by famine. This is brought about chiefly by the meddling of the freedman's bureau with the labouring population which is composed entirely of negroes who do now, and always did, hate constant labour—indeed will not work without compulsion.

Whilst thinking on this war, made on us for no cause whatever, the changed situation of the people of this our Parish of All Saints is brought forcibly to my mind.. I will name a few only, as all are in about the same situation. The Ward family who owned largely of real estate, and some 1,200 to 1,300 negroes, are now quite poor, having nothing left but the land which is rendered of but little value having no labourers who will work it. The Magills, Alstons, Nesbits are in about the same situation.

The writer of this Journal had, when this war began, settled on Laurel Hill plantation, and engaged in making turpentine in the pine woods, 300 negroes, 100 of whom were able men and also a half interest in 14 men working with E.I.Parker, who he took as an overseer for \$200, about AD 1850. The negroes are all gone, and the mill (Rice pounding and Barrel Machines) which cost \$29,000 burnt by the Yankees. So I consider my losses about a quarter of a Million of Dollars....

The last year just past has indeed been one of disaster to us. After much struggling to get the negroes to plant a little rice, the freshet of June came and swept off all as low down this river [Waccamaw] as Oakland; and the other rivers did not fare much better. The writer of this has been nearly ruined by this and [the] state of affairs, having been interested in about 800 acres up the river, from which he will not get a single bushel of rice, besides being in debt for supplies.

The state of affairs is indeed gloomy in the rice country; and I doubt if they are much better in the cotton. The planters having generally lost nearly all the rice, and not being able to pay the factors for advances made, leaves the factors unable, if they are willing, to make further advances. Indeed, with the uncertain labour it would seem imprudent for them to do so. What the country will do it is impossible to say.⁵⁴

After the 1867 freshet, Col. Jordan concentrated his efforts on cotton and, like other South Carolinians, struggled through the Reconstruction years before recovering financially. In 1868, with the agreement of the trustees of the Weston estate, he forfeited his \$46,000 investment in Laurel Hill, which reverted to his friend and former commission merchant, William Mazyck. Like most of the Georgetown plantations, Laurel Hill changed hands several times before finally being purchased by A.M. Huntington; it was one of four plantations incorporated into Brookgreen Gardens. Perhaps too much had been asked of this and other stately plantations—while they supported the antebellum planter society in grand style, they could not salvage it from the wreckage of the Civil War. Without slave labor these plantations eventually withered and died.

Col. Jordan's approach to business was to assess the circumstances, make a decision, and move on. Sentiment and tradition had their place, but usually not in business. He did not linger over failure, and was open to transactions involving rich and poor, the distinguished and the barely literate. He was a visionary, a risk taker, a survivor of the financial pressure cooker. In some ways an "outsider," he was accepted enough to win election over Charles Alston to the S.C. Legislature in 1850 and was one of only two men, after the founders, ever elected to membership in the Hot & Hot Fish Club, the social inner sanctum for the Waccamaw Neck planters. Unconstrained by their rigid social structure, however, he knew people in every niche of society. The explanation is simple—business was business—to him it was neither a hallowed way of life nor a necessary evil. Indeed, pride, so often misinterpreted as "honor," could often become a handicap, particularly in negotiations. His ability to survive, adapt, and even innovate through these traumatic, wrenching years of transition argues that he was one of the first modern businessmen in 19th century South Carolina.

⁵⁴ Col. Daniel W. Jordan "Diary," January 1, 1868, Jordan Collection, DMC.

BOOK REVIEWS

All Our Relations: Blood Ties and Emotional Bonds among the Early South Carolina Gentry. By Lorri Glover. Gender Relations in the American Experience. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi, 206; \$39.95 cloth.)

The planter aristocracy of South Carolina has captured the attention of a number of scholars, for among other reasons they left behind a trail of correspondence, business records, and other materials few colonies can match. Lorri Glover has sensitively mined these documents, providing one explanation for why they exist in such profusion: the meaning of family for Palmetto State planters demanded that they maintain correspondence with mothers, fathers, siblings and other kin. Her brief and lucid study has much new to say about how Carolinians understood family as well as the ways that kinship decisively influenced virtually every aspect of their lives. And Glover is insistent—and persuasive—that the direction of influence moved outward from the family, rather than from other social processes toward it.

The singular insight that renders *All Our Relations* such an important and original work is Glover's shifting of focus from patriarchal relations (between husbands and wives and parents and children) to sibling and kin bonds. Glover does not ignore the former, but she focuses on horizontal ties because, she argues, they have been ignored in most studies. More importantly, she maintains that appreciating their significance forces historians to reevaluate both the extent of patriarchy in the early South and the nature of class power in the region. Her central argument is that patriarchy existed alongside an alternative and equally powerful pattern of cooperation and egalitarianism rooted in sibling and kin ties. From the colony's very genesis patriarchal and egalitarian relations coexisted. The demographically unstable conditions that existed in South Carolina until at least 1750 made patriarchy difficult to establish: fathers and, often, mothers died before their children reached maturity. Hence not only was the colony founded upon sibling and kin cooperation, as relations depended on each other for financial and political support, but the conditions of life and death intensified horizontal ties against those between parents and children. Thus, while kin ties were essential social bonds across British North America, they became peculiarly important in South Carolina. And the early colonial period left another legacy for Carolina's social elite: a nearly single-minded desire to make money. Together, these qualities established the foundation for the unique family culture of early South Carolina's gentry.

Grounding her analysis in sociological literature on the family, Glover shows the unusual intensity of sibling relationships, usually the longest and hence the most important of our lives. She traces this two-tracked model of