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THE LOCAL ORIGINS OF ALLEGIANCE IN REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH CAROLINA: THE WAXHAW AS A CASE STUDY

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SINCE THE END OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR, HISTORIANS have sought to explain why some Americans remained loyal to the British Crown while others joined the independence movement. This tendency is nowhere more evident than in South Carolina, which was second only to New York in the absolute number of loyalists and where loyalists made up an estimated one-third of the white population. Even before the war, concerns about backcountry loyalism compelled lowcountry Whigs to canvas the interior in order to better understand and hopefully neutralize pro-British sentiment there. During the conflict, patriots took the trouble to survey captive loyalists and compile an account of their "reasons for refusing to unite with the Whigs." Immediately following the war, historian David Ramsay gave considerable attention to this question, ascribing loyalism to backcountry remoteness and resentment of coastal elites, fears of the British, and the weak character of the loyalists themselves (they were comprised of "the ignorant, the selfish, and the timid," according to Ramsay).¹

On a less polemical note, Ramsay found that length of residency in America informed patterns of allegiance. The "Irish" immigrants who took bounty lands after 1763 were more likely to remain loyal to the Crown, while the Scots-Irish settlers who immigrated from Pennsylvania and Virginia in the 1750s and 1760s "generally entered with zeal into the new measures." Latter-day historians have echoed Ramsay's findings. In his meticulous 1965 study of loyalist exiles, Wallace Brown concluded that British immigrants who arrived after the Seven Years' War were "much more likely" to remain loyal than earlier settlers. Brown found that nativity and time of immigration was a much stronger determinant of allegiance than a host of other factors, including religion, ethnicity, wealth, and occupation. Apparently the reasons for such loyalism were so obvious as to need little explanation, although Brown did cite "affection for their

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¹ Wallace Brown, *The King's Friends: The Composition and Motives of the American Loyalist Claimants* (Providence, R.I.: Brown University Press, 1965), 289 (numbers), 224 (first quotation); David Ramsay, *The History of South Carolina*, 2 vols. (Charleston, S.C.: Published by David Longworth for the Author, 1809), 1: 260.

inferiority complexes in nineteenth-century America and one of the most soaring superiority complexes any ruling class will ever develop lay that appalling eccentric, the South Carolina would-be revolutionary. . . . Through revolution, South Carolina might halt its decline, ascend to new leadership, bring its slipping synthesis between English and American values to aristocratic stability." But revolution required the support of the (more reluctant) rest of the South, and the word itself conjured visions of a race war or a popular egalitarian upheaval that might bring everything crashing down, a daunting prospect that produced "the anxiety of the gambler terrified of his obsession. They were proud sagging gentlemen desperate for a wild fling—and desperate never to dare anything wild at all."³⁹

Freehling's thesis is imaginative, intriguing, and thought-provoking if not clearly proven. If, as has been argued, South Carolina's yeomen were not quite the helpless political pawns that Freehling portrays, an explanation broader than *planter* psychology may be called for. But Freehling is likely right that one key to the state's antebellum extremism lies in its individual and social psychology.

Such is the current state of the debate. It is evident that not one single factor, but rather a combination of influences, accounts for South Carolina's antebellum radicalism. Some of these factors were unique to South Carolina; others were common to most of the South, but present to a greater degree in South Carolina. Economic decline, out-migration with its consequences of population loss and declining national political influence, the insularity of an almost entirely native-born population, internal unity in defense of a slave society, the apparently stark alternatives of survival or utter ruin that seemed to be involved in slavery's defense, a unique South Carolina variant of the American political tradition rooted in the eighteenth century and honed into final form by John C. Calhoun, emergent feelings of southern nationalism, the defense of southern honor—all interacted to produce a personal and social psychology that produced radical behavior. More remains to be done in explaining the nature of that psychology. The (perhaps unanswerable) question remains, too, to what extent was that psychology shared by yeomen who concurred in the directions set by their planter political leaders. To what extent was the yeomen's consent habitual and pro forma in a deferential and aristocratic order? In any case, although there is still much to be learned and more to be debated, the past thirty years have seen significant advances in our understanding of "The Problem of South Carolina."

³⁹ Ibid., 213-14, 252.

native land" and "zeal for the British constitution" as two possible sources of immigrant loyalty.²

More recent historians have turned an eye to the social dimensions of allegiance. Looking specifically at the South Carolina backcountry, Rachel Klein examined class dynamics at the local level to explain patterns of allegiance. Klein dismissed the sectional argument—that lingering resentment in the upcountry turned one-time Regulators into loyalists—since former Regulators generally joined their lowcountry enemies against the British. Rather, Klein argued, white settlers followed local "leading men" (or in at least one case, a leading man responded to grassroots pressure) when choosing sides. Lowcountry Whigs recognized the importance of local politics in winning adherents and played on the political and military ambitions of backcountry leaders, who accordingly brought entire neighborhoods to the American side. However, in stressing the role of powerful upcountry planters in the formation of allegiances, Klein ignored the residency and immigration issues so prominent in Ramsay and Brown, just as Brown and Ramsay neglected the local relationships that drove recent immigrants into the loyalist camp. In a somewhat more promising approach to the social issues behind allegiance, Robert Calhoon, the foremost authority on American loyalism, has noted that loyalism often took root among the "relatively powerless, victimized people" who occupied the margins of British North American society. Calhoon and others have further pursued this social angle at the local level, suggesting that "local feuds" among neighbors were exacerbated by the war, creating "Whig and Tory enclaves" in communities throughout the British-American borderlands.³


Despite the promise of the community-level approach, none of these studies has subjected the question of allegiance to a close analysis of community dynamics. If allegiance played out along neighborhood lines, as both Klein and Calhoon suggest, a careful examination of neighborhood

² David Ramsay, *The History of the Revolution of South-Carolina, From a British Province to an Independent State*, 2 vols. (Trenton, N.J.: Printed by Isaac Collins, 1785), 2: 54-55; Brown, *The King's Friends*, 269, 271, 278 (remaining three quotations, respectively). Also see the two book-length studies of South Carolina loyalists: Robert S. Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), and Robert W. Barnwell, "Loyalism in South Carolina, 1765-1785" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1941).

³ Rachel Klein, *Unification of a Slave State: The Rise of the Planter Class in the South Carolina Backcountry* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., by the University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 78-82; Robert M. Calhoon, *The Loyalist Perception and Other Essays* (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1989), xiii (first and second quotations); Robert M. Calhoon, Timothy M. Barnes, and George A. Rawlyk, *Loyalists and Community in North America* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994), 3, 5 (third quotation).

formation and community tensions may tease out both the patterns of allegiance and the reasons partisans remained loyal or joined the patriots. This study attempts to do precisely that, focusing on a single community, the Waxhaws, a predominately Scots-Irish settlement in the South Carolina backcountry. Although there were few bona fide loyalists in the Waxhaws, clear neighborhood patterns emerge in terms of allegiances and in the degree of "zeal," or lack thereof, colonists expressed for the "new measures." Indeed, as the experience of the Waxhaws shows, these patterns support Ramsay's and Brown's contention that allegiance was informed primarily by time of immigration. Yet underlying this familiar pattern is a much more complex story, one in which newcomers were marginalized and seemingly minor differences of ethnicity, religion, and class fueled neighborhood tensions that surfaced during the Revolution. This local analysis thus suggests that newcomers' reluctance to join the independence movement was driven by local social dynamics, in particular by the failure of established settlers to effectively integrate recent immigrants into their communities, more than by newcomers' affection for their country of origin or by the authority of local leading men.

The Waxhaw settlement was situated in the lower Catawba River Valley along the North Carolina-South Carolina border. The heart of the settlement comprised two creek systems that drained into the Catawba some forty miles north of Camden. Permanent Euro-American settlers first arrived in the Waxhaws around 1750. Consisting almost wholly of second- and third-generation Scots-Irish Americans, they moved down the Shenandoah Valley from Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina, crowding into the creek and river bottoms on the east bank of the river and occupying most of the choice bottomland by the mid 1760s. Taking up headrights along Waxhaw Creek, the Catawba River, lower Cane Creek, and Rum Creek, this first wave of white settlers formed a tightly knit community. Bound by blood and densely intermarried, they migrated along a social chain that stretched from the Carolina backcountry through the mid-Atlantic region and on to northern Ireland. Their large households enabled these migrants to acquire surplus lands, much of which they used to attract and resettle former neighbors and kin. Their strong communal ties were further reinforced by economic interdependency, habits of neighborliness, and a common religious identity in the form of New Light Presbyterianism. A shared history of conflict with the neighboring Catawba Indians made them still more deeply insular and cohesive. In the first two decades after 1750, they established a bustling yeoman community along Waxhaw and Cane Creeks; possessing few slaves and relying largely on the labor of household and extended-household members, these families produced goods for themselves and one another as they slowly developed the



Waxhaw Neighborhoods, 1780. Adapted from Vergil A. Rogers, *Soil Survey of Lancaster County, South Carolina* (Washington, D.C., 1973) by the author and Shanna M. McGarry.

infrastructure of roads, mills, stores, and credit networks through which they were gradually integrated into the provincial economy.⁴

On the eve of the Revolution, a second stream of immigrants poured into the Waxhaws directly from northern Ireland via Charleston. These new immigrants took up land in the more remote higher ground in the eastern part of the settlement, establishing neighborhoods along Gills Creek, Camp Creek, Bear Creek, Hannah's Creek, Turkey Quarter Creek, and upper Cane Creek. Later known as the "blackjack" area (after the

⁴ On the early history of the Waxhaws, see Peter N. Moore, "This World of Toil and Strife: Land, Labor, and the Making of an American Community, 1750-1805" (Ph.D. diss., University of Georgia, 2001), 29-96. Also see Louise Pettus, *The Waxhaws* (Rock Hill, S.C.: Regal Graphics, 1993), and the fine treatment of the early Waxhaws in Hendrik Booraem, *Young Hickory: The Making of Andrew Jackson* (Dallas, Tex.: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2001).

scrubby and resilient blackjack oak that thrived there), this undeveloped area had poorer soils and no roads providing access to the developing inland trading center at Camden. Blackjack immigrants brought their poverty with them; having been driven out of northern Ireland by high rents and economic depression, they immigrated with much smaller households than had the earlier Pennsylvania immigrants, giving them fewer headrights, less land, and fewer hands to help put their family farms on sound financial footing. Moreover, many of these new arrivals had been members of a traditionalist Covenanting Presbyterian church in Ulster, and they now settled uneasily among the evangelically inclined Waxhaw congregation. In short, the blackjack residents made up a poorer, ethnically distinct, religiously "dissenting" neighborhood whose growing population brought social tensions to the community, tensions that would later find an outlet in church-related conflicts. These tensions first surfaced, however, during the Revolutionary War, as the Pennsylvania migrants in the river bottom joined more eagerly into the cause for independence while the later immigrants of the blackjack neighborhood were more apt to claim neutrality or remain loyal to the Crown.⁵

The war arrived in the Waxhaws with sudden force on the afternoon of May 29, 1780. Charleston had surrendered to the British seventeen days earlier. The only American military presence remaining in South Carolina was a regiment of 350 Virginia regulars under the command of Colonel Abraham Buford, who retreated north when he learned of the fall of Charleston. Cornwallis dispatched his ambitious young cavalry officer, Banastre Tarleton, with 270 troops to attempt to overtake Buford before he reached Salisbury, North Carolina. After riding 154 miles in just fifty-four hours, Tarleton caught up with Buford in the Waxhaws around 3:00 P.M., on a stretch of road not far from Waxhaw Presbyterian meeting house. Buford rejected Tarleton's terms of surrender and prepared for battle.⁶ Neither side could have anticipated the confusion and carnage that followed. "Not a man was spared" by the British in the ensuing bloodbath, according to Buford's physician, Robert Brownfield. "For fifteen minutes after every man was prostrate they went over the ground plunging their bayonets into every one that exhibited any signs of life, and in some instances, where several had fallen one over the other, these monsters were seen to throw off on the point of the bayonet the uppermost, to come at those beneath." The Americans lost 113 men that day, with another fifty-four taken prisoner and 150 too

⁵ Moore, "This World of Toil and Strife," 111-16. Both early and later settlers were Scots-Irish, but the first wave had immigrated to the colonies some two or more generations earlier. Most were native-born Americans, while the immigrants of the 1770s came directly from northern Ireland.

⁶ Edward McCrady, *History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1902), 517-19.

wounded to travel. Sixty of these died soon thereafter. There were just five British casualties and fifteen wounded.⁷ Yet the Battle of the Waxhaws, though a stunning military victory for Tarleton, became a public-relations disaster for the British. Stories of men being hacked to pieces as they begged for quarter quickly circulated through the backcountry, and cries of "Tarleton's quarter" stoked anti-British sentiment in a bitterly divided region. Tarleton's victory was Buford's massacre, a fitting beginning to a bloody backcountry civil war in which both sides would commit their share of atrocities.⁸

Before 1780 local interest in fighting the British had been lukewarm at best, despite the fact that the white population of the Waxhaws seemed to be in near-universal sympathy with the Americans. When lowcountry Whigs toured the backcountry in the summer of 1775 to drum up support for the Continental Association and counter growing pro-Tory sentiment, they bypassed the Waxhaws. Unlike settlements in the Ninety Six District, in the fork of the Broad and Saluda Rivers, and along nearby Little Lynches River, there was no loyalist leadership in the Waxhaws and only scattered grassroots support for the British. However, the near-absence of loyalism did not automatically translate into zealous radicalism. Most of the fighting men of the Waxhaws remained quietly at home, unengaged if not neutral, until Tarleton and the British brought the war to them.⁹

There were several exceptions, the most prominent of whom was William Richardson Davie. Davie was as sharp as he was ambitious. Unlike most of his neighbors, Davie disdained farming and left the Waxhaws before the war, acquiring an education, a profession, and martial honors in pursuit of a public career that would eventually land him in the North Carolina governor's mansion. In 1774 he had gone off to the College of New Jersey, where he was radicalized during the heady days of 1776. He joined Washington at Elizabethtown, but returned to college shortly thereafter to complete his studies. The following year Davie moved to Salisbury, North Carolina, to study law, but was once again drawn into the rebellion and joined the militia in December 1777. In 1779 he persuaded an acquaintance in Salisbury to raise a troop of cavalry; inside of a month, Davie had

⁷ Ibid., 519-24. Tarleton's own account lends support to Brownfield's obviously biased one. See Banastre Tarleton, *History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America* (1787; reprint, New York: New York Times, 1968), 30-32, 80-83. For Brownfield's description, see Nat and Sam Hilborn, *Battle-ground of Freedom: South Carolina in the Revolution* (Columbia, S.C.: Sandlapper Press, 1970), 118.

⁸ For a balanced treatment of the backcountry's civil war that sorts out the atrocities on both sides, see John S. Pancake, *The Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782* (Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1985), passim.

⁹ McCrady, *History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783*, 33-52.

assumed command of the unit, was promoted to brigade major, and was stationed near Charleston in anticipation of a British invasion. Wounded at the Battle of Stono Ferry in June, he returned to Salisbury, but within a year, he was leading a guerilla force against the British army along the North Carolina-South Carolina border. Davie later served as chief commissary officer under General Nathanael Greene during the Continental army's southern campaign.¹⁰

There were also a handful of early recruits among Waxhaws farm families. Archibald McCorkle and Samuel Dunlap both served in the "Snow Campaign" of 1775, where more than four-thousand troops under Colonel Richard Richardson trudged through the December snow to put down loyalists in the country between the Broad and Saluda Rivers. Robert Crawford served as captain under Richardson in 1776 and fought with Davie at Stono Ferry in 1779. Similarly, James Adams and Robert Guthrie took part in Andrew Williamson's scorched-earth campaign against the Cherokee Indians during the summer of 1776.¹¹ Like Davie, however, these men were exceptions. Less than one-sixth of the Waxhaws' men who took part in the war and whose dates of enlistment can be determined joined before the British launched their southern campaign in 1779. Although enlistment climbed dramatically in 1779, only one-third of the men who eventually fought in the war joined before the fall of Charleston. In other words, two out of three Waxhaws soldiers declined to serve until Cornwallis marched into the backcountry in the summer of 1780, when enlistments soared.¹²

¹⁰ Blackwell P. Robinson, *William R. Davie* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957), 27-40.

¹¹ Pension and Bounty-Land-Warrant Application Files Based on Revolutionary War Service (hereinafter cited as Pension Applications), South Carolina Department of Archives and History (hereinafter SCDAH), numbers S2771 (McCorkle), S3310 (Dunlap), and W293 (Adams and Guthrie); Bobby Gilmer Moss, *Roster of South Carolina Patriots in the American Revolution* (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1983), 214 (Crawford).

¹² This and all subsequent analysis of war service in the Waxhaws is based on a list of 100 American soldiers generated from Moss, *Roster of South Carolina Patriots*, and of twelve loyalists generated from three sources: Robert W. Barnwell, Jr., ed., "Reports on Loyalist Exiles from South Carolina, 1783," *South Carolina Historical Association Proceedings* (1937): 43-44; Murtie June Clarke, *Loyalists of the Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War*, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Company, 1981); and Great Britain, Audit Office, Transcripts of the MS Books and Papers of the Commission of Inquiry into the Losses and Services of American Loyalists held Under the Acts of Parliament . . . Preserved among the Audit Office Records of the PRO of England, 1783-1790 (hereinafter cited as Loyalist Transcripts). The dates of enlistment could not be determined for nine of the 100 American soldiers. Where the documents do not indicate place of origin or date of immigration, Waxhaws residency and time of arrival has been determined by checking

These figures suggest that before the summer of 1780 most of the people in the Waxhaws were either neutral or Whig sympathizers who nonetheless hesitated to take up arms against the British. Developments in the month following Tarleton's victory bear this out. In early June, Lord Rawdon, who headed Cornwallis's advance guard, met with a local committee in the Waxhaws to discuss the terms of surrender. The committee declined to take up arms against the Americans and asked to be placed on parole as bona fide neutrals, supplying the British with cattle as a sign of good faith. For his part, Rawdon promised to respect their neutrality, permitted them to keep their weapons to defend themselves against North Carolina militiamen and their Catawba allies, and urged refugees to return to their farms. He wrote Cornwallis on June 11 that he believed the people of the Waxhaws might even join the British if other settlements were to take the lead.¹³

In the meantime, however, loyalists were terrorizing the neighboring settlement on Fishing Creek, where they burned the Presbyterian meeting house along with the home of its pastor, John Simpson. Eleven days later, North Carolina forces soundly defeated the Tory militia at Ramsour's Mill and scattered loyalist refugees along the border. This combination of loyalist depredations and vulnerability was sure to push the strongest American sympathizers into armed resistance, making neutrality increasingly difficult to sustain. Cornwallis went one step further, making neutrality virtually impossible. Rightly fearing that the American victory would encourage the Waxhaws' neutrals "to temporize," he ordered them either to take up arms for the Crown, surrender their arms and horses, or face execution. In essence, the British forced the people of the Waxhaws to choose sides. Worse yet for Rawdon, many of the Scots-Irish volunteers he had stationed at the Waxhaws, instead of drawing locals into the loyalist camp as hoped, began to desert the British and flee to the American lines. Rawdon promised severe consequences for deserters, but to no avail. Within a week of arriving in the Waxhaws, he was petitioning Cornwallis for a body of regulars to safeguard the local wheat crop and laying plans to place loyalist farmers on rebel plantations. By July 7, he complained that rigid British measures regarding parole and neutrality had alienated inhabitants all along the frontier.¹⁴

against land and cemetery records or assumed based on surname and service under known Waxhaws officers.

¹³ Rawdon to Cornwallis, June 11, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, SCDAH, PRO 30/11/2, 125.

¹⁴ McCrady, *History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783*, 591-92; Blackwell P. Robinson, *The Revolutionary War Sketches of William R. Davie* (Raleigh: North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, 1976), 7-8; Rawdon to Cornwallis, June 22, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO

Why the sudden about-face? The sources leave much room for conjecture. Subdued but not broken, the people of the Waxhaws may well have been playing Rawdon until given an opportunity "to temporize," as Cornwallis suspected. Perhaps they were genuinely compelled by the loyalist raid on Fishing Creek, which targeted their central institution and the symbolic center of local resistance, the Presbyterian meeting house. In all likelihood, however, the men who negotiated the truce with Rawdon were concerned most about their neighbors and the long-term social consequences of their actions. The British would come and go, but when the war was over, the people of the Waxhaws still had to live with and depend upon one another. Although willing to remain neutral against powerful local families like the Dunlaps and Crawfords, they would not oppose them. It was better to fight the British than go to war against their neighbors—a prospect more fearful by far than resisting an increasingly unfriendly, but decidedly temporary, occupying army—or so the men who flooded into the American camp in the summer of 1780 must have reasoned, driven as they were, not by strongly pro-American or anti-British sentiment, but by the power of these local relationships—by loyalty to, and fear of, their neighbors.

Enthusiasm for the war not only came late to the Waxhaws, it also had distinct social patterns. Part of what distinguished eager from reluctant revolutionaries was their length of residency in America. Fully three-fourths of the thirty-four men who enlisted prior to 1780 were among the first wave of settlers, immigrating in or before 1765. Many of these early enlistees were native-born. Dunlap and McCorkle were both born in the Waxhaws, along with John Ramsey, William Hood, George White, and William Barkley, all of whom enlisted before 1780. Robert White, who served alongside Dunlap and McCorkle during the Snow Campaign, was born in Ireland, but belonged to one of the oldest families in the community.

By contrast, recent immigrants were disproportionately represented in the ranks of late enlistees, while the proportion of early settlers among enlistees declined after 1780. Seven out of ten recent immigrants who enlisted did so after 1780 (Table 1). John McMurry was typical. Born in Ireland in 1750, McMurry immigrated to the Waxhaws shortly before the war. He enlisted in 1780 and served under James Craig and Robert Montgomery, his neighbors on Cane Creek, seeing action in local skirmishes at Hanging Rock, Camden, and Rocky Mount as well as more distant battles

30/11/2, 179-82; Rawdon to Cornwallis, July 2, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 235-36; Rawdon to Cornwallis, July 7, 1780, Cornwallis Papers, PRO 30/11/2, 252-55. For a discussion of Rawdon's woes in the Waxhaws, see John W. Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 120-21.

Table 1: Comparison of Time of Enlistment with Length of Residency in the Waxhaws

Date of Immigration	Enlisted before 1780	Enlisted 1780-81	Percent Increase
By 1765	26 (42%)	36 (58%)	38
After 1765	8 (28%)	21 (72%)	162

Table 2: Comparison of Time of Enlistment with Place of Residence in the Waxhaws

Neighborhood	Enlisted before 1780	Enlisted 1780-81	Percent Increase
Lower settlement	23 (40%)	35 (60%)	52
Upper settlement	9 (30%)	21 (70%)	122

at Edisto and Eutaw Springs. Like McMurry, most recent immigrants were more reluctant than early settlers to join the war effort, doing so only after the British invaded the backcountry and forced them to choose sides. Their enlistment rate rose two-and-one-half times after 1780, while the rate of early settlers rose by little more than a third.¹⁵

Recent immigrants were also more likely to live in the upper or eastern part of the settlement, and enlistment patterns reflect this neighborhood formation (Table 2). In general, most enlistees were from the lower or western part of the settlement (nearest the Catawba River), which is not surprising since this was the most densely populated part of the community. However, the significance of these neighborhood patterns lies in the dramatic increase in the number and percent of upper-settlement enlistees after 1780. The number of upper-settlement enlistees more than doubled after the British invasion, while the number of lower-settlement enlistees grew by just over half. American soldiers from the upper settlement

¹⁵ Pension Applications, S31318 (Ramsey), S32057 (George White), S16314 (Barkley); Moss, *Roster of South Carolina Patriots*, 460 (Hood), 986 (Robert White).

remained fewer as a rule, which is consistent with the overall distribution of the Waxhaws population, but they joined the war effort late at a much higher rate than lower settlers. In fact, the number of upper-settlement enlistees actually surpassed lower-settlement enlistees for the first time in 1781. The pattern is even more striking when length and place of residency are combined: seventy-eight percent of upper settlers who arrived after 1765 enlisted late.

Recent immigrants and blackjack farmers were not only more reluctant to join the Americans than their more established neighbors to the west, but also much more likely to join the British. Of the eleven probable loyalists in the Waxhaws whose neighborhoods are identifiable, nine were from the upper and only two from the lower settlement.¹⁶ Most of these men lived along Bear Creek, a branch of upper Cane Creek, or one of its tributaries. The most prominent upper-settlement loyalist was James Johnston, who immigrated in 1762, took out land on Camp and Bear Creeks, and later served as captain in Robert English's loyalist regiment. Others, such as James Baker and James Blackman, probably had roots in the Lynches River community on the other side of the district, a Tory stronghold, and had pushed into the fringes of the Waxhaws before the war. As for the two loyalists who lived in the lower settlement, both were recent immigrants. The same was true for four of the upper-settlement loyalists. The handful of loyalists in the Waxhaws, then, either lived in the upper settlement or immigrated late, and over half did both. All of the Waxhaws loyalists enlisted in 1780 or 1781.¹⁷

In sum, the data from the Waxhaws point to a clear correlation between neighborhood, length of residency, and support for the Americans. Recent immigrants and blackjack farmers were reluctant to embrace the Revolution: they generally enlisted after the British invasion, and they were much more likely to join the loyalists than were their more established neighbors to the west. Class and kinship account for much of what lay behind these differences. In the first place, there is a clear correlation between wealth (as determined by land holdings) and time of enlistment. Although many soldiers were too young to head their own households, the landholdings of

¹⁶ In all there were eight known loyalists in the Waxhaws and four others who had Waxhaws surnames and served in a local loyalist regiment. Of the eight known loyalists, seven were listed as exiles in Barnwell, "Report on the Loyalist Exiles," along with their places of residence. The one whose residence cannot be determined lived on Cane Creek and was probably an upper-settlement inhabitant, since he shared a surname with another upper-settlement loyalist.

¹⁷ Barnwell, "Report on the Loyalist Exiles," 44; Clarke, *Loyalists of the Southern Campaign*, 360, 370, 420, 111, 112, 115, 117, 118; Loyalist Transcripts, AO12/99/333; Brent H. Holcomb, *North Carolina Land Grants in South Carolina* (Greenville, S.C.: A Press, 1980), 16.

Table 3: Average Family Landholdings of Enlistees, 1780

Enlistment	Average Acreage Owned, 1780	Percent of Acreage of Early Enlistees
Before 1780	717	100
1780-81	470-533	65-75
Loyalists	336	47

their families give some indication of wealth. As table 3 shows, the families of late enlistees owned only about sixty-five percent as much land as the families of early enlistees, while the families of loyalists owned less than half as much. This data is reinforced by more general impressions of the poverty of immigrant families of the 1770s who fled economic hardship in Ulster and immigrated directly to South Carolina. Their grants were smaller and their lands poorer than those of the earlier immigrants who settled in the river and creek bottomlands to the west. As new arrivals, they struggled to survive in their new environment, and they got little help from their bottomland neighbors. Immigrating directly through Charleston, their kinship links with the core community were more tenuous than those of earlier settlers who had immigrated from Pennsylvania and Virginia. Lacking the near-automatic connections that kinship afforded and further separated by class and geographic distance, the people of the upper settlement were not readily integrated into the established community. This is corroborated by events immediately after the war that revealed deep divisions over the location of the Presbyterian church, divisions that were doubtlessly present before and during the war and probably contributed to the church's prolonged (seven-year) search for a suitable replacement for the Reverend William Richardson, who died in 1771. In short, recent immigrants were shunted to the geographic, social, and political periphery of the community. Class- and kin-based neighborhoods account for the peculiar patterns of allegiance in the Waxhaws.¹⁸

¹⁸ For the sources on landholdings, see Moore, "This World of Toil and Strife," chapter 1, especially p. 42, n. 20. On postwar divisions in the church, see *ibid.*, chapter 5. On the search for a replacement for William Richardson, see George Howe, *History of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina*, 2 vols. (Columbia, S.C.: Duffie and Chapman, 1870), 1: 421.

Nowhere was the importance of kinship more pronounced than in the family of the Waxhaws' most famous son, Andrew Jackson. The Jacksons were on the cusp of the two immigrant streams, coming to South Carolina in 1765 directly from Ulster via Charleston. Like the later blackjack immigrants, the Jacksons were too poor to purchase property in the heart of the settlement and took up land instead along Twelve Mile Creek on the margins of the community. The family's circumstances grew dire in 1767 when Andrew, Sr. died, leaving his widow, Elizabeth, with two young children (Hugh and Robert) and pregnant with a third (Andrew, Jr.). However, despite their poverty, their relatively late arrival, and their remote location, the Jacksons became ardent patriots. The eldest son, Hugh, enlisted at age sixteen and died defending Charleston. Andy and Robert were at various times refugees, prisoners, and soldiers; both contracted smallpox while imprisoned at Camden, from which Robert died shortly after his release. Their mother died some time later while returning from Charleston, where she had gone to care for sick soldiers imprisoned there.¹⁹

Why did the Jackson family join wholeheartedly in the struggle for independence, when others like them—poor immigrants settled on the fringes of the community—tended to remain neutral if not loyal to the Crown? The answer lies in large part with their kin connections. The Jackson family had strong ties to the core community. Elizabeth's sister—with whom she lived after Andrew's death—was married to James Crawford, who's brother Robert was an ardent Whig, joining the fight as early as 1776 and eventually rising to the rank of major under Thomas Sumter. Unlike the typical blackjack immigrants, the Jacksons were integrated into, even nurtured by, the established families in the core community. In their case, kinship trumped wealth, proximity, and length of residency. The same could not be said for later immigrants who settled in the eastern uplands of the Waxhaws, many of whom struggled for a generation to find their place among unwelcoming neighbors.

There were also reluctant revolutionaries in the lower settlement, but these too fall into familiar patterns. Of those lower settlers who enlisted after 1780, over 80 percent were recent immigrants. As already noted, the only two lower-settlement loyalists were also recent immigrants. One of these was George Grier, who had strong personal reasons for joining the British. Grier was sued twice by Robert Crawford in the mid 1770s; Crawford also sued Grier's stepfather twice and his mother once. A thoroughgoing Whig, Crawford served as captain under Richard Richardson in 1776, fought with Davie at Stono Ferry in 1779, and was promoted to major and subsequently captured at the fall of Charleston in 1780. Paroled by the British, he immediately joined Thomas Sumter's partisan regiment, where he served

¹⁹ Pettus, *Waxhaws*, 38-40.

until Sumter's defeat at Fishing Creek in August 1780.²⁰ Grier no doubt had little interest in taking sides with his old nemesis. Further, he and his family were also engaged in suits with John Thompson and John Latta, who would later become a Presbyterian church elder. Apparently Grier had few friends among his neighbors. Not surprisingly, he joined the loyalist regiment in 1781. Not long after the war, his 250-acre estate was seized by the sheriff and sold to satisfy a debt of eight shillings sterling to James Dunlap.²¹

The most prominent and enigmatic loyalist in the Waxhaws, however, was Daniel Harper. Harper immigrated from Ireland in 1767 at age twenty-two with his parents and six siblings. Although most of the Harpers did not own land until after the war, some settled among other recent immigrants along Bear and Gills Creeks. Others, including Daniel, settled in the lower settlement along the Catawba River. Sometime before the war, he married Sarah Dickey Cantzon, widow of Dr. John Cantzon, who had left a large estate at his death, including a dozen slaves that would have fallen at least in part to Sarah. Like his wife's first husband, Daniel Harper was a physician and would have depended on the patronage of his Whig neighbors. It is all the more surprising, then, that he joined the British army when it invaded the Waxhaws in 1780. In his absence, the American forces used his plantation as their local base of operations and "Robbed and Plundered . . . all his Property." By 1781 he was in Charleston, and soon thereafter he was on a ship back to Ireland with other loyalist refugees. In 1783 he filed a claim for 2,410 pounds sterling lost to the Americans during the war, including two tracts totaling 650 acres, two houses and offices, thirty cattle, and eight slaves. The Loyalist Claims Commission awarded him just twenty pounds sterling, and he soon gave up his practice in Balleyhone and returned to South Carolina. At his death in 1791, he resided in Chester County, on the western side of the Catawba River opposite the Waxhaws, and had begun rebuilding his estate, possessing two slaves, a silver watch, and over 300 pounds sterling. He was buried in the Waxhaw Presbyterian churchyard.²²

Although neighborhood and length of residency largely explain the degree and patterns of allegiance in the Waxhaws, the cases of Daniel

²⁰ Crawford apparently got drunk at Fishing Creek and failed to post proper guards as ordered by Sumter. His role in Sumter's disastrous defeat no doubt accounts for his suddenly abbreviated military career. Draper Manuscript Collection, Thomas Sumter Papers, Series VV, 15, 90 (Microfilm, SCDAH).

²¹ For Grier's lawsuits, see Moore, "This World of Toil and Strife," chapter 3; Moss, *South Carolina Patriots*, 214 (Crawford's war record); Clarke, *Loyalists of the Southern Campaign*, 112, 117 (Grier's war record); Lancaster County, S.C., Deed Books, SCDAH, A, 254 (Grier's debt).

²² Viola Floyd, *Descendants of William Harper, Irish Immigrant to Lancaster County, South Carolina* (Lancaster, S.C.: N.p., 1965); Lancaster Deeds, A-226, CE-130, CE-8; Robinson, *William Richardson Davie*, 45; William Henry Hoyt, ed., *The Papers of Archibald D. Murphey* (Raleigh, N.C.: E. M. Uzzell and Company, State Printers,

Harper and George Grier show that complex and often personal issues stood behind the act of choosing sides. For people like James Blackman and Andrew Walker, who lived in the blackjack section among other reluctant revolutionaries and Tory sympathizers, joining the loyalist forces was a significant, but logical, step. Though Waxhaws loyalists were essentially leaderless, the Tories of the blackjack district could at least count on the ambivalence, if not the outright sympathy, of their neighbors and kin. For people like George Grier, who had already alienated his neighbors and developed deep antipathy toward local Whig leaders, taking up arms against the Americans was likewise the logical conclusion to an already embattled relationship. But for recent immigrants living in the lower settlement like Daniel Harper, who had neither loyalist neighbors nor Whig enemies, the choice to enlist with the British or at least defer joining the Americans may well have been based on principle. Why else would Harper alienate his neighbors, jeopardize his practice, and risk losing his estate to plunderers and forfeiture? Unable to shield himself behind a prominent local loyalist leader, Harper's stand for the British took tremendous courage. For risking his life, family, practice, and property, the British rewarded him with twenty pounds—an act wholly consistent with their treatment of southern loyalists generally, explaining in part why they ultimately lost the southern campaign.²³

Yet Harper was exceptional. When neutrality—the default position for most people in the Waxhaws—was no longer an option, allegiance was primarily determined by two interrelated factors, length of residency and neighborhood. Where both of these factors were present—among recent immigrants who lived in the more remote blackjack neighborhood—pro-Whig sentiment was weakest, and the likelihood of loyalist feeling was highest. This pattern resulted largely from neighborhood-based social conflict stemming in turn from differences in ethnicity, religion, and class, all cemented by powerful kinship bonds. The failure of the tightly knit bottomlanders to integrate their new neighbors into the community drew the fault line between Whig and British sympathizers. Allegiances thus resulted from a failure of socialization more than a triumph of elite leadership. The war served to deepen and not to heal differences among neigh-

1914), 2: 230-31; John Cantzon Foster, *Ancestors and Descendants of Joseph Henry Foster and Charlotte Rebecca Brown of the Waxhaws, South Carolina* (Varnville, S.C.: J. C. Foster, 1997); Estate of John Cantzon, Inventories of Estates, SCDAH, Z, 472-73; Loyalist Claims, AO 13/129/233-8; Gregory Palmer, *Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American Revolution* (Westport, Conn.: Meckler, 1984); Chester County, S.C., Will Books, A, 60-61; Nancy Crockett, *Old Waxhaw Cemetery Inscriptions* (Lancaster, S.C.: N.p., 1965), 64.

²³ For a discussion of how poor British treatment of its loyalist allies contributed to the failure of the southern campaign, see Pancake, *Destructive War*.

bors, leaving new scars over old animosities and making for seemingly irreconcilable differences between neighborhoods. Viewed from the local level, the Revolutionary War was to some extent a staging ground for social conflict. As the war wound to a close, the battle between neighbors shifted to the Presbyterian church, which could not long sustain the local tensions that had hardened during the war. Within two decades, the congregation would rupture and start down the road to obsolescence, a casualty of neighborhood factionalism.

BOOK REVIEWS

Stono: Documenting and Interpreting a Southern Slave Revolt. Edited by Mark M. Smith. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2005. Pp. xvii, 128; \$39.95, cloth; \$14.95, paper.)

History professors have long known that an effective way to promote a thoughtful and animated discussion among undergraduate students is to select an exciting topic and assign a lively reader that combines important primary sources and persuasive, provocative essays that interpret those sources. Mark M. Smith has adopted this tried-and-true formula in this reader that focuses on the Stono Rebellion, the largest slave insurrection in colonial South Carolina and one of the bloodiest slave revolts in American history. *Stono* is a model of this genre. This brief, inexpensive paperback combines fifteen important and varied historical documents with four interpretive essays. Together, these materials shed considerable light on the Stono Rebellion. In addition, they illustrate important themes that historians have elucidated concerning early African American cultural patterns and the importance of an Atlantic World perspective for the study of colonial America. Moreover, Smith reveals to undergraduate students how historians interpret primary sources and use earlier explanations to construct new interpretations of complex events.

The dearth of contemporary public accounts is a major problem for understanding the Stono Rebellion. Historians and students alike will appreciate Smith's efforts to publish virtually all extant documents that shed light on Stono. Smith has also included two documents that are reprinted for the first time: an abolitionist's account first published in 1847 and an oral reminiscence originally recorded by the Federal Writers' Project in the 1930s. This last document, Smith notes, "is the only source we have from a nonwhite perspective" (p. 55), because there were no eighteenth-century accounts written by slaves.

Among the fifteen documents, nine are early reports, written between July 1739 and January 1740. These sources emphasize the malicious influence of Spanish officials in St. Augustine, Florida, and white fears concerning slave violence. Colonel William Stephens, for example, traveled through the lowcountry just before the rebellion and recorded in his journal that slaveholders thought Spanish officials were trying to foment a slave rebellion. His entry for September 13, just four days after the uprising, related that armed slaves killed numerous whites, "burning and destroying all that came in their Way; . . . the Country thereabout was full of Flames" (p. 4). Charleston merchant Robert Pringle also blamed the St. Augustine government for stirring up unrest; he hoped British forces would invade Florida. An "Account of the Negroe Insurrection in South Carolina," which may