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"THAT WILL MAKE CAROLINA POWERFUL AND FLOURISHING": SCOTS AND HUGUENOTS IN CAROLINA IN THE 1680S

KURT GINGRICH*

Some deputies from Scotland came here to look at the country which pleased them very much; they bought two counties, or provinces, and are preparing to bring over 10,000 people to settle them; I have no doubt that a number of others will follow shortly, people arrive every day from all parts to inhabit this country. That will make Carolina powerful and flourishing in a very short time.

—Louis Thibou, Huguenot refugee in Charles Town, 1683

ON APRIL 30, 1680, FORTY-FIVE HUGUENOT REFUGEES ON BOARD an English royal frigate, the *Richmond*, arrived at the Carolina port of Oyster Point, soon officially renamed Charles Town.¹ More than a dozen of these immigrant families remained in Carolina for decades thereafter.² Along with additional Huguenot refugees from other ships that arrived later in the 1680s, these new settlers helped to shape the colony's development. By the 1690s, Carolina had at least four thriving Huguenot communities, including one on the Santee River that was organized enough to boast its own landed elite by 1692.³ The presence of these Huguenot settlers was so well established as to be emblazoned on maps by the 1690s. John Thornton and Robert Morden's 1695 map of "South Carolina" shows the "French Settlement" on the Santee, as does Edward Crisp's 1711 map of Carolina. Crisp's map also contains an inset of the entire southeastern part of North America with "French Refuges" running more than two hundred miles inland from the coast along the Santee River.⁴ While this map exaggerates, the Huguenot

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¹ The exact number of Huguenots on board the *Richmond* is uncertain. Thomas Ash, who was on board the *Richmond*, suggested forty-five. Ash, *Carolina; or, A Description of the Present State of That Country* (London, 1682), 8 (this man's name is sometimes rendered as "Ashe," and this pamphlet is occasionally attributed to Thomas Amy).

² St. Julien R. Childs, "The Petit-Guerard Colony," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine* 43 (January 1942): 95.

³ Bertrand Van Ruymbeke, "The Huguenots of Proprietary South Carolina: Patterns of Migration and Integration," in *Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution of Colonial South Carolina's Plantation Society*, ed. Jack P. Greene, Rosemary Brana-Shute, and Randy J. Sparks (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 38.

⁴ William P. Cumming, *The Southeast in Early Maps* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958), plates 42, 44, 45.

In 1977 society director Gene Waddell proposed establishing an endowment "to provide for the continual publication of the *Magazine*." Once fully endowed, Waddell asserted, the *Magazine* could become "one of the best in the Nation."² More than three decades later, Waddell's vision is only partly realized. The *Magazine* has taken its place at the forefront of state historical journals: in 2009 it became one of only twelve such journals invited to join the prestigious online academic database JSTOR (for more on the *Magazine*'s inclusion in JSTOR, see page 116). Yet the *Magazine* is no closer to an endowment, and its fate remains tied to the vicissitudes of the Historical Society's operating income.

Departure from the traditional quarterlies for this volume is regrettable and intended only as a temporary measure for bringing the *Magazine* more up to date and balancing the budget. But here is a welcome change that holds much promise for the future. This double issue was published by the Historical Society with the support of a consortium of institutional partners from across the state: the Carolina Lowcountry and Atlantic World Program at the College of Charleston (CLAW); the York County Culture and Heritage Museums' Southern Revolutionary War Institute (SRWI); the Huff Center for Piedmont History at Furman University (HCPH); and the University of South Carolina's South Caroliniana Library (SCL). Each of these distinguished organizations shares with the Historical Society a commitment to advancing understanding of South Carolina history through scholarly publishing, and their generous contributions have prevented the *Magazine* from falling farther behind. While much work remains before the *Magazine* is at last on secure financial footing, this ad hoc partnership represents a positive sign.

The consortium would not have been possible without Allen H. Stokes, Jr., director of the SCL and longtime member of the *Magazine*'s Editorial Board, who first suggested the concept and provided important assistance as it evolved. Special thanks are due to Mr. Stokes as well as to Michael C. Scoggins, research director of the SRWI; Simon K. Lewis, interim director, and David T. Gleeson, U.K. affiliate director, of the CLAW; Stephen O'Neill, director of the HCPH; and John P. Barrington, chair of the Department of History at Furman University. The Historical Society is encouraged by the willingness of the consortium partners to invest in the *Magazine* and excited about the prospects for further inter-institutional cooperation.

MATTHEW A. LOCKHART
EDITOR

² Minutes of the Quarterly Board Meeting, July 13, 1977, SCHSR, 1965-1979.

settlers clearly were entrenched, their number swollen to nearly four hundred by 1700, and their presence so well accepted in the colony that a Huguenot militia from Santee was welcomed into Charles Town in 1706 when the French launched an assault on the port.⁵

On October 2, 1684, nearly 150 Scots immigrants arrived at Charles Town on board a commercial ship, the *Carolina Merchant*. Some of the men attempted to build a new settlement called Stuart Town, but its population, small at first, quickly dwindled even further, despite the fact that at least three other ships carrying Scots left for Carolina between 1684 and 1686.⁶ In August 1686, apparently only twenty-five able-bodied men remained at Stuart Town.⁷ Following a pair of raids by Spaniards and Native Americans later that year, the settlers abandoned the site entirely, and Stuart Town was soon forgotten. John Archdale's lengthy 1707 description of Carolina does not mention it. In his extensive narrative of his 1700–1701 travels in Carolina, John Lawson suggests that the area around Port Royal would someday make a very good settlement site, as if Stuart Town had never existed.⁸ Although Edward Randolph wrote a brief account of the Scots settlement in 1698, he seems to be reporting hitherto unknown information.⁹ Crisp's map shows numerous plantations in the area where the Scots had settled, but almost all of the plantations bear English names.¹⁰ Perhaps only two immigrants from the *Carolina Merchant*, John Stewart and George Smith, remained in Carolina for a considerable time and made lasting contributions to the colony's development.¹¹ These contributions, however, along with those of Thomas Nairne and other Scots who immigrated later, especially after 1700, did not create a self-consciously Scottish community

⁵ W. Noel Sainsbury et al., eds., *Records in the British Public Record Office Relating to South Carolina, 1663–1710* (Atlanta: Foote and Davies, 1928–1947), 5: 165, 175 (hereinafter cited as BPRO-SC).

⁶ Henry Erskine, Lord Cardross, to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, March 27, 1685, in George Pratt Insh, "The Carolina Merchant: Advice of Arrival," *Scottish Historical Review* 25 (January 1928): 100–101. These other ships were sent or led by Thomas Ferguson, Robert Malloch, and James Montgomerie of Skelmorlie. Though "Stuart's Town" may be the more accurate name, "Stuart Town" is more commonly used.

⁷ BPRO-SC, 4: 89.

⁸ John Archdale, *A New Description of That Fertile and Pleasant Province of Carolina* (London, 1707); John Lawson, *A New Voyage to Carolina* (London, 1709), 5.

⁹ BPRO-SC, 4: 89.

¹⁰ Cumming, *Southeast in Early Maps*, plate 44.

¹¹ Alan Galloway, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002), 89.

in the colony, and they arguably left British rather than Scottish marks on Carolina society.¹²

The question arises of why the Huguenot communities thrived while the Scots colony failed, a question yet to be fully answered. George Pratt Insh suggests that the 1686 Spanish raids destroyed the Scots settlement, which might otherwise have survived, while Verner Crane emphasizes Charles Town leaders' animosity toward the Scottish project.¹³ L. H. Roper attempts to bring these two ideas together by arguing that the Spanish raids were provoked by jealous English traders in Charles Town.¹⁴ Linda Fryer adds that developments in Scotland were significant in starving the Scots colony of needed assistance.¹⁵ Finally, St. Julien Ravenel Childs contends that malaria alone was enough to destroy the Scots' endeavor.¹⁶ For the Huguenots, older accounts relied on ethnocentric statements about success resulting from the determination, work ethic, and spirit of the settlers.¹⁷ More

¹² Ned C. Landsman, "Nation, Migration, and the Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600–1800," *American Historical Review* 104 (April 1999): 463–475.

¹³ George Pratt Insh, *Scottish Colonial Schemes, 1620–1686* (Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson, and Co., 1922), 161; Verner W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670–1732* (1929; reprint, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), 28, 30. The standard account of the Scots' settlement in Carolina is Insh's 1922 history. T. M. Devine, *Scotland's Empire and the Shaping of the Americas, 1600–1815* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2004), and David Dobson, *Scottish Emigration to Colonial America, 1607–1785* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994), have extended Insh's account. For the best descriptions of the Huguenot immigration, see Jon Butler, *The Huguenots in America: A Refugee People in New World Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983); R. C. Nash, "Huguenot Merchants and the Development of South Carolina's Slave-Plantation and Atlantic Trading Economy, 1680–1775," in *Memory and Identity: The Huguenots in France and the Atlantic Diaspora*, ed. Bertrand Van Ruymbeke and Randy J. Sparks (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 208–240; Bertrand Van Ruymbeke, *From New Babylon to Eden: The Huguenots and Their Migration to Colonial South Carolina* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2006). Several accounts of Carolina's early history, including Robert M. Weir, *Colonial South Carolina: A History* (Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press, 1983), are useful, as is a provocative recent volume by L. H. Roper, *Conceiving Carolina: Proprietors, Planters, and Plots, 1662–1719* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Sorting through any aspect of the history of proprietary Carolina is aided by Charles H. Lesser's impressive review of extant source material *South Carolina Begins: The Records of a Proprietary Colony, 1663–1721* (Columbia: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1995).

¹⁴ Roper, *Conceiving Carolina*, 88–90.

¹⁵ Linda Fryer, "Documents Relating to the Formation of the Carolina Company in Scotland, 1682," *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 99 (April 1998): 129.

¹⁶ St. Julien Ravenel Childs, *Malaria and Colonization in the Carolina Low Country, 1526–1696* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940), 242.

¹⁷ See Charles W. Baird, *History of the Huguenot Emigration to America*, 2 vols. (1885; reprint, Baltimore: Regional Publishing Co., 1966); Arthur Henry Hirsch, *The*

recent and more sophisticated explanations, best expressed by Jon Butler, point out that Huguenots arrived when Carolina's economy was growing rapidly, brought useful skills, benefited from the generous land policies of the Lords Proprietors, and faced relatively little competition or persecution.¹⁸ A more complete answer to that question can be derived by comparing five aspects of the two attempts at settlement: the preparations, the goals, the leadership, the interactions with other peoples, and the willingness to persevere. The Huguenots' reasonable goals enabled them to respect local leaders and adapt to local conditions. But the Scots' ambitious goals overwhelmed their preparations and resources; they found few friends in Carolina, in part because they were British; and their leaders exacerbated existing problems.

PLANNING

Careful planning preceded the departures of the *Richmond* and the *Carolina Merchant*. Both Huguenot organizers and leaders of the Scots' settlement effort arranged substantial financing. In 1679 René Petit and Jacob Guérard petitioned the English king for support in French, asking the Crown to help poor Huguenot refugees get to Carolina by providing financial aid and passage on board a royal ship. In exchange, Petit and Guérard promised to recruit only refugees who had recently arrived from France and had experience in the production of wine, silk, and olive oil, thereby quieting those royal advisers who feared such an outlay from the royal treasury would constitute both a poor investment and a drain on the kingdom's economy. The Crown agreed to advance money to Petit and Guérard, and space on board the *Richmond* was made available for refugees.¹⁹ Individual charitable contributions further assisted the passage of more immigrants later in the 1680s.²⁰

There is no evidence that Huguenot organizers gave considerable thought to any aspects of the project beyond raising money and arranging passage. While it would be surprising if they had not had contact with the colonial proprietors before petitioning the Crown, no definitive proof of such contact has survived. Bertrand Van Ruymbeke suggests that John Locke contacted Huguenots in France between 1675 and 1678 on behalf of the proprietors, that Huguenots looked to the Carolina colony because Lord

Huguenots of Colonial South Carolina (1928; reprint, Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1962).

¹⁸ Butler, *Huguenots in America*, 198–200. I define the Huguenot settlements as successful because their enclaves survived for decades. The longer-term survival of these enclaves is not directly relevant to this study.

¹⁹ BPRO-SC, 1: 62–64, 78–79, 85–86.

²⁰ Butler, *Huguenots in America*, 52; Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 67–70.

Shaftesbury, the leading proprietor at the time, had a reputation for religious tolerance, and that Shaftesbury's political influence gained approval for the Huguenots' petition.²¹ Such ideas are merely conjecture, though plausible. Furthermore, no evidence confirms that the first Huguenots consulted any of the extant literature on Carolina prior to leaving England.²² Huguenots who immigrated later in the 1680s, however, would have had access not only to letters written by earlier immigrants, but also to French-language pamphlets and a French translation of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina produced as part of an advertising campaign launched by the proprietors.²³

The Scots immigrants obtained financing from the Carolina Company, founded by Scottish landowners and merchants in 1682. The Carolina Company raised money by offering subscriptions at ten pounds each. The company hoped to attract seventy-two subscribers, although the precise number of contributors is unknown. The company had spent nearly four hundred pounds—enough to finance an exploratory voyage to Carolina, acquire a cargo of trade goods, and purchase a gift for the colonial governor—when its financial operations were disrupted and many of its participants fell into disrepute as a consequence of their association with the Rye House Plot, the supposed conspiracy to assassinate King Charles II.²⁴

The Scots went further than the Huguenots in their preparations, though. In addition to raising capital for the voyage, their leaders consulted other Scots who had been to America as well as Scottish merchants active in Atlantic trade, attempted to prepare ground in the colony for their arrival, and put together a plan of action for immigrants after they reached American shores.²⁵ Settlement leaders also studied Carolina's Fundamental Constitutions. Not satisfied with secondhand information, Carolina Company

²¹ Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 34–37.

²² Maurice Mathews's brief description of Carolina, written in 1680, may have been designed for the eyes of these Huguenots—someone requested that he write it, and it discusses grapes, olives, and mulberry trees. If so, it missed its mark, since it was not penned until several weeks after the Huguenots arrived in the colony. See Maurice Mathews, "A Contemporary View of Carolina in 1680," *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 55 (July 1954): 153–159.

²³ Louis Thibou, "Letter from Louis Thibou to Gabriel Bontefoy," in *The Huguenot Connection: The Edict of Nantes, Its Revocation, and Early French Migration to South Carolina*, ed. R. M. Golden (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1988), 140–144; Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 34; William L. Saunders, ed., *The Colonial Records of North Carolina* (1886; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1968), 1: 344.

²⁴ Fryer, "Documents Relating to the Formation of the Carolina Company," 111–114, 118–125.

²⁵ John Erskine, *Journal of the Hon. John Erskine of Carnock, 1683–1687*, ed. Walter MacLeod (Edinburgh: Printed by T. and A. Constable, 1893), 39; Devine, *Scotland's Empire*, 31–34.

officials sent the *James of Irvine*, captained by James Gibson, on a reconnaissance voyage in 1682. Gibson visited Charles Town and then scouted suitable settlement sites to the south, particularly around Port Royal.²⁶

Given these actions, it would be surprising if the Scots leaders had not scoured the public literature on Carolina for useful information. By the time the Scots were making their plans, many accounts of Carolina had been published. In addition to the description in John Ogilby's atlas, which was copied in Richard Blome's oft-reprinted *Description of the Island of Jamaica* (1672), there were two older accounts: Thomas Hilton's, printed in 1664, and Robert Horne's, printed in 1666. Pamphlets written by Thomas Ash, Robert Ferguson, and Samuel Wilson were printed, along with other propaganda, in 1682 as part of the proprietors' promotional campaign.²⁷ Maurice Mathews's 1680 account had also reached Scottish hands by 1682.²⁸ Though these documents contained fairly transparent hyperbole, they nevertheless shaped the Scots' beliefs about the colony.

The promotional materials focused primarily on what could be planted and hunted, giving glowing reports of fertile soil and abundant wildlife. Documents advertised Carolina as being rapidly settled and the people as beginning to thrive. Dangers, hazards, and inconveniences were ignored or minimized. Scots thus learned that alligators were slow and smelly, Native Americans were few and weak, and the air of Carolina was much healthier than that of Virginia. Spaniards seldom appeared in the accounts at all. Most mentioned the colony's constitutions, highlighting the rights guaranteed; Robert Ferguson's account focused especially on freedom of conscience. Ferguson, however, also included an obscure but perhaps significant warning that some Carolinians were trying to deny rights to other inhabitants.²⁹ Scots learned that Carolina had two colonies—one at Albemarle, the other at Ashley River—and that the area around Port Royal, praised in much of

²⁶ Tom Barclay and Eric J. Graham, "The Covenanters' Colony in Carolina, 1682–1686," *History Scotland* 4 (July–August 2004): 20–21; Fryer, "Documents Relating to the Formation of the Carolina Company," 119–120, 125–126. An account from this voyage was printed in 1683. See John Crafford, *A New and Most Exact Account of the Fertiles [sic] and Famous Colony of Carolina* (Dublin, 1683).

²⁷ William Hilton, *A Relation of a Discovery Lately Made on the Coast of Florida* (London, 1664); Robert Horne, *A Brief Description of the Province of Carolina on the Coasts of Floreda [sic]* (London, 1666); John Ogilby, *America: Being the Latest and Most Accurate Description of the New World* (London, 1671); Richard Blome, *A Description of the Island of Jamaica* (London, 1672); Ash, *Carolina*; Samuel Wilson, *An Account of the Province of Carolina in America* (London, 1682); Robert Ferguson, *The Present State of Carolina with Advice to the Settlers [sic]* (London, 1682).

²⁸ Linda G. Fryer, "The Covenanters' Lost Colony in South Carolina," *Scottish Archives* 2 (1996): 101.

²⁹ Ferguson, *Present State of Carolina*, 31. Given that Ferguson was a dissenting minister, it is not surprising that he highlighted religious freedom.

the literature as a place capable of supporting lucrative trade, lacked European inhabitants. Widely available maps confirmed this image of Port Royal by showing its capacious harbor fed by wide rivers flowing from deep in the country.³⁰ Based on such knowledge, representatives of the Carolina Company, John Cochrane of Ochiltree and Sir George Campbell of Cessnock, negotiated an elaborate land-purchase agreement with the proprietors.³¹

Thus, the Scots' immigration was carefully planned. In this case, however, less planning conduced to success. The Huguenots had prepared only enough to reach Carolina. Once there, lacking firm and formal expectations, they were able to adapt. The Huguenot immigrants tethered themselves to the colony itself, and as the colony thrived, so did they. They may have sacrificed some agency, but they minimized their chances of finding disaster. The Scots, too, had prepared adequately to reach Carolina, but they arrived with a settlement plan that they believed would bring success. Yet this plan reflected the imperfect knowledge of the colony available in Britain and was, therefore, not realistic. Preconceptions had tainted the Scots' reconnaissance voyage, as shown by the Carolina Company's instructions that the *James of Irvine* specifically scout the area around Port Royal.³² Aboard the *James of Irvine*, Gibson and John Crafford had *expected* to find an ideal place to settle near Port Royal, and not surprisingly, they found one. The Scots' arrival with a plan, supported by seemingly reliable information, instilled in them a dangerous confidence as well as a reluctance to listen to established residents, notice flaws in preparations, or adapt to local realities. Feeling prepared, the Scots proceeded aggressively when common sense urged caution. The Scots learned more and planned more than did the Huguenots before immigrating to Carolina, but these more elaborate preparations decreased the Scots' chances of thriving.

AMBITIONS

The Scots leaders had loftier ambitions than did the planners of the Huguenot immigrations, and the differences between the two groups' intentions further help to explain the divergent results. Scottish leaders sought a complex amalgam of goals—religious liberties and privileges, economic viability and profit, geographic exclusivity, and political rights.

³⁰ Numerous maps of Carolina were drawn before 1682, but the most significant were the ones included with the Horne account, John Lederer's description of the interior, and the so-called Moxon map that appeared in Ogilby's atlas. The proprietors also commissioned a new map by Joel Gascoyne in 1682. See Cumming, *Southeast in Early Maps*, plates 34, 36, 37, 39, pp. 147–160; Worthington Chauncey Ford, "Early Maps of Carolina," *Geographical Review* 16 (April 1926): 268.

³¹ BPRO-SC, 1: 212–219.

³² Fryer, "Documents Relating to the Formation of the Carolina Company," 119.

The Huguenots, on the other hand, had simpler designs: religious tolerance, better economic conditions, and perhaps creation of their own communities. In other words, the Huguenot immigrants wanted just hearth and home, whereas the leaders of the Scots imagined creating a Scottish colony. The Huguenots sought individual independence, to be able to live as they wanted without relying on anyone else. The Scots wanted sovereignty, to live as a group without being subject to outside authority.

The Scots insisted on religious freedom, and both then and now, their project was seen as dominated by Covenanters and synonymous with Scottish Presbyterianism.³³ The Scots settlement was more than a refuge for persecuted Covenanters, but the religious imperative was nevertheless important. Many of the Carolina Company's founders were Covenanters, and Shaftesbury's reputation as a champion of distressed Protestants undoubtedly attracted to Carolina these imperialists in search of an empire.³⁴ Scottish Presbyterians were suffering persecution at the hands of the royal government during that era, memorably known as the "Killing Time," and many of the immigrants on board the *Carolina Merchant* were Covenanters, including their ostensible leader, Henry Erskine, Lord Cardross, who had been imprisoned in the late 1670s for actions connected to his religious views.³⁵ Other observers have described Cardross's second, William Dunlop, an unlicensed Presbyterian preacher, as following a religious mission.³⁶

Though John Erskine, Lord Cardross's brother, did not accompany the immigrants to Carolina, he testified to their religious concerns. He was sorely tempted to go, he wrote, "especially considering the occasion of hearing the Gospel there, and that contempt and reproach was cast upon it and the people adhering to it in Scotland, and how great profanity, atheism, and all sorts of wickedness was abounding in Scotland."³⁷ Uncertain about what to do, Erskine spent a day in prayer and reflection, hoping for divine guidance. Although he received no sign that God intended him to go, he traveled to Gourrock to witness the ship's departure. Erskine watched on July 19, 1684, as the *Carolina Merchant*, ready to sail, ignored favorable winds rather than leave on the Sabbath. He and others listened the following day as Dunlop preached a secret sermon on Canticles 2:16–17. Finally, on July 21,

³³ See, for example, Barclay and Graham, "Covenanters' Colony in Carolina," 18–27; Fryer, "Covenanters' Lost Colony in South Carolina," 98.

³⁴ Fryer, "Documents Relating to the Formation of the Carolina Company," 114; Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 31–32.

³⁵ Erskine, *Journal of the Hon. John Erskine*, xvii–xviii, 221–227. For a dramatic account of royal persecution of Scottish Presbyterians, see Robert Wodrow, *The History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland from the Restoration to the Revolution* (Edinburgh, 1721–1722). See also Gallay, *Indian Slave Trade*, 77.

³⁶ Barclay and Graham, "Covenanters' Colony in Carolina," 22.

³⁷ Erskine, *Journal of the Hon. John Erskine*, 62–63.

the *Carolina Merchant* sailed: "Betwixt eleven and twelve o'clock I left my brother aboard, who now, because of the cruelty and illegall proceedings of St. — off — and the corruptions and antichristian latitude of bishops and their dependents, the now pretended officers of which was daily growing, and all this tending to promote — interest by extirpating Presbyterians out of Scotland (which I hope in God shall never be). The number, presumption, and interest of papists was now fast growing in Scotland, notwithstanding of all the standing laws against it."³⁸

Presbyterianism, therefore, was important to many of these immigrants, who departed for Carolina believing that the Fundamental Constitutions afforded a chance to create a religious community in the colony as a consequence of two revisions to the proprietors' religious codes enacted at the behest of leaders of the Carolina Company in 1682. First, they insisted that the Fundamental Constitutions be revised to deny the Church of England the right to tax all Carolinians. This change would free Scots immigrants of religio-economic oppression by the Church of England. Second, the Scots suggested a clause giving dissenter congregations the right to tax their parishioners.³⁹ This change was economically superfluous and would have done little to promote religious security, since the Covenanters intended to support their ministers to the best of their ability. While the revision may indicate that Carolina Company officials doubted the religious earnestness of many potential immigrants, this is unlikely because immigrants had not yet been recruited. More probably, the new provision had a social function. Covenanters saw their beliefs as a key part of being Scottish and consequently saw a Scots colony as privileging that version of Protestantism. Hence, defining the Scots settlement as a Presbyterian parish with the right to tax parishioners was both natural and would support the colony's exclusivity, discouraging settlement by outsiders.

Scots settlers made religious freedom a prerequisite for their enterprise, and religion helped to define the community. But their aspirations included more than just religious security. Scots leaders also wanted political autonomy. Scots concerned about the future of the kingdom had been advocating colonization for several years.⁴⁰ In 1682 Scots unsuccessfully sought a

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 63–72. That biblical text reads, "My beloved is mine, and I am his: he feedeth among the lilies. Until the day break, and the shadows flee away, turn, my beloved, and be thou like a roe or a young hart upon the mountains of Bether."

³⁹ This point is often made. For a copy of the revised Fundamental Constitutions, see Mattie Erma Edwards Parker, ed., *North Carolina Charters and Constitutions, 1578–1698* (Raleigh, N.C.: Carolina Charter Tercentenary Commission, 1963).

⁴⁰ P. Hume Brown, ed., *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland: Third Series, Volume 7, 1681–1682* (Edinburgh: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1915), 664–665, 671–672.

new propriety in Florida.⁴¹ Other Scots, including some involved with the Carolina project, were busily securing shares of East Jersey, establishing joint sovereignty there with English proprietors.⁴² In addition, some of the Scots involved with the Carolina Company had explored the possibility of purchasing land in New York, though this plan proved unsatisfactory.⁴³ Carolina's proprietors offered the Scots the greatest measure of political freedom.

The substantial August 1682 revisions to the Fundamental Constitutions reflect the political concessions to the Scots.⁴⁴ The proprietors advertised these changes as advancing the liberty of the people, offering them additional protection from potential proprietorial tyranny. The changes promised the transfer of further authority from the proprietors in London to the settlers in Carolina, and historians have generally accepted the proprietors's slant. However, the revisions less concerned the balance of power between the proprietors and the settlers than the distribution of power within the colony, making it more difficult for one faction to rule unchallenged over others. In this manner, given the cordial relationship between the Carolina Company leaders and the proprietors, the constitutional changes requested by the Scots were meant as protection not from the proprietors, but from other Carolinians. The Scots were prepared to accept proprietary authority, but insisted on political autonomy to guard their settlement against interference from other colonists.

Once resident in Carolina, the Scots quickly began to reify their goal of political autonomy. They received permission from the proprietors to make Stuart Town a county seat, with its own justices and sheriff. They also sought the right to hold elections for the assembly in Stuart Town and even asked the proprietors to name deputies just for Stuart Town, which would have vested in residents the ability to act as proxies of the proprietors.⁴⁵ Cardross

⁴¹ Board of Trade, August 28, 1682, September 30, 1682, in J. W. Fortescue, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, vol. 11, *America and West Indies, 1681–1685* (1898; reprint, Vaduz: Kraus Reprint, 1964), 278–279, 304.

⁴² Board of Trade, September 30, 1682, November 23, 1683, in Fortescue, *Calendar of State Papers*, 11: 304, 554.

⁴³ Fryer, "Documents Relating to the Formation of the Carolina Company," 114, n. 6.

⁴⁴ Parker, *North Carolina Charters and Constitutions*, 208–233; Proprietors to Governor and Council, May 10, 1682, in William James Rivers, *A Sketch of the History of South Carolina to the Close of the Proprietary Government by the Revolution of 1719 with an Appendix Containing Many Valuable Records Hitherto Unpublished* (Charleston, S.C.: McCarter and Co., 1856), 395–396. Less substantial revisions to the Fundamental Constitutions also took place in January 1682.

⁴⁵ BPRO-SC, 1: 216, 304–305, 2: 105; Cardross to Proprietors, March 27, 1685, in Insh, "Carolina Merchant," 103.

came close to asserting the Scots' autonomy in a March 25, 1685, letter to the governor and council of Carolina in which he suggested that the Charles Town government was overstepping its authority both in summoning Caleb Westbrook, "who liveth within this Countye and hath taken land from us," and ordering the arrest of John Edenburgh on Saint Helena Island, "which is likewise within our bounds." Cardross conceded, "Wee have the ties of liveing under the same Royall King and of haveing the same Lords Proprietors," but he pointedly did not acknowledge Charles Town's authority over Stuart Town.⁴⁶ Scots accepted royal and proprietorial power, but tried to refute the authority of the council in Charles Town as part of the quest for sovereignty.

Sovereignty requires economic viability, and establishing economic independence was another part of the Scots' thinking. As Fryer shows, the Carolina Company focused on trade and profit.⁴⁷ Cardross, leader of the immigrants, was at least as interested in securing his economic fortunes as in establishing a haven for Covenanters. John Erskine tellingly reported that his brother could not "get either law or justice in his own private affairs," referring to Cardross's belief that in Carolina he could achieve the financial success his religion had denied him in Scotland.⁴⁸

Other settlers were equally concerned with profits. Dunlop and his commercial partners placed twenty-two servants on board the *Carolina Merchant*, and the preacher made elaborate business arrangements with James Montgomerie of Skelmorlie.⁴⁹ Walter Gibson, member of a busy Glasgow merchant family and brother of the captain of the *Carolina Merchant*, contracted to transport convicts on the ship, an economic enterprise regardless of their religious affiliation.⁵⁰ Montgomerie and fellow Scots merchant Robert Malloch sent ships from Scotland in the wake of the *Carolina Merchant*, supposedly to provide Port Royal with settlers and supplies, but these ships never delivered cargoes to Stuart Town, instead selling them at other ports for quick and certain profit.⁵¹

The economic imperative is especially clear in the choice of a settlement site. The leaders of the Carolina Company were unwilling to accept land just anywhere in Carolina, but insisted on a place where they believed they could conduct a brisk Atlantic trade. They rejected the proprietors' first proposal for a site in favor of land at Port Royal, which was known to have a deep,

⁴⁶ Cardross et al. to Governor and Council at Charles Town, March 25, 1685, in Rivers, *Sketch of the History of South Carolina*, 397. Rivers misdates this letter 1684.

⁴⁷ Fryer, "Documents Relating to the Formation of the Carolina Company," 111.

⁴⁸ Erskine, *Journal of the Hon. John Erskine*, 72.

⁴⁹ Gally, *Indian Slave Trade*, 77; Lesser, *South Carolina Begins*, 146; Fryer, "Covenanters' Lost Colony in South Carolina," 105.

⁵⁰ Insh, "Carolina Merchant," 99.

⁵¹ Barclay and Graham, "Covenanters' Colony in Carolina," 22–23, 26.

natural harbor.⁵² As part of their land-purchase agreement, the Scots gained the right to load and unload goods at their settlement, and the proprietors later permitted the settlers to establish a port town.⁵³ Once at Port Royal, the Scots attempted to form trade relations with nearby Indians, planned explorations of the interior, and readied materials for export.⁵⁴ The Scots wanted more than self-sufficiency and did not anticipate becoming part of Charles Town's trading networks: they sought an independent commercial presence as an element of sovereignty.

Finally, to bolster their sovereignty, the Scots desired geographic exclusivity and demographic security. The leaders of the Carolina Company did not want their land commingled with lands already held by other settlers and consequently negotiated to purchase a whole new county from the proprietors as well as an option for a future purchase of a second county.⁵⁵ Likewise, the proprietors found out in advance, likely to their delight, that the Scots intended to settle on the colony's southern frontier, away from the population center at Charles Town.⁵⁶ Then, having learned from years of living in the dual monarchy of the Stuart kings of Britain how smaller sovereignties could be undermined by larger ones, the Scots made known their intent to people their lands with ten thousand immigrants, hoping to protect themselves from their demographically promiscuous English neighbors.⁵⁷ Seeking religious unity, political autonomy, economic viability, geographic exclusivity, and demographic superiority, the Scots leaders believed they could achieve their goal of a sovereign Scottish colony.

By contrast, the Huguenots sought more modest goals, chiefly involving individual independence, which they believed required religious free-

⁵² Fryer, "Documents Relating to the Formation of the Carolina Company," 114–115. Port Royal's potential was noted in Hilton and Horne's accounts, written in the 1660s, and the proprietors long believed that the most sensible place for a settlement was on one of the rivers flowing into Port Royal. BPRO-SC, 1: 6–9. The proprietors envisioned placing a colony at Port Royal in 1670, but Native American overtures drew the immigrants to the Ashley and Cooper Rivers. Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 58–59; Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 5–6. Even into the 1680s, the proprietors hoped to settle a new chief town near Port Royal. Proprietors to Governor Morton, November 21, 1682, in Rivers, *Sketch of the History of South Carolina*, 397. As late as 1703, they insisted that it was a better port than Charles Town. BPRO-SC, 5: 117.

⁵³ BPRO-SC, 1: 214, 304–305.

⁵⁴ Steven J. Oatis, *A Colonial Complex: South Carolina's Frontiers in the Era of the Yamasee War, 1680–1730* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 26.

⁵⁵ The agreement between the Scottish Carolina Company, represented by Campbell and Cochran, and the Lords Proprietors of Carolina is printed in full in BPRO-SC, 1: 212–219.

⁵⁶ Proprietors to Governor, March 4, 1684, in BPRO-SC, 1: 271.

⁵⁷ Thibou, "Letter of Louis Thibou," 144; Proprietors to Andrew Percival, October 18, 1690, in Rivers, *Sketch of the History of South Carolina*, 413.

dom. In France, religious persecution was forcing Huguenots to choose whether they preferred suffering, conversion, or flight. Those Huguenots who opted to flee risked terrible hardships, as Judith Giton Manigault testified.⁵⁸ Their faith sustained them as far as London, where they found religious tolerance. The English capital was not free of anti-Huguenot feelings, however.⁵⁹ While Huguenots had a thriving church in London in the late 1670s, few dissenters could have felt fully comfortable in Britain in the later years of the reign of Charles II. Huguenots were persecuted in France and religiously insecure in London. Perhaps as early as the 1670s, when Locke was in France, and certainly by 1682, Shaftesbury had identified these distressed Protestants as appropriate immigrants for his colony.⁶⁰ The proprietors thus targeted Huguenots with French-language promotional materials that emphasized Carolina's freedoms, including religious liberty.⁶¹ Not surprisingly, some Huguenots responded favorably to the proprietors' entreaties. Drawn to Carolina partly for religious reasons, Huguenot immigrants expressed their spiritual values once in the colony, founding no fewer than five Huguenot churches before 1700.⁶²

Yet as Butler and others argue, the Huguenots were economic refugees when they immigrated to Carolina. Indeed, in London their suffering was more financial than spiritual.⁶³ Although the evidence is slim, poverty appears to have been a prime motivating factor in their decision to leave the English capital. Petit and Guérard's original petition emphasized the economic plight of the Protestant refugees, and the French Protestants who left for Carolina were more likely to be poor than rich, often able to emigrate only thanks to charity.⁶⁴ At the same time, economic potential appears to have attracted them to Carolina. When Louis Thibou wrote to London in 1683, he suggested that other Huguenots join him in Carolina because they would be able to improve their standard of living.⁶⁵ Manigault's immigration offers evidence of an economic motivation, as well. Her brother, who led settlers to Carolina in 1685, was influenced by reports of the colony, most likely from

⁵⁸ Slann L. C. Simmons, "Early Manigault Records," *Transactions of the Huguenot Society of South Carolina* 59 (1954): 24–27.

⁵⁹ Butler, *Huguenots in America*, 31–33.

⁶⁰ Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 34; Childs, "Petit-Guérard Colony," 96–97; David Armitage, "John Locke, Carolina, and the *Two Treatises of Government*," *Political Theory* 32 (October 2004): 610–611.

⁶¹ The Fundamental Constitutions were printed in French, as was a 1682 pamphlet written by Samuel Wilson. See Saunders, *Colonial Records of North Carolina*, 1: 344; Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 34.

⁶² Butler, *Huguenots in America*, 66.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 31–33, 58–60.

⁶⁴ BPRO-SC, 1: 62–68; Butler, *Huguenots in America*, 52; Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 67–70.

⁶⁵ Thibou, "Letter of Louis Thibou," 140–144.

the proprietors' promotional efforts.⁶⁶ One of the pamphlets translated into French was Samuel Wilson's 1682 tract. Although this document began by noting the constitutional status of Carolinians and highlighting the freedom of conscience, the bulk of it covered economic issues.⁶⁷ A French-language response to proprietor propaganda likewise focused on economic matters; though it contended that Carolina was not as promising economically as was being reported, it still indicates that financial issues were foremost in the minds of immigrants.⁶⁸ Fearing or experiencing poverty in London, many Huguenots immigrated to Carolina believing that the colony offered a chance at individual economic independence.

Some of these immigrants also sought to live in Huguenot communities, defined by religion and language.⁶⁹ Huguenots in Carolina attempted to settle in enclaves. For example, many of the immigrants from the *Richmond* may have settled contiguously in what came to be known as Orange Quarter.⁷⁰ Along the Santee River, a group of Huguenots consciously chose to live apart from other Carolinians, selecting a site as far from Charles Town as had the Scots at Stuart Town.⁷¹ These settlers failed to found a lasting town, but they nevertheless established the area as a flourishing French community.⁷² After visiting French Santee just after 1700, Lawson described its inhabitants as living like "one Tribe."⁷³ However, other Huguenots lived alongside English settlers at Charles Town and Goose Creek, demonstrating the broader focus on individual independence that required only religious and economic security.

LEADERS

The men who assumed leadership of the Scottish design are easy to identify, but Huguenot leaders are harder to pick out. The Huguenots on the

⁶⁶ Simmons, "Early Manigault Records," 24–27.

⁶⁷ Wilson, *Account of the Province*, 7–19.

⁶⁸ "South-Carolina in 1686," *Magnolia; or, Southern Appalachian* 1 (October 1842): 226–230.

⁶⁹ Butler, *Huguenots in America*, 67–68; Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 85–87.

⁷⁰ Discerning which Huguenots went where is difficult because of the dearth of sources. Butler contends that the *Richmond* immigrants founded Santee, but other sources challenge this conclusion. Butler, *Huguenots in America*, 93. Hirsch and Childs suggest the connection between the *Richmond* immigrants and the Orange Quarter settlement. Hirsch, *Huguenots of South Carolina*, 74; Childs, "Petit-Guérard Colony," 8–9. Van Ruymbeke asserts that the Santee settlement was founded by refugees who arrived in 1685 on the *Margaret*. Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 111–113.

⁷¹ Peter A. Coclanis, *The Shadow of a Dream: Economic Life and Death in the South Carolina Low Country, 1670–1920* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 48.

⁷² Cummings, *Southeast in Early Maps*, plates 42, 44.

⁷³ Lawson, *New Voyage*, 12–16.

Richmond did not even have a minister to provide religious authority.⁷⁴ While Petit and Guérard put their names on the petition that pried pounds from the king's purse and gained passage for refugees on board the *Richmond*, there is no evidence that either of those men actively led the Huguenots after they arrived in Carolina. In fact, Petit apparently never went to Carolina, although Guérard immigrated, probably on board the *Richmond*, and his family thrived for decades in the colony.⁷⁵ The lack of formal leaders from within their group forced the new French arrivals to turn to established residents for guidance. In so doing, they may have conceded a measure of self-determination, but eased their incorporation into the colony's existing framework.

Conversely, the men who led the Scots may well have caused their group's ruin. By the time Scots immigrants were ready to sail for Carolina, fallout from the discovery of the Rye House Plot had gutted the original leadership of the Carolina Company, and Cardross and Dunlop had assumed authority, making them "the onlie two" of the immigrants "who had from the beginning of our treaties with the lords proprietors been undertakers for the plantations."⁷⁶ In retrospect, Cardross clearly compounded some of the Scots' problems. In many of his unfortunate decisions, he was just following the plans worked out in advance by the Carolina Company. In two ways, however, Cardross bore responsibility for the failure of the Scots immigration. First, he contributed to the animosity between the Scots immigrants and powerful settlers at Charles Town. Second, he abandoned the settlement, dooming the already shaky enterprise to failure.

Cardross raised hackles in Charles Town by boasting of his close relationship with the proprietors, flaunting his nobility, and challenging the authority of the colony's leaders. As Roper makes clear, holding the proprietors' trust was useful for colonists hoping to control events in Carolina. Maurice Mathews and others benefited when they found favor with the proprietors and felt threatened when rivals for leadership did so.⁷⁷ The arrival of the Scots was bound to worry Mathews and other prominent Carolinians, but Cardross may have heightened this concern by appearing an especially dangerous political challenger. Writing to the governor and council in Charles Town in March 1685, he highlighted his connection to the proprietors: "Wee nothing doubt but that you all know the contracts and treaties that have been made betwixt the Lords Proprietors and us, and other of our Countrey men, which, as wee resolve to sincerely keep on our part, soe

⁷⁴ Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 116.

⁷⁵ The original petition is in BPRO-SC, 1: 62-68; Childs, "Petit-Guérard Colony," 9-11.

⁷⁶ Cardross to Proprietors, March 27, 1685, in Insh, "Carolina Merchant," 101.

⁷⁷ Roper, *Conceiving Carolina*, 84-88.

likewise wee expect and resolve to have them kept firme to us. As wee are confident that Lords Proprietors themselves, persons of soe great honor and worth, will faithfully doe."⁷⁸ Such statements surely earned Cardross powerful enemies.

Cardross's link with the proprietors was unique because he alone among the people in Carolina shared with Shaftesbury the tie of nobility. Though not a great noble, Cardross made sure people knew he was a lord. His brother and fellow immigrants referred to him as "Lord," and he used his title in formal communications with the governor and council in Charles Town.⁷⁹ He also expected to be treated as a lord. Although little is known about Cardross's actions in Charles Town between his arrival in October 1684 and his departure for Port Royal the following month, any lordly pretensions could easily have created ire. Presuming a natural authority based on blood irked residents of a frontier colony where inhabitants were fashioning a new aristocracy based on achievement. A suggestion of class conflict appears in the council's June 2, 1685, report of legal action against Cardross, which conspicuously refers to him not as "Lord Cardross," but as "Askin [Erskine] als Lord Cardrosse," thus nearly stripping him of his title and denying its weightiness in Carolina.⁸⁰ Cardross complained to the proprietors about affronts to his nobility, and on April 22, 1686, they chastised the governor and council on his behalf: "We would have all persons of quality treated with civility and respect."⁸¹ On March 3, 1687, the proprietors formally apologized to Cardross for the lack of respect he had received in their colony.⁸² More than four years later, the proprietors were still scolding Carolinians for having mistreated Cardross from the first day he arrived at Charles Town.⁸³

Cardross had a record of challenging authority that predated his arrival in America, and his clash with leading figures in Carolina was not his first scrape with the law. In 1675 he was arrested in Scotland on charges of holding conventicles at his estate, harboring a minister whose preaching had been banned, and inciting people to prevent authorities from apprehending this minister. Convicted, Cardross spent four years as a prisoner.

⁷⁸ Cardross et al. to Governor and Council, March 25, 1685, in Rivers, *Sketch of the History of South Carolina*, 408.

⁷⁹ Erskine, *Journal of the Hon. John Erskine*, 25; Dunlop to Governor Quarry, July 17, 1685, in BPRO-SC, 2: 79.

⁸⁰ BPRO-SC, 2: 69.

⁸¹ Proprietors to Governor Morton, April 22, 1686, in J. W. Fortescue, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, vol. 12, *America and West Indies, 1685-1688* (1898; reprint, Vaduz: Kraus Reprint, 1964), 178-179; BPRO-SC, 2: 132-133.

⁸² BPRO-SC, 2: 193.

⁸³ Proprietors to Council, May 13, 1691, in Rivers, *Sketch of the History of South Carolina*, 414.

After his release, he presented an indignant petition to the Scottish Privy Council that was so forward, it offended the council, which reported his impudence directly to Charles II.⁸⁴ In Scotland, Cardross had felt that defying authority (the king's law) was warranted in the service of a higher power (God), and he took the same tack in Carolina, challenging the council's preeminence out of a belief that he was answering directly to the higher power of the proprietors. Though he considered himself justified, his behavior greatly irritated leaders in Charles Town, just as he had earlier irritated the Scottish Privy Council. And just as the Scottish Privy Council had demanded that he be punished, so too the governor and council in Charles Town reacted by seeking his arrest. Of all Cardross's responsibilities, perhaps none was more important to the settlement than orchestrating relationships between Scots immigrants and other Carolinians. On this score, he failed miserably.

Having assumed leadership of the enterprise and complicated relations between Scots immigrants and the government in Charles Town, Cardross then abandoned Stuart Town.⁸⁵ The Stuart Town settlement was undoubtedly struggling by the time of his departure in the autumn of 1686, but by leaving first the town and then the colony, he placed his personal well being above that of the settlement he was supposed to be nurturing. Having left Scotland with trumpet fanfare, Cardross fled Stuart Town to the sound of cannon fire, as attacking Spaniards turned the settlement's guns on the tiny boat in which he fled. Cardross took the Stuart Town seal of government with him, leaving the remaining settlers at the mercy of the invaders.⁸⁶ The other men of the settlement, who hid in the woods when the attackers came, were now on their own, and the fates of all but a few of them remain unknown. Dunlop stayed in Carolina and tried to carry on, but he had preceded Cardross out of Stuart Town and was in Charles Town. Dunlop could do little to rebuild the ruined town, and he left in disappointment by 1689.⁸⁷ Cardross's flight killed the Scots settlement. Given the enormity of their ambitions, leading the Scots immigrants was complex and difficult,

⁸⁴ Erskine, *Journal of the Hon. John Erskine*, xvii–xviii, 221–227.

⁸⁵ There is some uncertainty as to Cardross's departure date. J. G. Dunlop places him at Stuart Town in August 1686 during the first Spanish raid, but Lawrence S. Rowland, Alexander Moore, and George C. Rogers, Jr., assert that Cardross was in Scotland when Stuart Town was attacked. It seems likely, therefore, that he left Carolina after the first Spanish assault, but before the second one in December 1686. See Dunlop and Mabel L. Webber, "Spanish Depredations, 1686," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine* 30 (April 1929): 82; Katharine M. Jones, *Port Royal under Six Flags: The Story of the Sea Islands* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), 94; Rowland, Moore, and Rogers, *The History of Beaufort County, South Carolina: Volume 1, 1514–1861* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 74.

⁸⁶ Jones, *Port Royal*, 93.

⁸⁷ BPRO-SC, 2: 119; Rowland, Moore, and Rogers, *History of Beaufort County*, 75.

and Cardross was overmatched. When this failing became apparent, he gave up and returned to Britain, the Scots' plan in tatters, prepared to blame the demise of Stuart Town on leaders in Charles Town.

INTERACTIONS WITH OTHERS

Another significant difference between the two immigrations lies in the fact that the Scots often clashed with other people, while the Huguenots mostly coexisted. Indeed, problems caused by Cardross's leadership were part of a larger set of issues that earned the Scots enemies in Carolina. While Huguenots occasionally suffered harassment, their sufferings paled in comparison to the spectacular conflicts that swirled around the Scots at Stuart Town, as their settlement grated on English settlers, Spaniards, and Native Americans.

While their main enemies among the English in Carolina cannot be identified with certainty, the Scots blamed Maurice Mathews above all, and they probably had trouble with other important traders and government leaders, including Arthur Middleton, James Moore, John Boone, Robert Quarry, and John Godfrey. The Scots' hostility arose from their economic and political goals as well as from the relationship between the proprietors and the English settlers.

Trade with the Native Americans, including traffic in enslaved Indians, was the most lucrative activity in Carolina in the 1680s, and the people who were profiting could be ruthless in their determination to sustain and extend this trade.⁸⁸ The Scots' settlement plan, with its vision of fabulous earnings from Atlantic commerce, required breaking into the Indian trade. The Scots hastily implemented their plan, colonizing Port Royal and claiming the right to settle a port town. They then established connections with the Yamasee, who were migrating into that region at the same time, and began exploring the interior. Cardross even reported to the proprietors the Scots' hope of creating trade links all the way to Spanish New Mexico, though he acknowledged that these efforts were provoking animosity from other Carolinians.⁸⁹ The Scots apparently did not care that they were offending

⁸⁸ Philip M. Brown, "Early Indian Trade in the Development of South Carolina: Politics, Economics, and Social Mobility during the Proprietary Period, 1670-1719," *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 76 (July 1975): 118-125. The trade relationships between Carolinians and Native Americans are ably covered in Crane, *Southern Frontier*; Gallay, *Indian Slave Trade*; and Oatis, *Colonial Complex*. See also Converse D. Clowse, *Economic Beginnings in Colonial South Carolina, 1670-1730* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971). Though differing in detail and perspective, these books agree that the Indian trade was Carolina's key economic activity in the 1680s and that the Indian traders could be violent.

⁸⁹ Cardross to Proprietors, March 27, 1685, in Insh, "Carolina Merchant," 103-104.

established English traders, lending plausibility to the accusation by the council at Charles Town that Cardross had arrested Henry Woodward and other English traders for trespassing in an area where the Scottish lord claimed to have a trade monopoly.⁹⁰ Regardless of the veracity of this allegation, the Scots were striving to become independent players in Carolina's most lucrative economic pursuit, a dangerous aspiration because established Indian traders saw all rivals, regardless of nationality, as enemies.

Political issues further led to bitter feelings between the Scots and other Carolinians. Political power in Carolina rested in the hands of the Grand Council, whose members included elected colonists and a governor chosen by the proprietors. Ambitious settlers consequently sought to control Carolina politics by dominating the council and influencing the governor, ends more easily accomplished with the patronage of the proprietors. The Scots feared that they would fail to reach their goal of sovereignty if they fell under the domination of this Charles Town government. Benefiting from proprietary patronage, they moved quickly not only to claim but also to establish autonomy. A new autonomous Scots settlement in the colony implicitly challenged the men who based their power in part on controlling the existing government. However, the Scots also presented a direct political threat: as Britons, they had guaranteed rights in English domains; their leaders had experience in law and politics; their agreement with the proprietors gave them control of one county and an option on another; and they boasted of bringing ten thousand immigrants. The Scots, therefore, had the potential to become a dominant force in the Charles Town government. Apparently difficult to control and a threat to seize power, the Scots were feared and perhaps hated by powerful Carolinians.

The proprietors granted special favors to the Scots, which engendered additional suspicion and fear from other groups. In particular, the changes to the Fundamental Constitutions provided Carolinians with ample evidence of the friendship between the proprietors and the Scots immigrants.⁹¹ While the proprietors repeatedly claimed that these changes had been intended to increase the liberties of all settlers, the powerful residents of Goose Creek and other established English enclaves found the situation alarming. Information that the Scots were receiving further privileges and that the proprietors had instructed the governor to give them "all manner of countenance" further fueled the fire.⁹² The proprietors even gave their blessing to the Scots settling at Port Royal, where they envisioned the

⁹⁰ BPRO-SC, 2: 63.

⁹¹ Proprietors to Governor and Council, May 10, 1682, in Rivers, *Sketch of the History of South Carolina*, 395; BPRO-SC, 1: 305.

⁹² BPRO-SC, 1: 271, 304, 305.

immigrants establishing a port that would eventually eclipse Charles Town.⁹³ Moreover, the proprietors joined proclamations regarding the arrival of Scots immigrants with denunciations of some of the colony's leading men and new restrictions on land grants around Charles Town.⁹⁴ As a whole, these actions suggested to some prominent English colonists that the Scots' arrival portended a struggle for control.

Responding to established settlers' objections to the new Fundamental Constitutions, the proprietors scolded, "Upon request of the Scots wee did agree to make some alterations in the fundamental constitutions whereby more power was put into the hands of the people but some seditious places in Carolina made use of this our kindness to infuse jealousy into the people that wee did intend thereby to inslave them and might hereafter change them to their prejudice soe rejected them."⁹⁵ Colonists claimed that they feared tyranny, the proprietors groused that the colonists resisted all authority, and historians have never adequately explained how Carolinians could reject a document that promised them more independence on the grounds that it threatened their liberties. The settlers' complaints make sense, though, because they saw the changes as part of the proprietors' plan to hand authority to the new immigrants from Scotland. The Scots represented a threat, and the new constitutions had to be rejected as part of the effort to neutralize that threat.

In March 1685, Cardross complained from Stuart Town that some residents of Charles Town "who wold be esteemed grate men there, . . . not only did what they could to discouradge us to setle here, but also both used us uncivilie and dealt with severall of our number to deserte us, which some did."⁹⁶ The location of the Scots settlement between Charles Town and the Savannah River, along what was becoming the key route into the interior, caused established Indian traders to fear that commerce then flowing through Charles Town could easily be rechanneled through a new Scots port town. Consequently, some English leaders lashed out at the Scots, unable to deny them political rights or prevent them from setting up separate frameworks of law and governance, fearing their potential political power, and sensing that they were being favored by the proprietors.

Although the relationship between Stuart Town and Charles Town improved somewhat in the wake of an obsequious letter Dunlop sent to the governor in the summer of 1685, animosities remained.⁹⁷ By autumn,

⁹³ Proprietors to Governor Morton, November 21, 1682, in Rivers, *Sketch of the History of South Carolina*, 397.

⁹⁴ BPRO-SC, 1: 305; Clowse, *Economic Beginnings*, 76–77.

⁹⁵ BPRO-SC, 1: 305.

⁹⁶ Cardross to Proprietors, March 27, 1685, in Insh, "Carolina Merchant," 100.

⁹⁷ Dunlop to Governor Quarry, July 17, 1685, in BPRO-SC, 2: 79; Gallay, *Indian Slave Trade*, 80.

Dunlop was ensconced on the council at Charles Town, but he was close to Governor Joseph Morton, of whom Mathews was not fond. Continued hostility to the presence of the Scots colony is further suggested by a September 1686 report from the council to the proprietors, in which the former begged the latter to give encouragement "to all others (especially to Englishmen) to transport themselves hither."⁹⁸ Regardless, English settlers' machinations had already damaged the Scots' efforts. Stuart Town received only meager supplies from Charles Town and was thinly settled, as would-be immigrants had been lured away and the Scots had been outbid for indentured servants. Moreover, Stuart Town faced danger from Native Americans and Spaniards, brought on in part by the settlers at Charles Town.

The Huguenots, in contrast, did not pose a threat and thus did not provoke similar treatment from entrenched English settlers. The French immigrants apparently did not initially attempt to build trade networks outside of those run by the colony's leading Indian traders. Once settled on the Santee, they traded with Native Americans, but these activities were either satellites to Charles Town efforts or not large enough to bother English merchants.⁹⁹ In addition, the Santee River, a minor trade artery into the interior, was not the nexus for the most lucrative commerce.

Furthermore, Huguenot potential was circumscribed because the French immigrants occupied an uncertain constitutional position. Although promotional materials may have led them to expect full rights, these refugees found that such rights were not guaranteed. And even if political rights were granted, the Huguenots could not pretend to possess autonomy and had to operate within the colony's existing political framework. The English settlers considered the Huguenots, a distinct minority with no apparent potential to swamp Carolina demographically, easy to control and manipulate, especially considering their tenuous legal status and perceived lack of political savvy. Therefore, the Huguenots did not threaten the political factions already vying for control of the colonial government.

Finally, the Huguenots who arrived on the *Richmond* did not disembark boasting of close connections with the proprietors. Their coming was not presaged in numerous letters, and they were not granted special privileges. Their arrival was noted only briefly in a single letter from the proprietors to the governor and council that arrived with them onboard the *Richmond*: "By the same conveyance with this goes Severall families of forraigne Protestants to Settle in Carolina whome wee recommend to your care and desire they may be so treated that others may be encouraged to follow them." The letter noted that Petit and Guérard were to receive four thousand acres each,

⁹⁸ Dunlop and Webber, "Spanish Depredations," 86.

⁹⁹ Lawson, *New Voyage*, 12.

but the land was to be used by the immigrants for producing wine, silk, and olive oil.¹⁰⁰ As a result, existing settlers did not regard the Huguenots as rivals for proprietary affections.

Of course, hostility toward the French immigrants arose occasionally, especially when they appeared to threaten the colony's dominant political culture. Later in the 1680s, after the proprietors began aggressively encouraging Huguenot immigration and French settlers started to arrive in greater numbers, some Carolina interests attempted to stanch the flow.¹⁰¹ Huguenots subsequently encountered harassment when their political activities became too forward. In the 1690s, French settlers established a substantial presence in Craven County and seemed poised to take control of many seats in the colonial assembly. English colonists quickly acted to prevent this outcome, launching challenges to Huguenot voting rights, inheritance rights, and marriage certificates that put the French settlers on the defensive.¹⁰² As a rule, however, the Huguenots experienced little harassment because they did not seem to threaten the colonial leadership.

In the 1680s, powerful and ambitious Carolinians welcomed strangers only as slaves. A cold calculus greeted outsiders, as well-established colonists assessed newcomers' usefulness and competitiveness. Subservient allies or useful pawns were good; anyone who seemed able to build an independent power base was bad. By this logic, Huguenot refugees were accepted. When they pushed the accepted boundaries, they could easily be checked. The Scots, on the other hand, had to be undermined from the start to prevent them from realizing their destabilizing potential.

The Scots' settlement plan evoked Spanish and Native American hostility, as well. The plan identified a site with economic potential and anticipated the possibility of English oppression, but did not foresee Spaniards or Native Americans as serious threats. Rather, Scots leaders hinted at a desire to be as close to the Spanish as possible to initiate trade with them.¹⁰³ The Scots' fantastic vision of ten thousand immigrants may have made them overconfident. The imperfect knowledge about Carolina available to the Scots in Britain left them unprepared to see Spaniards or Native Americans as dangerous. Instead of learning that Spain had a long-articulated claim to Carolina, the Scots read repeated assertions of England's right to and

¹⁰⁰ BPRO-SC, 1: 95–96. Their arrival is also discussed in Martha Bailey Burns, "The Richmond," *Transactions of the Huguenot Society of South Carolina* 85 (1980): 43–49.

¹⁰¹ This reasoning explains the appearance of a French-language anti-Carolina pamphlet in 1685. See "South-Carolina in 1686," 226–230.

¹⁰² BPRO-SC, 3: 103–104.

¹⁰³ Fryer, "Documents Relating to the Formation of the Carolina Company," 116.

unchallenged possession of the land.¹⁰⁴ Instead of learning about the tumult resulting from the collapse of the Spanish mission system in Guale (modern coastal Georgia), the migration of the Yamasee toward the Savannah River, and the penetration of Carolina traders into the interior, Scots read that the Carolinians were far more powerful than the Indians, who were weak from fighting each other, and that they enjoyed the natives' friendship and treated them with justice.¹⁰⁵

When Scots waded ashore at Port Royal, they trod on the toes of angry Spaniards without realizing the seriousness of this action. The Spanish saw England's 1670 colonization of the Ashley and Cooper Rivers as an invasion of their long-claimed, though unsettled, territory. Furthermore, Spain viewed Carolina's southern expansion as menacing Spanish-occupied lands and prepared to defend them.¹⁰⁶ Spaniards in part blamed Carolinians for the Native American and pirate raids in the late 1670s and early 1680s that destroyed their missions in Guale.¹⁰⁷ The Carolina proprietors feared that the Spanish were preparing to retaliate against the colony, but apparently did not convey this concern to the Scots.¹⁰⁸ Arriving in Carolina, Scots found the colony anticipating an assault from the Spanish in the wake of their recent attack on the English settlement at Providence in the Bahamas. Despite these fears and the defections they caused, a group of fifty-one Scots set off southward from Charles Town in November 1684.¹⁰⁹ At Port Royal, in that debatable land, they built Stuart Town, further provoking the Spanish.

Moreover, the Scots were ill prepared to understand the diplomatic complexity of the region south of Charles Town, where multiple European and myriad Native American groups were interacting, seeking allies, eyeing enemies, and exploiting stooges.¹¹⁰ The Scots were surprised to find the area around Port Royal, which they expected to be mostly uninhabited, quickly filling with Yamasees in numbers far too great for the Scots to control. The Scots nevertheless saw the Yamasee migration as a great opportunity, believing that it promised them trade partners and military allies against the Spanish and other Native Americans.¹¹¹ The Yamasees probably had a similar view, seeing the arrival of the Scots as a great opportunity. In this

¹⁰⁴ See, for example, Ash, *Carolina*, 40–41.

¹⁰⁵ See, for example, *ibid.*, 15.

¹⁰⁶ Jones, *Port Royal*, 92.

¹⁰⁷ Galloway, *Indian Slave Trade*, 41–42, 56; Clowse, *Economic Beginnings*, 85–86; Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 17–26.

¹⁰⁸ Proprietors to Governor Kyrle, April 29, 1684, in Fortescue, *Calendar of State Papers*, 11: 623; BPRO-SC, 1: 279, 284, 2: 184–186, 222.

¹⁰⁹ Cardross to Proprietors, March 27, 1685, in Insh, "Carolina Merchant," 101.

¹¹⁰ Oatis, *Colonial Complex*, 3.

¹¹¹ Cardross to Proprietors, March 27, 1685, in Insh, "Carolina Merchant," 104.

encounter, the experienced Yamasees were more likely to exploit than be exploited by the naive Scots. On their own at Port Royal, the Scots became entangled in a web of relationships beyond their understanding and even more beyond their control.

The 1685 Yamasee raid into the Timucua Province of Spanish Florida is one of the most important events in the Stuart Town saga, but the Scots' role in this affair has never been certain.¹¹² Contemporary reports from Charles Town accused the Scots of fomenting the Yamasee raid, supplying them with guns, and receiving enslaved Indians in exchange.¹¹³ Historians who accept the most hysterical of these inflated reports, such as those suggesting that the Scots received 220 captive Native Americans, probably go astray.¹¹⁴ At the same time, historians who absolve the Scots of all responsibility, portraying them as pawns of English traders in Charles Town, probably miss the mark.¹¹⁵ Most likely, the Yamasees lured the Scots into a trade relationship, promising benefits for both sides but designed according to a Yamasee agenda. The Scots supplied guns and received twenty-two enslaved Indians as part of the deal, trafficking them to a ship in Port Royal in May 1685, just after the Yamasee raid.¹¹⁶

Whatever the Scots' true role, the episode is significant because others believed that the Scots had been involved.¹¹⁷ Having settled on contested land and become entangled in Native American affairs, the Scots made themselves a target and helped to trigger the shots fired against them. Provoked by broader developments across the Southeast, of which both Scottish and English Carolinians were a part, Spaniards and Native Ameri-

¹¹² See, for example, Gally, *Indian Slave Trade*, 79–80; Oatis, *Colonial Complex*, 26–29.

¹¹³ BPRO-SC, 2: 49, 2: 66.

¹¹⁴ See, for example, Rowland, Moore, and Rogers, *History of Beaufort County*, 73.

¹¹⁵ See, for example, Roper, *Conceiving Carolina*, 88–91. Roper suggests the less plausible explanation that the attack on Carolina by Spaniards and Native Americans happened not on its own initiative, but rather at the urging of Mathews and other men within Carolina. Stronger evidence, such as correspondence between Mathews and the Spaniards, is necessary to make this suggestion persuasive. Roper's evidence is not convincing. That Westbrook sent reports to Charles Town does not prove he was a puppet. That the council at Charles Town quickly reported to the proprietors news of trade between Scots and Yamasees does reveal commercial rivalry, but does not show that it precipitated a Spanish assault. That Peter Colleton and the proprietors decided Mathews was complicit with the Spaniards undoubtedly reflects the proprietors' hostility toward Mathews as well as information that they received about the events from Cardross. Leading English traders resented the Scots' settlement and sought to protect their trade from the Scots, but did not invite a Spanish attack.

¹¹⁶ Childs, *Malaria and Colonization*, 231–232.

¹¹⁷ Proprietors to Governor Colleton, October 10, 1687, in Fortescue, *Calendar of State Papers*, 12: 451.

cans attacked Carolina in August 1686. The invaders deliberately struck first at Stuart Town, on the colony's southern flank, and then began pillaging their way up the coast toward Charles Town.¹¹⁸ Hostile Spaniards and Native Americans returned to the colony's southern frontier in December 1686, again burning Stuart Town, which never arose from these ashes.

The Huguenots did not make themselves a target. The immigrants from the *Richmond* settled either in or near Charles Town. This decision followed not only from their economic goals and lack of leadership but also from their relationship with the English. The Huguenots were comfortable living among or close by English Carolinians, partly because of their reasonably hospitable stay in London.¹¹⁹ For Huguenots, the English were not the persecutors, but rather had provided refuge from persecution. Thus, the Huguenots saw no need to live apart from the English. Their first enclaves were in the middle of the colony—in Charles Town, Orange Quarter, and Goose Creek—and did not openly provoke the Spanish. Likewise, these Huguenot enclaves lay within an orbit defined more by Europeans than by Native Americans, so the French immigrants did not become directly embroiled in Native American controversies. Tucked away in the center of Carolina, Huguenots did not even suffer inadvertently from the raids of 1686, because the attackers never reached as far north as Charles Town. And when Huguenots later spread out from Charles Town, they moved to the north. Indeed, fear of Spaniards and Native Americans helped induce Huguenots to spurn Dunlop's offer to join the Scots at Port Royal.¹²⁰ Going instead to the Santee River not only kept Huguenots safe from Spanish hostility, but also helped them avoid complex and precarious dealings with Native Americans.

PERSEVERANCE

Finally, the Huguenots had more incentive to persevere than did the Scots. Immigration was difficult, and both groups faced their share of troubles. But the Huguenots were more apt to endure difficulties, as the response of both groups to disease shows. The Scots arrived in Charles Town during the settlement's first devastating malaria epidemic. As Cardross reported, "We found the place so extrordinerie sicklie that sickness quickly seased many of our number and took away great many of our number and discouraged others, insomuch that they deserted us."¹²¹ Childs probably overstates when he describes malaria as the primary cause of the failure of

¹¹⁸ Dunlop and Webber, "Spanish Depredations," 81–87. See also Jones, *Port Royal*, 93–96.

¹¹⁹ Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 65–66.

¹²⁰ Gallay, *Indian Slave Trade*, 84.

¹²¹ Cardross to Proprietors, March 27, 1685, in Insh, "Carolina Merchant," 100.

the Scots settlement. Even so, French immigrants also encountered malaria and did not give up as easily. According to Childs, mild malaria was endemic by 1678 or 1679, so the immigrants aboard the *Richmond* and any Huguenots who came later faced seasoning.¹²² Although Thibou's 1683 letter does not mention distempers, Manigault included "sickness" among her sufferings in Carolina.¹²³ The French Protestants may well have been seeking refuge from the sickness of Charles Town when they migrated to the Santee region, but they would likely have carried the contagion with them. Malaria, therefore, could explain why the Huguenot town on the Santee, Jamestown, did not persist: as an interior town near a swampy river, it would have provided the perfect environment for malaria.¹²⁴ The Huguenots on the Santee learned by hard experience to preserve themselves by living as a spread-out community.

At least four factors explain why the *Richmond* immigrants showed more perseverance than did those from the *Carolina Merchant*. First, the Scots had more of an option to return home. Religious persecution of the Covenanters was real, but not severe enough to cause a mass exodus or make repatriation unthinkable.¹²⁵ Moreover, Scots could relocate and live as individuals anywhere in England's American colonies. Hence, almost as soon as they arrived in Carolina, Scots began "going off againe" to other colonies or back to Scotland.¹²⁶ French Protestants, however, could not return to France, because the intense persecution that began in 1679 only worsened over the next few years.¹²⁷ They might have been able to return to London, but no evidence suggests that the Huguenots who immigrated to Carolina had developed strong psychological connections with the city. For Huguenots, the Atlantic was a one-way street. In addition, these refugees had limited opportunities for remigration, as only a handful of American towns had French Protestant populations. Many Huguenot families remained prominent in Carolina for generations.¹²⁸

Second, whereas many of the Scots on the *Carolina Merchant* were forced immigrants, most of the refugees on the *Richmond* were free. While some Huguenots traveled as indentured servants, charity spared others that fate.¹²⁹ A few French Protestants even traveled with money and

¹²² Childs, *Malaria and Colonization*, 188, 242.

¹²³ Thibou, "Letter of Louis Thibou," 140-144; Simmons, "Early Manigault Records," 27.

¹²⁴ Childs, *Malaria and Colonization*, 231.

¹²⁵ Fryer, "Covenanters' Lost Colony," 104-105.

¹²⁶ Cardross to Proprietors, March 27, 1685, in Insh, "Carolina Merchant," 101.

¹²⁷ Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 15-19.

¹²⁸ Nash, "Huguenot Merchants," 225.

¹²⁹ Hirsch, *Huguenots of South Carolina*, 179; Butler, *Huguenots in America*, 52; Van Ruymbeke, *New Babylon to Eden*, 67-70.

servants.¹³⁰ Free of compulsion or obligation, the Huguenots were more likely to feel that they had chosen to immigrate.¹³¹ Seeing immigration as their best option gave them incentive to persevere. Most of the *Carolina Merchant's* passengers, in contrast, were either indentured servants or transported criminals who left Scotland against their will.¹³² Thus, they likely had little interest in persisting in the face of hardship and likely felt no fondness for the expedition's leaders or goals. Charles Town settlers lured Scots away from the Stuart Town design, and Cardross reported that his party was "reduced almost to these of our own families" by the time he left for Port Royal.¹³³

Third, the Scots immigrants were a collection of lone men, while many Huguenots traveled as families. The passenger list of the *Richmond* reveals the familial nature of the Huguenot immigration, and the "Liste Des François et Suisse" shows how fast Huguenots began to propagate in Carolina.¹³⁴ Conversely, only one woman traveled on the *Carolina Merchant*, and she was not there by choice.¹³⁵ Cardross and Dunlop left their families behind in Scotland, as apparently did many of their fellow travelers. Other Scots were bachelors.¹³⁶ The decision-making calculus for individuals differs from that of family heads. For Huguenots, traveling as families imposed a higher level of responsibility on decision makers, causing them to think first of basic necessities, instilling a basic conservatism, and requiring determination. For Scots, traveling as single men freed them to pursue more radical, less sensible, and ultimately impermanent designs.

Fourth, compatriots came to join the French immigrants, while the Scots on the *Carolina Merchant* were disappointed that more of their countrymen did not follow. Cardross reported with discouragement the loss of the ship carrying Thomas Ferguson and Scots settlers from Belfast.¹³⁷ When the

¹³⁰ Hirsch, *Huguenots of South Carolina*, 252; Butler, *Huguenots in America*, 55.

¹³¹ Jon Butler, "The Huguenots and the American Immigrant Experience," in Van Ruymbeke and Sparks, *Memory and Identity*, 66.

¹³² Rowland, Moore, and Rogers, *History of Beaufort County*, 70.

¹³³ Cardross to Proprietors, March 27, 1685, in Insh, "Carolina Merchant," 101.

¹³⁴ Childs, "Petit-Guéraud Colony," 1-2; Daniel Ravenel, "Liste des François et Suisses" from an Old Manuscript List of French and Swiss Protestants Settled in Charleston, on the Santee and at the Orange Quarter in Carolina Who Desired Naturalization Prepared Probably about 1695-6 (1868; reprint, Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1968), 45-61.

¹³⁵ Rowland, Moore, and Rogers, *History of Beaufort County*, 71.

¹³⁶ Erskine, *Journal of the Hon. John Erskine*, 67; Barclay and Graham, "Covenanters' Colony in Carolina," 22.

¹³⁷ Cardross to Proprietors, March 27, 1685, in Insh, "Carolina Merchant," 100-101. Cardross likely referred to Ferguson's ship when he wrote of "the loss likeways of a ship which came from Belfast filled with our cuntrymen who desyned to setell with us."

infant settlement at Stuart Town hungered for support from Scotland, it was not forthcoming: Covenanters were first distracted by the 1685 Monmouth's Rebellion and then prevented from sending people or supplies by the subsequent royal clampdown on Scotland.¹³⁸ In addition, the dismal reports from Carolina dampened enthusiasm for the settlement. Finally, following the Glorious Revolution, conditions for Covenanters improved markedly. By 1689 any thoughts of reviving the Stuart Town settlement had disappeared. For Huguenots, continued persecution in France and uncertainty in London encouraged refugees to join their coreligionists in Carolina, and many hundreds of French Protestants traveled to Carolina during the 1680s. The Huguenots were supported and heartened; the Scots, discouraged and starved.

CONCLUSION

In Carolina after 1679, a formal Scottish venture failed to create a strong settlement, while a less-directed Huguenot endeavor led to a lasting and significant local presence by members of that group. The Scots were undermined ultimately by their ambitiousness, their Britishness, and their leadership. Because the Scots' plan was so grand, it required essentially founding a new colony, but to attempt a sovereign settlement at Stuart Town without a multitude of people, an abundance of resources, or control over nearby peoples was to court disaster.

What brought ruin to the Scots had no impact on the Huguenots, however. The French immigrants faced different, surmountable difficulties and had more incentive to overcome them. Willing to sacrifice agency and endure hardship, Huguenots became part of Carolina and were buoyed by the colony's rising economic tide. Huguenot enclaves persisted, individual Huguenots thrived, and French Protestants played significant roles in building Carolina's economy and society. Yet these immigrants ultimately paid a steep price: the loss of a large part of their identity. The Huguenots later experienced what the Scots had feared—that is, discrimination and near oppression at English hands and the fading of a distinctive cultural presence. Within three generations, the Huguenot community was woven into the broader fabric of Carolina society, largely indistinguishable from English fibers. Even the "tribe" of refugees at Santee quickly learned to speak English and converted their French Protestant church to an Anglican one.¹³⁹ In other words, they stopped being Huguenots.

¹³⁸ Barclay and Graham, "Covenanters' Colony in Carolina," 25.

¹³⁹ This conclusion is evident in the history of the French Huguenot church at Santee. See Hirsch, *Huguenots of South Carolina*, 317.

The Scots who came to Carolina in the 1680s were interested in starting a new community because they believed that doing so would help to safeguard their old community—Scotland. They were unwilling to purchase land at the cost of their identity. The failure of their enterprise demonstrates the enormous difficulties that await any group of immigrants hoping to maintain its identity in a foreign land.

Had the resources poured into Darien, a settlement attempted a decade and a half later on the shores of present-day Panama, been expended at Stuart Town, the Scots might well have succeeded, and Atlantic history could have been wildly different. An autonomous Scottish settlement anchoring Carolina's southern frontier could easily have established a third sovereignty within the propriety and provided the outlet for the abundant Atlantic energy that later flowed from Scotland. As events unfolded, however, the Scots presence in North America was doomed to be limited to the efforts of individuals incorporated into British designs, and the ideals and goals that inspired Stuart Town resurfaced on the swampy shores of Darien.